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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of dissertation:  The role of an education in the behavioural sciences 
towards contributing to the safety culture of the maritime  
industry. 
 
Degree:  MSc 
Developing a safety culture is a prime aim of the maritime industry as spearheaded 
by the International Maritime Organization. For several reasons such as number of 
accidents and a poor public image, safety culture is seen as a way to move beyond 
current levels to optimum safety. However, the human factor poses a challenge to the 
achievement of a safety culture and the dissertation argues that this is more so due to 
the neglect of a holistic engagement with the behavioural sciences in devising 
solutions to the need for non-technical skills. 
 
Through literature review, case studies and interviews, the dissertation explores 
safety culture and the factors impacting its development. A number of factors which 
shape performance such as fatigue, lack of teamwork and poor situational awareness 
were identified as needing attention. The role of MET and the STCW in contributing 
to effective training of the seafarers to counter the negatives of the performance 
shaping factors was examined. It was found that both needed to be improved. The 
relevant aspects of the behavioural sciences were investigated to ascertain their 
contribution to creating awareness and understanding of the performance factors.  
 
It was concluded that in order to develop a safety culture there has to be a holistic 
approach to the human factor and that the behavioural sciences has a role to play. It 
is recommended that with further research, the STCW considers making mandatory, 
the training in the relevant aspects of the behavioural sciences that are relevant to the 
development of the non-technical skills in the maritime industry. 
 
KEYWORDS: Safety culture, behavioural sciences, human factor, maritime 
industry, maritime education and training, STCW convention.  
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A little Learning is a dang'rous Thing; 
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian Spring: 
There shallow Draughts intoxicate the Brain, 
And drinking largely sobers us again. 
Fir'd at first Sight with what the Muse imparts, 
In fearless Youth we tempt the Heights of Arts, 
While from the bounded Level of our Mind, 
Short Views we take, nor see the lengths behind, 
But more advanc'd, behold with strange Surprize 
New, distant Scenes of endless Science rise! 
So pleas'd at first, the towring Alps we try, 
Mount o'er the Vales, and seem to tread the Sky; 
Th' Eternal Snows appear already past, 
And the first Clouds and Mountains seem the last: 
But those attain'd, we tremble to survey 
The growing Labours of the lengthen'd Way, 
Th' increasing Prospect tires our wandering Eyes, 
Hills peep o'er Hills, and Alps on Alps arise! 
Excerpt from: “An Essay on Criticism” by Alexander Pope 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ENGAGING THE SCIENCE OF MAN 
 
 
I have one gnawing concern which embraces the whole question as to why 
intelligent, well trained, highly-skilled and experienced professional seafarers 
make critical mistakes despite the advances in technology which have been 
designed to make them more efficient and, by inference safer in the way they 
operate. It is extremely important that we should get to the root of this 
question so that we can introduce corrective measures. [author’s emphasis] 
(O’Neil, 2001). 
 
At the turn of the 21st century when reflections are taking place as to the past and 
paths for the future, the maritime industry found itself at a cross roads of safety 
measures that were not bearing the expected fruits.  The concern articulates a 
burgeoning realization that something more was needed in the industry to stem the 
number of accidents which were inimical to the International Maritime 
Organization’s (IMO) goal of safer ships and cleaner oceans. The more that was 
needed turned the spotlight onto the human factor and that something has been 
translated into the establishment of a safety culture. This concern remains relevant 
as the industry seeks to understand and devise solutions to the role of the human 
factor in accidents (Barnett, 2005; Pekcan, et. al., 2005; IMO 2006a, 2007a, 2008). It 
is the subject of this dissertation that the behavioural sciences can assist in getting to 
the root of the question by offering insights into the human condition and suggesting 
areas for education and training. 
 
This chapter introduces the subject of this dissertation by presenting an overview of 
the issues to be explored such as the human factor challenges as regards the 
establishment of a safety culture; behavioural factors that shape performance; a 
review of the maritime education and training regulatory regime and possible areas 
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within the behavioural sciences which may be incorporated to develop personal skills 
and abilities to contribute to safety culture as a whole.  
 
The purpose of the opening question was to focus on the need to foreground the 
seafarers. Crucial aspects of their lives are not fully addressed – “certainly fatigue, 
boredom, health …family problems, pressure to meet schedules, shipboard living 
conditions…can all play a part” (O’Neil, 2001) in the seafarer contributing to 
accidents. Indeed fatigue, the most studied of those factors, has been implicated in 
many accidents (UK P & I Club, 1996; MAIB, 2004; Hetherington et. al., 2006; 
Lützhöft, et. al., 2008). However, fatigue is addressed mainly in physiological terms 
and the psychological dimensions are neglected (Smith 2007). These human factor 
variables are the “softer” non-technical skills, the nature of which needs a multi-
disciplinary approach to solutions that include the behavioural sciences, which are 
currently peripheral in the maritime education and training regulatory regime and 
applied in an ad hoc way in the industry as a whole. 
 
1.1 SAFETY CULTURE IN THE MARITIME INDUSTRY 
Shipping faces negative perceptions as regards its safety and pollution record 
(Clayton, 2005; Kristiansen, 2005; Sohmen, 2005;). Although it is said that generally 
the total number of accidents are declining (Baker & McCafferty, 2005; Barnett, 
2005; Owsley, 2005), a recent article in the ISM Code magazine (Reportism, 2008) 
laments the many collisions despite the existence of electronic aids to navigation, 
rules, and safety management procedures. Solutions to the problems of safety had 
focused primarily on the technological (Schager, 1998; Psaraftis, 2002; Eriksson & 
Mejia, 2003), a fact admitted by former secretary general of the IMO (O’Neil, 2002). 
The spotlight has now turned on the people leading to increased work in the industry 
(Eriksson & Mejia, 2003; Arthur D. Little Ltd. 2004; MAIB, 2004; Barnett, 2005), 
and the IMO where Members made submissions regarding understanding the human 
factor (IMO, 2003a; IMO, 2003b; IMO 2003c). 
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The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978 and the International Management Code 
for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code), are the two instruments considered to address the human 
factor aspect of a safety culture (O’Neil 2001, 2002; Veiga, 2002; IMO, 2003a; 
Winbow, 2003; Bhattacharya, 2007; Fuazudeen, 2008). The STCW addresses the 
actors at the sharp end, the seafarers, while the ISM Code addresses the actors at the 
blunt end, management in the shipping companies. The success of these two 
instruments is in question (Pekcan, et. al. 2005; Bhattacharya, 2007; Fuazudeen, 
2008) due to lack of global implementation (Veiga, 2002), and a lack of provisions 
for relevant aspects of the human factor (Pekcan, et. al., 2005; Barnett, et. al. 2006).  
 
The STCW Convention focuses primarily on the technical competence (Gauw, 1994) 
and provisions regarding human and social competence are limited (Pekcan, et. al., 
2005; Barnett, et. al. 2006).  There are mixed perceptions regarding the ISM Code as, 
while it is viewed positively in some quarters, it is believed that it is most helpful to 
those at the middle of the safety continuum rather than those at the poles (Arthur D. 
Little Ltd., 2004).   
 
Establishing a safety culture involves deliberate and sustained orchestration (Reason, 
1997; Cooper, 2000; Hudson, 2001; Sudhakar, 2005), the cultivation of the correct 
mindset and behaviours (Veiga, 2002; IMO, 2003a; Manuel, 2005; Bhattacharya, 
2007) and these two safety culture instruments do make substantial provisions in this 
regard. As has been confirmed, technological advancement does not automatically 
make operators more efficient, responsible or inculcate any of the behavioural 
imperatives necessary to ensure safe operations (Schager, 1998; O’Neil, 2001; 
Broadbent 2006; Reportism, 2008). Likewise, focus on organizational policies and 
procedures without equal focus on the people will not bear much fruit. The 
behavioural and attitudinal imperatives are developed through education and training 
with the appropriate content (Asyali, et. al., 2003; Barnett, 2005; Barnett, et. al., 
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2006) and the industry has to be willing to fully engage all aspects of the human 
factor which cannot be accomplished without an engagement with the behavioural 
sciences – “The human factor, how people function, belongs to the domain of 
psychology.” (Schager, 1998, p.63). 
 
1.2 HUMAN FACTOR CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME ACCIDENTS 
Although only one of the sources that contribute to accidents (the others being 
technical and organizational), the human factor is seen as the main source in shipping 
(UK P & I Club, 1996; IMO, 2001; Baker & McCafferty, 2005; Barnett, 2005; 
Owsley, 2005; Hetherington, et. al., 2006).  Yet the IMO’s human element strategy 
(IMO, 2006a) does not include any provision for education and training, neither 
direct reference to welfare or working conditions. It may be extrapolated that areas of 
focus in the strategy such as a safety culture, safety management systems, 
incorporating ergonomic approaches and more inclusion of human element expertise 
in IMO’s deliberations, may eventually lead to a full engagement with the more 
complex “human condition,” but as with the experience of the STCW Convention, 
what is not explicitly stated is left to wide ranging interpretations (IMO, 1996; 
Fuazudeen, 2008). Other areas of neglect which influence safety are welfare and 
rights of seafarers. Job satisfaction and positive perceptions of rights may be viewed 
as defences against accidents. However, seafarers’ rights have become a contentious 
issue in the industry (Gold, 2005; Mukherjee, & Mustafar, 2005; ITF, 2006; Donner, 
2008; Zhang, 2008; Mukherjee, n.d.).  
 
1.3 MARITIME EDUCATION AND TRAINING  
Maritime education and training (MET) is seen as an important defence in accidents 
if training is adequate and relevant (Pekcan, et. al., 2005; Barnett, et. al. 2006). The 
STCW convention is the standard bearer for education and training and therefore has 
a critical role to play in the quest for a safety culture. It is instructive that an article in 
Lloyd’s Ship Manager in 1992, (Seafarers’ training needs…1992), called for a focus 
on basic skills and human factors. The discussion introduced the notion of the 
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“seafarer of the future” where it noted that education and training had to be 
conscious of the technical as well as the social-psychological dimensions, stressing 
the importance of understanding human behaviour. The article also noted that 
seafarers were “socially poor” and modern shipboard management required a broader 
set of skills. Yet, years later the discussion of providing a more holistic education 
remains on the table (Schröder, et. al., 2003; Ho, 2004; Manuel, 2005; Solanki, 2007). 
This is the role of MET to respond to the training needs of the industry. A more 
holistic approach to education would contribute to empowering the seafarer, making 
him more prepared to take on the demands of contemporary shipping as well as 
preparing him for roles in the shore-based maritime sector (Schröder, et. al., 2003; 
Solanki, 2007). Education in the behavioural sciences also promises to impart 
survival skills as regards welfare and health issues. It is believed that this kind of 
empowerment could also benefit the industry in terms of recruitment and retention of 
seafarers (Solanki, 2007). As such, a long term human resource strategy for the 
industry is seen as the prudent course of action (Solanki, 2007; Graveson, 2008). 
 
1.4 THE BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES  
The maritime industry has been engaging the behavioural sciences evidenced by the 
proliferation of such concepts as leadership, power distance, fatigue, teamwork, 
communication, attitudes, complacency and destructive obedience, to name a few 
(Schager, 1998; MARCOM, 1999; MAIB, 2004; Kristiansen, 2005; Manuel, 2005; 
Sohmen, 2005; Horck, 2006, 2008a; Kahveci, 2007).  The term behavioural sciences, 
as used in this dissertation, will be limited to psychology and social psychology as 
the concepts of interest stem mainly from these disciplines. Social psychology is seen 
as a branch of psychology which stresses the social nature of man as distinguishable 
from the individual focus of psychology (Hayes, 1993). The foregone discussion has 
revealed human factors as being of importance to the maritime industry’s quest for a 
safety culture, noting the need for an engagement with the behavioural sciences as 
the area concerned with people. 
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The behavioural sciences have a rich tradition of research and theories that my assist 
in explanations and applications of strategies to the human factor challenge to safety 
culture. For example, theories and practical applications in perception (Zebrowitz, 
1990) that may assist in the area of situational awareness; group dynamics (Brown, 
2000) for areas such as team work, leadership and multi-cultural interactions on 
board.  Figure 1-1 is an illustration of the relationship between the behavioural 
sciences and areas of a seafarer’s life. This is not comprehensive but gives an 
example of where the behavioural sciences may be useful. 
 
 
 
 
Behavioural 
Sciences 
Operational Level  
- situational awareness 
- team work 
- fatigue 
- values/attitudes 
Professional Level  
- team work 
- fatigue 
- situational awareness 
- social competence 
- career development 
- values/attitudes 
Personal Level  
- stress 
- depression 
- values/attitudes 
- social competence 
- career development 
Figure 1-1: Relationship of the behavioural sciences to the three important areas of a seafarer’s life. 
Source: Author 
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1.5 SUMMARY/STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The discussion may be summarized as follows: 
• There are problems in the maritime industry as regards safety. 
• The human factor plays a substantial role in accidents. 
• Many aspects of the human factor are behavioural, that is, belonging to the 
psychological and/or social-psychological realm. 
• The IMO has opened the topic for debate and finding solutions, yet the 
regulatory regime is lacking in addressing it holistically.  
• Maritime education and training has a role to play in transferring skills and 
knowledge that resides within the behavioural sciences so as to enhance the 
human factor contribution to a safety culture. 
 
These are the ideas for exploration in the reminder of the dissertation. The 
dissertation does not discount the value of the technical approach of the STCW, 
neither the work of the IMO in safety.  The wish is to point to other areas that may be 
of benefit to the industry if such strengths are harnessed. The human factor is 
complex and the way to access to any degree such complexities towards 
understanding and possible solutions is to engage the science of man.  It is against 
this background that this dissertation explores what education in the behavioural 
sciences can contribute to meeting the challenges towards achieving a safety culture. 
 
1.6  OBJECTIVE 
The objective of the dissertation is to identify and explore the human factor 
challenges in developing a safety culture and the potential benefits of an education in 
the behavioural sciences towards achieving the same. 
 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
The study is exploratory. As such a qualitative approach was taken using maritime 
casualty cases and the literature as the main sources of information. A limited 
number of interviews and discussions were held with persons from the seafaring 
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profession and MET institutions as well as one professional body. Special focus was 
given to the STCW Convention as the regulatory training regime and therefore 
extensive use was made of IMO papers.   
 
Arising from background reading, the following research questions were developed: 
 1. What are the human factor challenges to arriving at a safety culture? 
 2. What provisions are there in the STCW to address these challenges? 
 3. What is the role of MET in meeting these challenges? 
 4. What can education in the behavioural sciences contribute towards  
meeting these challenges? 
 
1.7.1 Cases 
Accident analyses provide valuable sources of information on human factor 
contribution to casualties. As such it was thought that the use of cases would benefit 
the research process by substantiating the human factor challenges to safety culture. 
Five cases were selected for detailed exploration and five as supporting evidence. 
This however did not preclude the mention of other cases where relevant. The 
sources of cases were Horck (2006), Sampson (2003) and accident reports of the 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) and the internet. Original cases were 
read and selected on the basis of the investigators’ analysis of the human factors. 
Therefore, accidents reporting fatigue, situational awareness, and teamwork were 
selected. These are the factors which shape performance and will be the focus in the 
dissertation. Human factor issues were grouped as per Table 1-1. 
 
Table 1-1: Performance shaping factors identified in maritime accidents 
PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS 
Situational Awareness 
• perception 
• complacency 
• distraction 
• violations1 
 
Teamwork 
• leadership 
• communication 
• destructive obedience 
• power distance 
Fatigue 
• health 
• stress 
• welfare issues 
Source: Author – compiled from accident reports and the literature. 
                                                 
1 Violations are grouped here for convenience. 
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  1.7.2 Literature review 
The literature review served a two fold purpose; firstly, for generally guiding the 
research process, and secondly, as a source of data. As such the literature will be 
referred to throughout the dissertation. The literature was drawn from a number of 
sources: peer reviewed journals, books; conference proceedings; research reports; 
seminars; periodicals, class handouts and the internet.  Sources were selected for 
their relevance to the topic and currency of information. This however did not 
preclude the use of sources that were dated but the information was relevant. The aim 
was to acquire a wide range of information from a variety of sources to achieve as 
global a picture as possible on the issues in keeping with the exploratory approach. 
 
 1.7.3 Interviews 
This took the form of online discussions where questions were sent via email and 
responses returned and follow-up discussions, for clarification, took place where 
necessary via email. This was necessary as persons were either in another 
geographical location or indicated they preferred that method. One personal 
interview was done. A visit was made to one professional body, the Swedish Club to 
participate in a seminar in Maritime Resource Management (MRM). Discussions 
were held with the presenter and participants on the course who were from a popular 
cruise line.    
 
 1.7.4 Other Sources 
Use was made of observations and notes taken on field trips to MET institutions in 
Europe as part of the WMU’s curriculum for its students pursuing the MET 
specialization.  
 
1.8 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS/DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
The dissertation explores and utilizes a number of theories as dictated by the four 
main concepts under discussion: safety culture, human factor, MET and the 
behavioural sciences.  Each concept carries its own theoretical perspective(s) as 
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purported by practitioners and detractors alike. This section draws attention to the 
theories governing the concepts to be used as well as definitions of concepts to be 
introduced by the writer. 
 
1.8.1 Safety Culture  
Theories of safety culture surround its nature as an organizational approach to risk 
management. It rests on theories of culture and therefore has its foundation in 
anthropology (Cox and Flin, 1998; Cooper, 2000). Theories surround for example 
components: shared values, attitudes, commitment; management: such as top-down 
or bottom-up; its nature: whether it is something the organization is or something the 
organization has.  
 
An accompanying concept is safety climate which, by its existence has contributed to 
the development of safety culture theories. Climate is seen as being on the surface 
and reflects perceptions of safety at a moment in time whereas culture lies below the 
surface (Cooper, 2000). The debate is divided on disciplinary lines. From a 
management perspective culture is something the organization has (Cooper, 2000; 
Reason 1997), meaning it can be orchestrated and is malleable (Reason, 1997). The 
contending perspective from the social scientists and academics sees culture as 
something the organization is (Cooper, 2000; Reason 1997) as it emerges as a 
property from the values, attitudes, and ideologies of all the members of the 
organization (Reason, 1997). Approaches to the achievement of safety culture is 
influenced by the view one holds and Reason is inclined towards the has theory. 
Although it may be rationalized that what an organization has may and does lead to 
what it is; and what it is drives what it has, as Reason (1997) comes to acknowledge 
at the end of his discussion on safety culture.  
 
The dissertation operates on the premise of the mutual influences between the 
concepts but also takes the position that safety culture is something the organization 
is, in keeping with its anthropological influences. This position provides the basis for 
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later discussions on the maritime safety regime of rules and regulations as belonging 
to the realm of safety climate, what the organization has, which at best fosters a 
compliant culture. To achieve a safety culture, the dissertation argues, a holistic 
approach engaging the human factor as social-psychological beings has to be among 
the strategies, to create what the organization is. 
  
1.8.2 Behavioural sciences 
This is a general term used to refer to disciplines concerned with people and their 
place and behaviour in the social world, whether as individuals or as groups. 
Disciplines such as Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology and branches thereof fall 
in the realm of the behavioural sciences. For this dissertation the term behavioural 
sciences refers particularly to psychology, but also social psychology as a branch of 
psychology. Psychology is concerned with the individual while social psychology is 
concerned with social interactions (Hayes, 1993; Brown, 2000). Theories of salience 
to this work are cognitive theories such as perception and information processing 
explaining issues of situational awareness, and group theories for explanations of 
leadership, teamwork, and power etc. 
 
1.8.3 Human factor 
The concept human factor is largely an ergonomic term. The term human element is 
also used, both terms are taken to mean the same thing for the purposes of this 
dissertation. Using Hawkins’ (1993) definition, human factor is about people in their 
working and living environment. “It is about their relationship with machines and 
equipment, with procedures and with the environment about them. And it is about 
their relationship with other people.” (Hawkins’ 1993, p.20).  The area of concern for 
this dissertation is human factor highlighting the factors that shape performance as 
they are discussed in risk management analysis. The dissertation also takes some 
liberty and uses the term loosely in general reference to people and related issues. 
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 1.8.4 Other Concepts 
The dissertation has coined a number of concepts which are explained below: 
• Safety triad – this concept is used to refer to the interrelationship of the 
technological, the organizational and the individual factors in safety-critical 
systems. Chapter 2.  
• Psycho-socio-technical system – this concept refers to the elements of the 
safety triad. It is an extension of the socio-technical space to emphasize the 
place of the people in safety-critical systems. Chapter 2. 
• Idiosyncrasies – this word, meaning a behavioural attribute that is distinctive 
and peculiar to an individual,2 is used as a concept in the dissertation to refer 
to distinctly human behaviour and disposition such as those lying in the 
cognitive domain as peculiarities in perception or those mediated by culture 
such as power distance. 
 
1.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The chapter introduced the ideas surrounding the main concepts of safety culture, 
human factor, MET and behavioural sciences.  The basic premise is that safety 
culture is seen as a desirable pursuit for the maritime industry to promote safer 
operations, improve public image and protect the marine environment. However, 
there are human factor challenges that are not solved solely by regulations or 
technical means. To devise appropriate solutions, the human factor must be 
understood on its terms. The behavioural sciences, as the science of man, have been 
underutilized in the maritime industry. It is suggested that a holistic approach is 
needed which entail training and education, but the STCW Convention needs to 
strengthen its provisions for the non-technical skills.  
 
The remaining chapters develop on the ideas introduced in this chapter. Chapter 2 
looks at safety culture in detail highlighting the place and role of the human factor 
and emphasizing the need for the behavioural sciences.  Chapter 3 examines the 
                                                 
2 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary. 
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factors that shape human performance as the source of erroneous acts and the target 
of intervention strategies. Chapter 4 is divided into two parts. The first section looks 
at MET and its role in developing the non-technical competence. The second section 
is a review of the STCW Convention to ascertain its provisions to address the human 
factor. Chapter 5 introduces the behavioural sciences vis-à-vis the accident cases and 
discusses their potential for contributing to a safety culture. Chapter 6 is an overall 
discussion bringing the whole together. It presents the aviation industry’s CRM as an 
example of lessons to be learnt for the maritime industry. Chapter 7 concludes the 
arguments highlighting the contributions of the study and makes recommendations.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
SAFER SHIPPING DEMANDS A SAFETY CULTURE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The three legged stool – the most important leg is the one that is missing (Patraiko, 
2007).   
 
Figure 2-1: The three legged stool 
Source: Patraiko (2007) 
 
…while reflecting on the gains which have been made, a look to the future is 
also made to determine which areas offer the greatest opportunities for 
further advances….it has been recognized that there have been marked 
improvements in the casualty records… than was the case a decade ago. The 
records also show that there has been a concurrent decline in the amount of 
pollution entering the marine environment…These successes have been 
achieved mainly through improved standards and an enhanced regulatory 
regime… accompanied by the introduction of technologically advanced 
navigational systems. 
However, it has also been recognized that the one area to which most 
accidents have been attributed – namely the human factor – while not being 
totally neglected in the past, was in need of greater attention. (O’Neil, 2002, 
p.1). [Author’s emphasis] 
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The title for this chapter was adopted from the 2002 World Maritime Day message 
by former Secretary General of the IMO, William O’Neil where he unequivocally 
declared the need to focus on human behaviour as an intrinsic aspect of any quest 
towards a safety culture.  It is instructive to note that this focus refers to actors both 
at the sharp and blunt ends “… the importance and advantages of creating a genuine 
safety culture in the people involved in all components of the shipping industry.” 
(O’Neil, 2002, p.1). Leading players in the maritime industry have also 
acknowledged the importance of involving the people on ship, ashore and at the ship-
shore interface (Arthur D. Little Ltd., 2004). This is not to suggest that such an 
approach is entirely new, but the decade of the 2000s has seen much more focus on 
the people as indispensable to the safety goals of the maritime industry (Veiga, 2002). 
 
The focus of this chapter is safety culture and the place of people in defining and 
achieving a safety culture. On the one hand, safety culture is an organizational or 
industry approach to engender safety in the very being of the organization or the 
industry so that nothing is done without thinking safety (INSAG3, 1991; Veiga, 
2002).  On the other hand, humans pose a challenge to this approach if they are not 
factored in all aspects; the human factor is the centre (Mathiesen, 1994; Arslan, & Er, 
2006). People can be the champions of a safety culture or as equally, its adversary. 
So whereas the organization is the embodiment of safety culture, the people are the 
drivers, both as individuals and as groups and therefore conscious and deliberate 
actions should be taken to “engineer”4 their place in the overall system.  
 
There are many issues being discussed regarding safety culture. Chief among them 
are a lack of a common definition, contentions between safety culture and climate 
and the lack of consensus on the “cause, the content and consequences of safety 
culture” (Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; Hale; 2000; Wiegmann, et. al., 2002; 
Zhang, et. al. 2002; Manuel, 2007). These discussions will be mentioned so far as 
                                                 
3 International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group 
4 As used by Reason (1997) to suggest focused actions at developing. 
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they have implications for the human factor focus of this dissertation and are 
explored on the basis of: What is safety culture? Why the need for a safety culture? 
How is a safety culture achieved? (looking at a number of models); and whether the 
human factor is a challenge to safety culture. A brief discussion on the relationship of 
safety culture with security is presented as the two impacts each other and is a 
contentious issue within the maritime industry. 
 
2.2 WHAT IS SAFETY CULTURE? 
The term safety culture is said to have been introduced in the “Summary report on 
the post-accident review meeting on the Chernobyl accident” (INSAG, 1991). The 
term was further developed in a follow-up publication “Basic safety principles for 
nuclear power plant” (INSAG, 1991) bringing the term into “authoritative” usage 
(Reason, 1997; Cox & Flin, 1998). The dangers to life, property and the environment 
posed by high risk industries, such as shipping, were contrary to the demands of a 
modern society that had evolved beyond basic needs. Corporate society had to 
develop a social conscience and therefore the need to engender a safety culture in 
their organizations emerged as the sine qua non of responsible corporate operations. 
 
The literature has revealed that safety culture is a complex multi-dimensional, multi-
disciplinary concept which, for high risk industries, involves the dimensions of the 
psycho-socio-technical. Figure 2-2 is borrowed from Hollnagel (1998), to 
demonstrate the relationship among the three components of the system which this 
dissertation refers to as the safety triad. The term socio-technical has its foundation 
in ergonomics and is used in the literature, particularly in discussing the environment 
as created by the organizational and the technical aspects of the system. The addition 
of the psychological dimension, seeks to make obvious the need to focus on the 
people as feeling, sensing beings who should be understood within their domain as 
well as within an overall socio-technical system.  
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 Figure 2-2:  The relationship among the three components of the psycho-socio-technical space. 
Source: Hollnagel ,1998. 
In the safety triad, man represents the people as individuals or groups within the 
system both at the blunt and sharp ends. The organization provides the social 
environment in terms of policies, rules and procedures, creating the socio-cultural 
milieu within which people meet each other and the technology. The technology 
provides the machinery (hardware and software) where man interfaces as an operator, 
or a monitor, depending on the nature of the technology. Actions at the sharp end are 
influenced by all actors within the system although they have significant implications 
for those in the immediate environment as the “inheritors” (Reason, 1997) of the 
actions of the others, but also as creators of their own actions.  These three 
dimensions form the safety triad that has to operate in harmony if the quest for a 
safety culture is to become a reality.  
 
 2.2.1  Definition 
Definitions of safety culture encompass its organizational genesis as well as the place 
of people in its realization. As such, its definitions have impacted methodologies to 
measure, assess and ultimately manage safety culture (Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 
2000; Hale, 2000; Zhang, et. al. 2002; Human Engineering, 2005). However, one of 
the criticisms is the lack of a common definition (Cooper, 2000; Hale, 2000; 
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Wiegmann, et. al., 2002; Zhang, et. al. 2002). What may be arguably the first attempt 
at a definition of safety culture was by INSAG (1991, p.1) as “…that assembly of 
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, 
as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted 
by their significance.” As explained by INSAG, the aim was to reflect the attitudinal 
and structural composition of safety culture relating to the individual and the 
organizational respectively, and that the appropriate perceptions and actions were 
comparable with the importance of the concept (INSAG, 1991).  
 
Since then, many other definitions have emerged as the concept gained currency 
which provide evidence that safety culture is not easily articulated (Cooper, 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Hale, 2000; Human Engineering, 2005; Bhattacharya, 2007; 
Manuel, 2005, 2007).  Turner’s definition, as quoted by Cooper (2000) attempts to 
account for the organizational, the technical and the human factors – “the set of 
beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical practices that are concerned 
with minimising the exposure of employees, managers, customers and members of 
the public to conditions considered dangerous or injurious.”   
 
The definition that is arguably most widely used (HSL, 2002), and seemed to have 
gained favour in the maritime industry, as echoed by the ISM Code, is the UK’s 
Health and Safety Commission’s definition:   
The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to, and style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and 
safety programmes. Organizations with a positive safety culture are 
characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared 
perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of 
preventive measures.” (As quoted in Reason, 1997, p. 194).  
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This definition seeks to capture the human aspects both as individuals and groups 
which are necessary to culminate in a desirable outcome of safety consciousness for 
the organization, through commitment.  
 
Despite the criticism of lack of a common definition, there are common elements that 
have been identified which give direction to the concept as a whole. In their review 
of the safety culture literature Zhang et. al. (2002, pp.2-3) identified a number of 
common elements as to what constitutes safety culture: 
• Safety culture is a concept defined at group level or higher, which refers to 
the shared values among all the group or organization members. 
• Safety culture is concerned with formal safety issues in an organization, and 
closely related to, but not restricted to, the management and supervisory 
systems. 
• Safety culture emphasizes the contribution from everyone at every level of an 
organization. 
• The safety culture of an organization has an impact on its members’ 
behaviour at work. 
• Safety culture is usually reflected in the contingency between reward system 
and safety performance. 
• Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and 
learn from errors, incidents, and accidents. 
• Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable and resistant to change.  
 
These points of convergence suggest that there is some agreement as to what the 
contents of safety culture are. Perhaps the approach is to focus on the elements of 
salience as was done by the Human Engineering (2005) when faced with the task of 
developing as safety culture tool kit following two rail accidents.      
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  2.2.2  Safety Culture and Safety Climate 
A brief exploration of safety culture versus safety climate is necessary as this is 
another area of contention associated with definition, measurement and management. 
The distinction between the two concepts has been an ongoing debate (Cox & Flin, 
1998; Guldenmund, 2000; HSL, 2002; Wiegmann, et. al., 2002; Zhang, et. al., 2002: 
Ek, 2006; Manuel, 2007). Safety culture and climate were at times used 
interchangeably (Cox & Flin, 1998); the general preference however is to separate 
both concepts.  The debate between the concepts may have arisen because, as Cox 
and Flin (1998) explained, both terms developed in parallel but have distinct 
etymologies arising from separate theoretical roots.  They noted that earlier ideas of 
climate had a social psychological background and was used later on for the 
measurable characteristics of organization, therefore the use of quantitative 
measurement tools such as questionnaires.  Safety climate is seen as a “snapshot” 
(Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Wiegmann, et. al., 2002; Sudhakar, 2005) reflecting the 
perceptions of the employees in an organization at a particular point in time 
(Guldenmund, 2000; HSL, 2002; Zhang, et. al. 2002). Figure 2-3 is the iceberg 
metaphor used to demonstrate the distinction between the concepts (Manuel, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 2-3: The iceberg metaphor of safety culture and safety climate 
Source: Safety Culture Bulletin 2002 as quoted in Manuel, 2007  
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Culture has its roots in anthropology (Cox & Flin, 1998; Ek, 2006). The emphasis on 
culture initially “…was on uncovering deeper organizational values, underlying 
assumptions and symbolism associated with artefacts5, rituals, norms and rites of 
passage” (Cox & Flin, 1998 p. 191).  This perspective has informed subsequent 
approaches to safety culture as seen in the definitions discussed. Culture is pervasive 
(Zhang, et. al. 2002) lying at a deeper level than climate, “below the iceberg” 
(Manuel, 2007); its measures are therefore qualitative (Cox & Flin, 1998).  
 
The dissertation takes the position of Mearns, et al. (1998) who believe that 
theoretical distinctions should be drawn and empirical investigations should be clear 
on which concept is being measured. Such distinction is helpful because, whereas 
climate may be indicative of the underlying conditions and hence culture (Wiegmann, 
2002), people’s “real” attitudes and perceptions are not easily captured through 
“snapshot” quantitative methods, for a number of reasons – fear, job security etc. 
Climate indicators need validation to be interpreted in a cultural framework (Glendon 
& Stanton, 2000).  
 
This writer sees the usefulness of climate as a desirable stage in the progression 
towards a safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000). Mathiesen (1994) identified three 
types of culture in the maritime industry: evasive, compliant and safety culture, to 
which Sudhaker (2005) has added uninformed culture. These are explained in 
Section 2.5.1.4 (Figure 2-8). Climate measures may be valuable for diagnosing an 
organization’s state of compliance and therefore becomes a useful audit tool.  Having 
a climate may be the final step in a “have to” (compliant) culture and steps may be 
taken to move to a “want to” (safety) culture. Climate may be achieved through rules, 
regulations and compliance with safety systems which is helpful towards a safety 
culture. This distinction is necessary to reflect the complexity of the main element, 
the people, who may present a desirable picture for a “snapshot” yet disguising the 
picture below the surface - safety culture is “a way of life” (Veiga, 2002). 
                                                 
5 Language, technology, products etc. (Ek, 2006) 
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2.3 WHY A SAFETY CULTURE FOR THE MARITIME INDUSTRY? 
The fervent engagement with safety culture in the literature, across high risk 
industries such as aviation, nuclear and transportation, compels one to coin the 
maxim safety is a virtue. Safety culture emerged as an organizational approach to 
understanding and managing health and safety issues at work (Cox & Flin, 1998; 
Cooper, 2000; Batteau, 2001; Zhang, et. al., 2002; Ek, 2005; Wiegmann, et.al. 2007).  
For the maritime industry, human factor is said to be the major contributor to 
accidents. A review of major6 accident databases by Baker and McCafferty (2005, 
p.70) reveal that management practices, failures of situation awareness and risk 
taking/risk tolerance account for 25% of accidents. Also 80 to 85% of accidents were 
either directly initiated by human error or were associated with human error. It is 
believed that a safety culture will contribute towards a reduction in such figures. 
Although cautioned by Cox and Flin (1998) that expectations of safety culture may 
be overinflated, it is nonetheless a desirable goal for the maritime industry as there is 
no denying the need to protect life, property and the environment which is the 
promise of a safety culture if it is realized.   
 
Safety remains one of the fundamental objectives of the IMO, but an “over-riding” 
challenge is “how [to] improve global maritime safety still further?” (Mitropoulos, 
2004). The IMO’s efforts at promoting a safety culture are evidenced by the 
development of the ISM Code and the STCW convention (Veiga, 2002; Manuel, 
2005; Bhattacharya, 2007; Fuazudeen, 2008), but good intentions do not make 
sensational headlines. Shipping has a poor image which makes a safety culture even 
more urgent. Figure 2-4 are a few headlines which demonstrate the public’s attitude 
towards shipping.  Additionally, names such as the Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz, 
Exxon Valdez and the Prestige have gone down in infamy for causing extensive 
environmental damages.  Likewise, when the vessels’ management contravene the 
                                                 
6 United States Coast Guard, Marine Accident Investigation Board (UK), Transport Safety Board 
(Canada), Australian Transportation Safety Board, The Nautical Institute’s Marine Accident 
Reporting Scheme (MARS), The Det Norske Veritas Worldwide Offshore Accident Database 
(WOAD) 
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rules and regulations, as in the case of the Herald of Free Enterprise, and the Erika, 
or the Exxon Valdez where the master was said to be under the influence of alcohol, 
the public demand for “heads” increases.  
Prestige captain on 
$3m bail 
 
MADRID, Spain (CNN) -- 
The Greek captain of the 
sunken oil tanker Prestige 
left a Spanish jail after nearly 
three months following the 
posting of a $3 million bond. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/W
ORLD/europe/02/07/prestige.c
aptain/index.html
 
Chirac hits at 
'gangsters of sea' 
PARIS, France (CNN) -- 
President Jacques Chirac 
has blamed the "gangsters of 
the sea" for the millions of oil 
pellets that are beginning to 
float onto France's beaches. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/W
ORLD/europe/01/03/prestige.c
hirac/index.html
Cancer fears over oil 
spill 
 
Volunteers who helped 
clean oil spilt by the 
tanker, Erika, which broke 
up off north-west France in 
December, have been told 
they could be at risk from 
cancer. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/eu
rope/677180.stm
 
Human error led to the sinking of the ”Bow Mariner”  
 
The final report by the US Coast Guard on the explosion and sinking of the 1982-built, 
chemical/product tanker ”Bow Mariner” on February 28 last year in the Atlantic, is grim 
reading and bears witness of human error and inadequate operational management. 
http://www.shipgaz.com/magazine/issues/2006/02/0206_article.php
Figure 2-4:  headlines to news items.   
Source: various sources online as per websites. 
 
In addition to the corporate need, many other issues of health and safety, welfare and 
rights of the seafarers also hinge on the development of a safety culture. According 
to Broadbent (2006, p.1), “optimal safety cultures typically provide the necessary 
support for employees to strive beyond minimal efforts.” It is said that morale in the 
industry is low and seafarers’ welfare, health and safety are neglected (Stevenson, 
2002; Nielsen & Panayides, 2005; ITF, 2006; Kahveci, 2007). A safety culture 
therefore offers many promises of safer, cleaner oceans, protection of the 
environment and a more people-caring industry.  
 
2.3.1 Safety in Shipping 
Of all the high risk industries, the maritime industry has had the longest history of 
establishing a safety regime. This can be traced to ancient laws governing various 
aspects such as construction, use of ships and cargo carriage.  These laws were 
mainly to protect property and commercial interests, rather than for safety as a 
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virtue7. Other more substantial laws were developed overtime throughout antiquity 
and into modern society (Zhang, 2008)8. 
 
For modern society, the establishment of a safety regime through rules and 
regulations had been tumultuous arising from excessive loss of lives in the British 
merchant navy and resistance to the establishment of laws to govern safe shipping 
(Veiga, 2002; Jones, 2006).  Although these were national laws, they ultimately had 
influence of international proportions due to Britain’s position and impact in 
maritime history and as a colonial power where it bequeathed its laws to its colonies. 
Table 2-1 provides a listing of international efforts at regulating maritime safety. The 
approach to safety has been reactionary to major accidents, such as the Titanic, 
Herald of Free Enterprise, Estonia etc., with strong technical components and 
neglect of the non-technical skills. 
 
Table 2-1: Milestones in maritime safety 
 
Year Initiative or regulation 
 
1914 • Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS): Ship design and lifesaving equipment 
 
1929 • First international conference to consider hull subdivision regulations 
 
1948 • The International Maritime (Consultative) Organization (IMO) is set up as 
a United Nations agency 
 
1966 • Load Line Convention: Maximum loading and hull strength 
• Rules of the road 
• The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS): 
Harmonization of classification rules and regulations   
1969 • Tonnage Convention 
1972 • International Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREG) 
1973 • Marine Pollution Convention (MARPOL 73) 
1974 • IMO resolution on probabilistic analysis of hull subdivision 
1978 • International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and         
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 78) 
1979 • International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) 
1988 • The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) 
Source: Kristiansen, 2005 p. 10 
                                                 
7 See for example, Code of Hammurabi, paragraphs 234-240 
8 For example The Rhodian Sea Code, 7th or 8th Century; The Rôles of Oléron, 13th Century;  The Judgements of 
the Damme, 13th Century; The Rules of Wisby, 13th Century; The Black Book of the Admiralty, 14th Century; 
The Ordonnance de la Marine, 1681; and the British Merchant Shipping Act, 1850. 
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  2.3.1.1  Can safety culture be regulated? 
“…Although the behaviour of individuals may be influenced by a set of rules, it is 
their attitude to the rules that really determines the culture. Do they comply because 
they want to, or because they have to?” (O’Neil, 2002 p.1).             
 
The safety regime of the maritime industry rests on international conventions and 
regulations (Psaraftis, 2002; Veiga, 2002).  It is the position of this dissertation that 
the regulatory regime (eg. ISM and STCW) and the enforcement regime through port 
state control (PSC) facilitate compliance at best, but more is needed to develop a 
safety culture (Mathiesen, 1994; Broadbent, 2006; Bhattacharya, 2007).  This is not 
an indictment on the regulatory regime, its success lies in effective implementation in 
the right environment that would allow the founding principles to flourish.9 This 
environment has to be “engineered” as Reason (1997) puts it. For example, in the 
United States it was discovered that regulations do not instil desirable attitudes for 
voluntary compliance as regards road traffic (Foss, 2007). Compliance was achieved 
with sustained and deliberate actions, including enforcement. The international 
nature of shipping necessitates voluntary compliance, and this is more challenging 
with substandard shipping. It is recognized in the ISM Code that “In matters of safety 
and pollution prevention it is the commitment, competence, attitudes and motivation 
of individuals at all levels that determines the end result.” (IMO, 2002, p.5). 
Internalized values, manifesting themselves through appropriate attitudes and 
behaviours are the hallmark of a safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000; Cooper, 2000).   
Safety culture for Manuel (2005) is associated with ethics. On their own, rules and 
regulations do not make people ethical, except they are mediated by affect (Nichols, 
2002), which requires deliberate actions.   
 
The existence of sub-standard shipping (Mathiesen, 1994; Lang, 2001; Arthur D. 
Little Ltd., 2004; ITF, 2006) is evidence that not all players in the industry are ethical 
                                                 
9 Bhattacharya (2007) in his study on the influence of the ISM Code on safety culture, demonstrates 
that its principles are defeated by autocratic environments that engender fear. 
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hence there is a role for the regulators to fill the gap where there is not the 
organizational consciousness or will to develop a safety culture. To circumvent the 
organizational deficiencies, the dissertation sees a possible solution in targeting the 
education of the seafarers to instil the desirable values and attitudes that will be 
tapped regardless of employer (Manuel, 2005).  Regulations and enforcement 
strategies are features of a compliant culture where the necessary actions are taken to 
avoid the consequences (Mathiesen, 1994; Manuel, 2005; Foss, 2007). A safety 
culture goes beyond to an advanced stage (Bhattacharya, 2007) of thinking and doing 
safety. Safety systems may be robust but they are insufficient if they are merely 
applied mechanically (Hudson, 2001; INSAG, 1991), or if they are founded on 
wrong principles (Foss, 2007). Safety systems “… need an effective safety culture to 
flourish” (Hudson, 2001, p.3). 
 
2.4 HUMAN FACTOR: A CHALLENGE TO SAFETY CULTURE? 
Accidents are usually the starting point to question an organization’s safety culture or 
lack thereof (eg. Chernobyl, Herald of Free Enterprise) (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; 
Ek, 2006). It has been said throughout the literature that the human factor contributes 
to a large percentage of accidents. Although it is realized that such figures lie in the 
complex interrelationship of technological, organizational, individual and group 
factors (Perrow, 1999; Ek, 2006), the operators at the sharp end are usually the focus 
of an accident for the maritime industry. 
 
In looking at causal factors, Kristiansen (2005) identified from an analysis of 419 
groundings, that core causal factors involve “soft” problems of work conditions, 
human performance and neglect. Neglect is sub-divided into “failure in watch 
performance” and “individual human conditions.” Others have identified such causes 
as communication, language and cultural diversity (MARCOM, 1991; Hetherington, 
et. al., 2006; Horck, 2006), teamwork, stress and health issues (Stevenson, 2002; 
Hetherington, et. al., 2006). These factors may be aligned with Kristiansen’s “human 
conditions.”  The most dominant contributory factor has been identified as lack of 
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situation awareness and fatigue (MAIB, 2004; Baker & McCafferty, 2005; Barnett, 
2005; Hetherington, et. al., 2006; Owsley, 2005). Barnett (2005) and UK P & I Club 
(1996) have also found violations as another common factor in accidents, possibly 
stemming from attitudes to risk (and some amount of male machismo - ego)10
 
As a contributory factor to accident, Kristiansen’s (2005) “human conditions” could 
also been seen in terms of neglect of seafarers’ welfare that may affect job 
satisfaction which is important in developing a safety culture. According to the UK’s 
submission to the IMO (2003a), job satisfaction is one of the key indicators of a 
safety culture, a lack of which can thwart any safety strategy as management is 
viewed with mistrust and suspicion.  Poor welfare may also lead to depression and 
isolation (Kahveci, 2007; Thomas, 2003) affecting mental health and performance. 
The UK P & I Club (1996) acknowledges the role of “states of mind” in accidents.  
 
Addressing the root of factors that shape performance, which many see as lying in 
the organization (Reason, 1997; Dekker, 2006), is not disputed, but the human 
condition is complex and its influence should not be denied (Foss, 2007). As 
Broadbent (2006, p.1) sees it “safety [culture] requires people to adopt a set of habits 
and ways of thinking that are often difficult and unnatural (eg. reporting one’s own 
mistakes…),” “it is human nature to cover things up. There is a fear of criticism and 
reprisal from the company” (Arthur D. Little Ltd. 2004, p.63). Solutions to such 
primal responses lie in education of the individual to impact the relevant attitudes 
and behaviour formation. 
 
Further, the maritime industry has unique challenges that necessitate an engagement 
with the sharp end, at the same time it attempts solutions directed at the organization.  
These challenges include sub-standard shipping, an open register regime which 
                                                 
10 In investigating the Bow Mariner casualty, the investigator had an interview with the Chief Officer 
of the sister ship, the Bow Transporter, regarding operational procedures as outlined in manuals the 
investigator noted “…the Chief Officer of the Bow Transporter scoffed at suggestions that the Cargo 
and Ballast Operations Manual was governing stating that his ’30 years of chemical tanker 
experience’ was all he needed to perform his job. 
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spreads the company’s responsibilities across organizations and countries; it is 
sometimes difficult to identify a company, more so to police its operations; 
management is outsourced, seafarers are on relatively short term contracts and 
therefore time to instil company’s values and attitudes, if these exist, is not sufficient. 
Challenges such as these make the development of a safety culture difficult as it must 
be admitted that not all owners are interested. In brief, those at the sharp end are left 
to learn by trial and error many aspects of the human-human interface. For example 
the Crimson Mars grounding where it was reported that the pilot had a “one-on-one” 
communication with the helmsman to put him at ease so he could offer challenge if 
any orders given appeared “stupid” but this made the situation more tense, and was 
interpreted as an “inappropriate joke” by the others on the bridge. Therefore, 
intervention at the level of maritime education and training is recommended (Arthur 
D. Little Ltd. 2004; Sudhakar, 2005; Manuel 2005, 2007; Horck, 2006, 2008), where 
the lessons are learnt to create mental models of appropriate responses before they 
are needed.  
 
2.5 HOW IS SAFETY CULTURE ACHIEVED? 
Commitment of the people at all levels to the safety goals and principles has been a 
consistent theme throughout the literature. As said before, safety culture is an 
organizational response to risks. Yet individual actions cannot be separated, although 
writers such as Reason (1997) thinks from an organizational perspective on the 
premise that one cannot change the human condition, but one can change the 
conditions under which people work. At times the conditions are right, but humans in 
all our complexities also pose a risk (Foss, 2007). For INSAG (1991), safety culture 
operates in a framework where management and policy provide the direction and 
individuals provide the appropriate responses to those policies. An individual 
approach is also evident where maritime education is discussed as one of the 
strategies towards a safety culture (Manuel, 2005, 2007; Sudhakar, 2005). Manuel, 
(2005) offers an alternative definition for culture:- “The cultivating or development 
(of the mind, faculties, emotions) - improvement or refinement by education and 
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training – the result of such refinement.” – which may be adapted for the purposes of 
this dissertation to suggest  an educational approach as one of the strategies to 
achieving a safety culture. Such a definition of safety culture may be:- The 
cultivating or development (of the mind, faculties, emotions) of the safety imperatives 
within the individual through appropriate  education and training.  
 
 2.5.1 Approaches to Achieving Safety Culture 
  2.5.1.1  Social Engineering 
Reason (1997) sees the development of safety culture as “social engineering,” where 
deliberate actions are taken by the organization to instil safety in all aspects of its 
operations. An organization with a safety culture possesses the following 
characteristics (Reason, 1997, pp. 195-196): 
• an informed culture – continuously collects data regarding the “many entities 
that may penetrate its barriers” and uses these constructively to ward off 
complacency. The organization must not forget to be afraid.  
• a reporting culture – the people at the sharp end are willing to report their 
errors and near-misses without fear of punishment.    
• a just culture – an atmosphere of trust where people are encouraged when 
behaviours are appropriate and contribute to safety, and they are also aware 
of unacceptable behaviours. 
• a flexible culture – adaptability to changing demands, as such power and 
authority does not interfere with the safe procedures. Control of a hazardous 
situation passes to the person with the knowledge on the spot and reverts 
when the situation is returned to normal.  
• and a learning culture – where lessons are taken from the system and a 
willingness to make major reforms if these are needed. 
For Reason, safety culture equals an informed culture and the others are seen as 
subcomponents. These must be “engineered” through deliberate actions on the part 
of the organization.  
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   2.5.1.2  Evolutionary Model 
Hudson, (2001) stresses the development of solid individual and organizational 
safety management skills that have to be cultivated: “skills have to be developed, and 
require practice; they do not suddenly appear just because you read the manual” (p.6). 
Writing from an aviation perspective, Hudson (2001) combines Reason and Westrum 
to develop this approach.  Reason’s categories have been summarized into the 
following: 
• A safety culture is informed at all levels 
• A safety culture exhibits trust by all parties 
• A safety culture is adaptable to changes in conditions 
• A safety culture worries 
Figure 2-5 is the adapted Westrum’s model which shows the movement with 
increasing trust and “informedness”, from a pathological stage to the highest level of 
a generative stage which is the place of safety culture. The rationale for an 
evolutionary model is that it gives direction, where the organization is going (Hudson, 
2001). The development of good safety management skills which is learnt and 
practiced is the mainstay of this approach. 
 
Figure 2-5: Hudson’s evolutionary model of safety cultures 
Source: Hudson (2001) 
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 Both the social engineering and evolutionary models involve the development of 
skills, attitudes, mutual respect for members in the organization, they involve 
flexibility, willingness to change, commitment, and learning. Both Hudson (2001) 
and Reason (1997) admit that safety culture is not necessarily an easy pursuit but it is 
a desirable pursuit.  
 
  2.5.1.3  Reciprocal Safety Culture Model  
Cooper (2000) proposed a goal making model whereby safety culture is seen as a 
super-ordinate goal. This model is an adaptation of Bandura’s model of reciprocal 
determinism.  Cooper (2000 p.116) believed “the creation or enhancement of a safety 
culture is dependent upon the deliberate manipulation of various organisational 
characteristics thought to impact upon safety management practices”, hence a theory 
of action. Each characteristic is viewed as a sub-goal, the antecedents, leading to a 
safety culture, the behaviour and consequences which are the goal-achievements. 
The model (Figure 2-6) emphasises the “reciprocal relationship” among the 
behavioural, situational and psychological and therefore sees a holistic engagement 
to successfully arrive at a safety culture as imperative. 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Cooper’s Reciprocal safety culture model 
Source: Cooper (2000) 
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2.5.1.4  The Convergence Model 
odel where the top-down and bottomSudhakar (2005) proposed a convergence m -up 
approaches to safety culture are merged, Figure 2-7. Writing from a maritime 
industry perspective, Sudhakar presents his model in the ambit of safety as a risk 
management tool. The top-down approach sees safety culture as a sub-set of 
organizational culture and the bottom-up approach sees safety culture as learned 
behaviour. Safety culture existing in the industry takes four possible forms as 
outlined by the road map to safety culture (Figure 2-8) (Sudhakar, 2005).  It is 
therefore suggesting that to move from an uninformed culture to a safety culture the 
“interactive relationship” (Cooper, 2000) among the stakeholders must be 
“engineered” (Reason, 1997), which is also a reciprocal relationship of another kind, 
but necessary to achieve the goal of a safety culture.    
 
 
Figure 2-7: Convergence Model 
 
Source: Sudhakar (2005). 
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he models demonstrate that safety culture rests on the people. Reason (1997) and 
appropriate  education and training.  
o Safety Culture
 
 
T
Cooper (2000) presented general organizational models, with Reason presenting 
from a managerial/leadership perspective, while Cooper’s model is based on a more 
social psychological view. Hudson wrote from an aviation perspective, presenting an 
organizational psychology model and Sudhakar’s model is an organizational/ 
educational model. What these models offer are differing perspectives on addressing 
the human factor that may be adopted according to the nature of the organization or 
the industry within which one is operating. The point of convergence for the models 
is that achieving a safety culture arises from deliberate efforts at engineering 
(Reason), cultivating (Hudson), developing by deliberate manipulation (Cooper) and 
fostering linkages (Sudhakar); they stress the need for a holistic approach to the 
human factor in safety culture predicated on behaviour modification. Therefore to 
reiterate the adapted definition of safety culture: The cultivating or development (of 
the mind, faculties, emotions) of the safety imperatives within the individual through 
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2.6 SAFETY AND SECURITY 
Any discussion of safety in shipping necessitates, at the very least, a mention of 
erformance.  A quote from Benjamin Franklin 
 has become standard procedure in certain parts to 
onstruct homes with burglar bars as a means of access control due to crime 
ent to security is firmly embedded in the amended motto of 
safer, secure, efficient shipping on cleaner seas.” The maritime industry’s security 
ous issue  since the 
creased attempts at security (ITF campaigns…2004; Mukherjee & Mustafar, 2005; 
Grey, 2006; ITF, 2006). Lack of shore leave exacerbates health issues, particularly 
security as it impacts the seafarer’s p
“The way to be safe is never to be secure” (quoted in Schröder, et. al.) sums up the 
tensions between the concepts.   
 
In Jamaica (my home country) it
c
problems. These ensure security but present direct threats to safety in the event of 
dangers such as fires.  Persons have been known to die in fires because they could 
not leave the house as the keys to the burglar bars could not be found (possibly a case 
of panic), or they lie unconscious from smoke inhalation and nobody could get in… 
secure, but not safe.   
 
The IMO’s commitm
“
regime has been adequately documented by a number of researchers in the area 
(Mejia, 2007; Mensah, 2005).  The most recent addition to the security regime, the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, has given rise to tensions 
between safety and security.  The background and rationale for the implementation 
of the ISPS Code are well known (Franson, 2005; Wright 2006). Safety and security 
have been at logger heads since the implementation of the Code. At the very 
minimum, it has added to the administrative responsibilities aboard, hence increased 
workload (Schröder et.al. 2006; ITF, 2006) amidst concerns of fatigue and lack of 
situational awareness (Barnett, 2005; Hetherington, et. al. 2006) which are 
implicated in weakening the system’s defences against accidents. 
 
Additionally, seafarers’ right to shore leave has become a contenti
in
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mental health such as stress, isolation and boredom, (Kahveci, 2007) and compounds 
the possible negative effects on performance (Schröder, et. al. 2006). Issues of 
conflicts of interest (Schröder, et. al. 2006), and overall mistrust in the industry 
surrounding perceptions of unfair treatment at ports (ITF campaigns…2004; ITF, 
2006; Joshi, 2004; Grey, 2006) have impacted on an amicable union between safety 
and security. An attempt at addressing possible conflicts is found in provisions of the 
ISPS Code section 11.11 (IMO, 2003d), where it is the duty of the company security 
officer (CSO) to ensure consistency between security and safety requirements. 
Additionally, Regulation 8 of Chapter XI-2 of the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, gives the master power to prioritize safety over 
security where such conflicts arise during operations, but such jurisdiction does not 
go beyond the guard rails of the ship and may of the issues are with border personnel 
(ITF campaigns…2004; Joshi, 2004; Grey, 2006; A question of balance, 2007).  
 
The relationship between safety and security does not have to be acrimonious as both 
are affected by similar complexities and human idiosyncrasies.  Harmonization is 
ecessary to reduce the tensions and increase the scope for cooperation (Schröder, et. n
al. 2006; A question of balance, 2007). Despite the separation of security and safety 
in maritime studies (Mejia, 2007), there are grounds to subsume security under an 
overall safety regime, as vulnerabilities to security threats also compromise safety. It 
would therefore be useful to strike a balance and engage the human factor issues for 
both safety and security simultaneously so there is not a reinvention of the wheel 
when it is discovered that more is needed to ensure persons not only comply with 
security measures but internalize them as well, as is the current challenge with safety. 
The term security culture has already been mentioned in the human element strategy, 
MSC/MEPC 7/Circ. 4 (IMO, 2006b).  
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2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 number of issues were looked at in this chapter. It was ascertained that although 
e genesis of safety culture is organizational, it places great emphasis on the people 
ey to its realization.  It was 
human factor in all aspects of the safety 
iad. A number of approaches exist that are useful in guiding the development of a 
A
th
as their responses and attitudes towards safety culture is k
shown that there are many definitions for safety culture but there are points of 
convergence which gives guidance in identifying workable approaches to achieving a 
safety culture. Culture and climate are differentiated on the basis of compliance 
versus an advanced response to safety. Although climate may be an indication of 
culture, it measures perceptions at a particular moment in time whereas culture is 
more pervasive. This distinction has implications for the maritime industry’s safety 
regime. The chapter makes a distinction between the maritime industry’s safety 
approaches which, while being robust, does not necessarily engender a safety culture, 
and may, at the most achieve a safety climate, as the key ingredient, the people, have 
been left out of the loop in a holistic way.  
 
Safety culture is a necessary goal for the maritime industry to stem its accident and 
near miss records through addressing the 
tr
safety culture but the maritime industry has additional challenges that are unique to 
its nature. Challenges such as sub-standard shipping, an open register regime, 
differences in the vigilance of PSC regime, make it difficult for this industry, more 
than any other industry, to pilot the development of a safety culture. Having safety 
systems in place without the commitment of the people at all levels is tantamount to 
not having a system. As demonstrated in this chapter, the human factor is essential to 
the successful achievement of a safety culture and as Manuel (2005, p.46) puts it “If 
the core of a safety culture is human element, then the source of this element, how 
they are educated and how they perform is critical.”  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
“To err is human…” Alexander Pope 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the dynamics of human performance in safety-critical systems is a 
crucial aspect of any safety culture agenda. Humans at the sharp and blunt ends are 
regarded as the dominant risk factor in safety-critical systems (Baron, 1988; Reason, 
1990; Barnett, 2005) and as noted in Chapter 2, is a major challenge to achieving a 
safety culture. The root of this challenge lies in the performance shaping factors 
(PSFs) as they are the link to erroneous acts and therefore influences safety.   It is the 
domain of risk management to understand and devise solutions to risks in safety-
critical systems including those pose by humans. 
  
Table 3-1 gives a summary of major accidents that have come to epitomize what can 
go wrong in safety-critical systems with devastating consequences. These accidents 
have become fodder for the safety culture quest in all high risk industries. These 
accidents have also been used to illustrate the point that no major accident is caused 
by a single direct action at the sharp end, but organizational factors, management 
decisions and designers of equipment and technology are intricately involved 
(Watson, 1988; Reason, 1990; Perrow, 1999; Barnett, 2005; Dekker, 2006). 
 
This chapter focuses on the human factor as a source of risks in safety-critical 
systems. In so doing it explores the dynamics of human erroneous acts and factors 
shaping those performances, an understanding of which is key to risk management, 
which involves training and education. Although the dissertation focuses on the 
people at the sharp end, it maintains in principle that actions at the blunt end are 
extremely critical towards overall effective functioning of safety-critical systems, as 
is proven in the literature. As such, actions at the sharp end cannot be discussed in 
isolation and as is appropriate for this chapter, the blunt end is incorporated. 
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Table 3-1 Accidents Involving Human 
INDUSTRY YEAR ACCIDENT CAUSES IDENTIFIED CONSEQUENCES 
Error  
1979 Three Mile Island operator error, latent failure, 
maintenance error 
No direct deaths bu
assumed people di
t it 
ed 
years later from 
radiation poisoning 
 
Nucl
1986 Chernobyl  Deliberate, syste
numerous violations of safety 
procedures by operators, design 
miles contaminated. 
Increase in risk of 
ear 
matic and 31 lives lost. 400 sq. 
failures cancer deaths over a 
wide area of 
Scandinavia and 
Western Europe  
Petrochemical  1984 Union Carbide, 
Bhopal 
Operator error, poor maintenance, 
failed safety systems, design 
support problems.  
2500 died 
1988 Piper Alpha Technical and organizational 
causes.  
167 persons died Maritime/Offshore 
1987 Herald of Free 
Enterprise 
Commercial pressures, poor 
management, operator error,  
150 passengers & 38 
crew died 
Space Programme 
 
1986 Challenger Faulty O-ring, Organizational 
failure, conflicting goals, 
maintenance management 
problems.  
All 7 astronauts died 
1987 King’s Cross Management failures,  31 died 
 
Railway 
 
1988 Clapham Junction Technician failed to remove a 35 died 500 injured 
wire, bad workmanship, poor 
supervision and poor 
manangement. 
Aviation 1989 Kegworth M1 Air 
Crash 
 47 persons died 
Source: Compiled from Watson, 1988; Reason, 1990; Senders & Moray, 1991; Redmill & Rajan, 1997 
 
 
  
3.2 THE SAFETY CRITICAL SYSTEM 
The term safety-critical system borrowed from Redmill and Rajan (1997) is useful. A 
fety-critical system is defined as one which may present a hazard to human life or 
 systems 
sa
well-being, or the environment. Their theory on human factors in safety-critical 
systems highlights the central position of humans in such systems, and supports the 
concept of the safety triad where the psycho-socio-technical variables interact to 
either promote or undermine safety.  
 
Redmill and Rajan (1997), as indicated in Figure 3-1, show a total system and the 
place of people within that system. The system has three parts, 1) the equipment 
under control (for example a nuclear plant), 2) the control and protection
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which are computer[ized] elements for monitoring, controlling and providing 
and 3 u
 
umans in this context include all the people. Applied to the maritime industry, the 
diagram would indicate the equipmen  ship; the protection 
system consisting of elements that are t /computerized (warning systems, 
navigation systems); and organizational systems such as safety management; and the 
ontrol systems also entail organizational policies and procedures as well as the 
ider regulatory regime, for example conventions and port state control. Humans are 
ents meet each other at the apex of 
ty-critical systems should ensure that risk 
anagement aggressively adopt a variety of approaches to solutions, which is the 
protection ) the h mans. 
 
 
H
t under control as the
echnological
Humans 
Protection 
system 
Control 
system(s) 
Equipment 
under control 
Figure 3-1: T al s rding to
Source: Redmill and Rajan (1997) 
he tot ystem acco  Redmill and Rajan.  
c
w
the point of convergence where the various elem
the safety-triad.  
 
The purpose here is to demonstrate that shipping is a safety-critical system and that 
humans pervade the entire system and a balanced and holistic approach towards 
understanding such dynamics is indisputable. Further, acknowledging the 
pervasiveness of humans in safe
m
shortcoming of the maritime industry. Solutions, particularly for education and 
training, do not reflect the human complexities that exist in shipping (Arslan, & Er, 
2006; Kristiansen, 2005). Pekcan, et. al. (2005) thus conclude that approaches to the 
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non-technical aspects in the maritime industry are comparatively (with aviation) 
immature. Redmill and Rajan (1997, p-7), underscore the importance of the human 
actor, their view is still relevant for today and is instructive for the maritime industry:  
The human component should be the subject of hazard analysis and careful, 
verified design to the same degree as the other components of the system. 
That it often is not, is the cause of many otherwise avoidable accidents. … 
people have freedom of choice and, while this is a strength …it also renders 
their behaviour unpredictable and its analysis more complex and difficult. 
 
This attempt to balance the scales by giving due regard to the role of humans at the 
sharp end is not a popular position to take as the prevailing perspectives  focus on the 
organization (such as Reason, 1997) or take a systems approach (such as Perrow, 
999 and Dekker, 2006). However this dissertation, also sees the need to consider the 
 the term human error has proven problematic within safety culture, 
s it connotes blame, whereas the situation is usually more complex. To demonstrate: 
f
1
human component of safety critical systems as the subject of hazard analysis in their 
own right as feeling, sensing beings with their own human mechanisms for action 
and/or inaction.  
 
3.3 HUMAN ERRONEOUS ACTS 
Human error analysis, is an integral part of human factor theory, discussing the what, 
when, where, why and how of errors (Reason, 1990; Senders & Moray, 1991; Perrow, 
1999).  However,
a
A man has a protracted argument with his wife. He stamps out of the house to 
the nearest bar and drinks four highballs. He then decides to go for a ride. It is 
night-time, there is a skim of snow on the ground, and the tyres on our 
victim’s car are smooth. In rounding a poorly banked curve at excessive 
speed, the right front tyre blows out; the car leaves the road and is demolished. 
What was the cause of the accident? The argument? Drinking? Speed? The 
weather? The smooth tyres? The blow out? The poorly designed highway? 
(Chapanis as quoted in Barnett, 2005, p.132) 
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Any one of the reasons listed above could be taken as the cause depending on the 
perspective and motivation of the investigator, as well as how far in retrospect the 
analysis of the chain of events goes (Barnett 2005). As such, Hollnagel (1998) sees 
attribut
itself e
acts to 
role of
therefo s is 
 major step towards fostering a no blame culture, an important sub-component of a 
 the technology as the source of errors and attempts were made at 
proving the technology (Senders & Moray, 1991; Redmill & Rajan, 1997). The 
an eak link in an otherwise safe system and 
the leas
focus o
 
3.4. 
Risk m
and saf
conside
(1978)  by what they describe as the 
ing a cause for an accident to human error as a judgment in hindsight and is in 
rroneous. Likewise, Reason (1998) makes a strong case for human erroneous 
be seen as consequences rather than causes. In so doing he emphasized the 
 organizational conditions in shaping the performance of the people, and 
re cautions the human impulse to lay blame on those at the sharp-end. Thi
a
safety culture (Reason 1997; Manuel, 2005). Causes are attributed to failures within 
the organization (Watson, 1988; Reason, 1997; Dekker, 2006), or the system as a 
whole (Perrow, 1999).  
 
The organizational perspective is one approach to understanding error. Others have 
been the technological approach and the human approaches. The technological 
paradigm viewed
im
hum perspective saw people as the w
attempts were made to design people out of the system (Senders & Moray, 1991; 
Dekker, 2006). These polarities, while useful in their own right, have been 
detrimental to a holistic approach to risk management. The dissertation is not 
proposing a return to the old paradigm of a blame culture but as the human factor is 
t understood of the systems, they are to be brought into the loop, which is the 
f this work.  
HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS 
anagement may be to safety culture what a waypoint is to a navigator. Safety 
ety culture must consider risks (O’Neil, 2000; Kristiansen, 2005).  It is in the 
ration of risks associated with humans that PSFs arise. Gyles and Salmon 
as quoted in Barnett (2005, p.134) illustrate
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frustration that those responsible for safety may feel in the face of an accident when 
they thought all defences were in place:  
There was no gross negligence, no recklessness or stupidity, no drunkenness 
or fatigue, no question of the ship being without enough trained personnel; no 
lack of equipment. But there were mistakes. Mistakes of the kind that all men 
are liable to make on occasions. Seeing what they expect to see; not seeing 
what they should see, failing to recognise a mistake in a colleague, reacting 
too late, or not at all, in the face of the unexpected.  
Such an understanding of the human capacity to commit erroneous acts, and viewing 
humans as a system in its own right, would lead to a full engagement with the human  
idiosyncrasies making them an integral part of the risk analysis, without the blame.  
 
Humans have their own built in mechanisms for protection (flight or fight), 
man actions contribute to accidents; there is merit in addressing 
e “garnish,” without which the meal is not appetizing. For the maritime industry, 
 direct 
restoration (sleep), for information processing as well as mechanisms that are 
sometimes seen as inadequacies such as boredom, distraction, loss of concentration, 
(Redmill & Rajan, 1997) and susceptibility to fatigue. Although Reason (1990, p.173) 
extols an organizational perspective, he acknowledges the role of the human element: 
Rather than being the main instigators of an accident, operators tend to be the 
inheritors of system defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, 
faulty maintenance and bad management decisions. Their part is usually that 
of adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have already 
been long in the cooking.  
 
The argument is, hu
th
Baker and McCafferty (2005) have found where seafarers have been
instigators of accidents. Reason (1990) also acknowledges that humans commit 
violations. These violations he sees as occurring in a social context where rules, 
codes of conduct and procedures exist. Violations are described as “…deliberate – 
but not necessarily reprehensible – deviations from those practices deemed necessary 
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(by designers, managers and regulatory agencies) to maintain the safe operation of a 
potentially hazardous system.” For example, the master of the Attilio Ievoli, of his 
own vo
ran agr
human 
 
Human
and vio  is commonly referred to 
f 
lanning failures are termed mistakes while execution failures are termed slips and 
knowle
(1990) 
to rule-
from hi
decisio ay sometimes lead to inaccurate information and 
oor decision. It is at this juncture that the behavioural sciences are evident where 
lition, used the west Solent, against company instructions, where the vessel 
ound. This dissertation refers to these human related threats to systems as 
idiosyncrasies, as explained in the Chapter 1. 
 threats to system failure are said to stem from two sources, erroneous acts 
lations. Rasmussen’s categorization of performance
in explaining erroneous acts. These types of performance are skilled-based, rule-
based and knowledge-based (Reason, 1990).  Skill-based actions are prone to slips 
and lapses; rule-based and knowledge-based actions are pone to mistakes. In brie
p
lapses (Reason, 1990).  
 
The sequence of performance is for skill-based actions to precede rule and 
knowledge-based actions (Reason, 1990; Redmill & Rajan, 1997). It is subsequent to 
an erroneous act at the skill-based level, if such error is detected, that rule and 
dge based performance is activated (Reason, 1990).  However, as Reason 
explains, the nature of man is such that the tendency is for the actor to resort 
based actions (separate from written rules), seeking a pre-determined solution 
s database of cognitive scripts and schemas. These are human mechanisms for 
n making short cuts but m
p
concepts such as availability heuristic and confirmation bias surface.  The notion is 
that stored scripts and schemas are activated to pair with the existing situation to find 
solutions. Information that is readily available in memory is used (availability 
heuristic) and such information confirms what the person wishes (confirmation bias) 
(Zebrowitz, 1990). It is after these mechanisms have failed to satisfactorily resolve 
the situation that knowledge based performance is activated (Reason, 1990).  
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 3.4.1 Assessing Performance 
Human reliability assessment (HRA) methods have been developed to analyze the 
risk posed by humans to systems. Here, factors that shape performance are 
investigated. HRA approaches involve three stages of 1) identifying the possible 
errors that can occur, 2) determining the likelihood of their occurrence and 3) 
proving human reliability by reducing the likelihood of their occurrence (Redmill 
l for observable actions. It was however discovered that 
ccount had to be taken of the internalized (endogenous) actions and therefore other 
im
& Rajan, 1997).   
 
Hollnagel (1998) noted that at different periods in the development of HRA methods 
the focus was altered. Initially such human risk assessment was categorized 
according to errors of omission and commission. Such categorization was behaviour 
based. Taking their cue from Skinnerian stimulus-response behavioural theory, the 
categories proved usefu
a
HRA methods focused on human cognition (Hollnagel, 1998). One of the major 
premises of the cognitive approaches is that “…any attempt of understanding human 
performance must [Author’s emphasis] include the role of human 
cognition…particularly in the study of humans at work.” (Hollnagel, 1990, p. 15).  
 
3.4.2. Nature of Human Performance  
Reasons (1997) Swiss cheese model (Figure 3-2) of active and latent failures in 
organizations may be used to apply a similar analysis to human erroneous acts. This 
writer is of the view that similar to the organization, humans have internal 
mechanisms that may be seen as active and latent failures. Such mechanisms lie in 
the cognitive 11  and behavioural domain. Therefore cognitive heuristics 12  that 
manifest themselves in perceptive biases such as confirmation bias may be viewed in 
the sense of a latent failure (although it must be said that these are built in 
mechanisms that have their usefulness). Active human failures may be seen a as a 
                                                 
11
th
 This use of cognitive refers to mental programming and not the reference to knowledge gained 
rough education. 
12 Mental shortcuts  
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mistake, a slip or a lapse which manifest themselves in observable behaviours. Both 
active and latent failures shape performance. The relationship between the two types 
of human failures can be seen as failing to act or acting incorrectly as driven by cues 
from the cognitive dimension.  
 
 
Figure 3-2: An accident trajectory passing through the holes and defences in a system 
Source: Reason (1
was not changed. Due to latent conditions the cues to indicate that something was 
997). 
 
The figure shows Reason’s (1997) accident trajectory to which a parallel may be 
drawn. Using the Royal Majesty accident as an example, the holes in the system due 
to latent conditions can be compared with the human idiosyncrasies such as 
confirmation bias. Active failures may be seen as overreliance on automation 
(diffusion of responsibility)13, defences in depth can be referred to as knowledge and 
skills gained from training.  For the Royal Majesty, the accident trajectory was 
activated when at the skill based level, an execution failure occurred; that is, course 
                                                 
13 Less vigilance in the presence of others or an automated system. This is discussed further in Chapter 
 Sciences. 6 on the Behavioural
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wrong were used instead to confirm that the vessel was on the planned route, as the 
officers had over-relied on the automated system; as there was no training on the 
human biases, these could not be activated as further defences in the system and 
therefore the error led to the grounding. 
 3.4.3 Performance Shaping Factors in the Maritime Industry 
A number of factors shaping human performance have been discussed for the 
maritime industry. The UK P & I Club (1996) found that deck officer error was the 
highest among its main causes of major P & I claims, accounting for 25%. This 
justifies a focus on the factors that shape their performance. In a review of the 
literature relating to the human factor in the maritime industry, Hetherington et. al. 
(2006, p. 403-409) discussed a number of PSFs; those of relevance to this work are 
listed below: 
• Personnel issues
 
: Fatigue, stress, health and wellbeing 
o Non-technical skills: situation awareness, decision-making and 
cognitive demands, communication, language and cultural diversity, 
teamwork. 
Issues of health, stress and welfare will be discussed under fatigue, while issues of 
s a part of 
awareness is discussed separately.  
leadership, power, communication and culture will be discussed a
teamwork, situation 
 
3.5 REDUCING HUMAN ERRONEOUS ACTS 
Senders and Moray (1991) suggest a dichotomous taxonomy of erroneous acts that is 
suitable for this dissertation as it relates to internal and external influences - 
exogenous and endogenous erroneous acts. Exogenous acts are caused by factors 
external to the person and endogenous within the person, which is similar to 
Reason’s (1990) intrinsic (cognitive biases, attentional limitations) and extrinsic 
factors (structural characteristics of the task, context effects) as well as Hollnagel’s 
(1998) internal and external view of PSFs.  Since the focus is primarily actors at the 
sharp end, this taxonomy is useful to distinguish active failures that arise in the social 
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system (exogenous/context) - team-work, leadership, communication - and those that 
arise in the individual (endogenous/intrinsic) - perception, cognition. It is said that 
most erroneous acts are exogenous in keeping with other writers who foreground the 
organization, and the situations in which this is not true are said to result from among 
ther things, poor quality of training. It stands to reason therefore that education and 
 provisions taking a holistic, systematic and focussed approach to 
train  
 
Maritime educa
competence in t the on board tasks. Competence currently does not 
raining needs to go further to 
stil the correct attitudes to ensure that the requisite mindset is present to carry out 
is so, the curriculum has to 
o
training is a strategy to combat such erroneous acts.  
 
Accidents have many causes and it is considered that interrupting the causal linkages 
at any point would prevent the error (Senders & Moray, 1991) although there are 
opposing views to this notion (Reason, 1997; Dekker, 2006). The rationale is that, for 
the maritime industry it is easier to access the seafarers than companies for 
regulatory purposes. The training regulatory regime is in place, what is needed is to 
strengthen its
ing that would engage the science of man. 
tion and training is a combination of knowledge and skills to ensure 
carrying ou
include human behaviour. A comparison can be made with the aviation industry 
where the behavioural sciences are embraced holistically at every level of the pilots 
life.  Manuel (2005) points out maritime education and t
in
tasks with integrity and professionalism.  While this 
contain the correct content as well. Such content has been discussed in terms of 
communication and cultural awareness (Horck, 2006, 2008a), leadership and 
teamwork (Sampson, 2003; Arthur D. Little Ltd., 2004; Pekcan, et. al., 2005), but 
content concerning perception and how these affect judgment and decision making 
are yet to be discussed in the maritime industry.    
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3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The premise of this dissertation is that safety culture is a desirable goal for the 
maritime industry that promises to enhance safety. The human factor is a challenge 
to this goal. The challenge lies in the performance on board in areas such as 
teamwork, situation awareness and fatigue. PSFs are usually the domain of risk 
management. Risk management strategies to address human performance have 
tilized the behavioural sciences. It has been shown that human factor theory and the 
ington et. al. (2006) indicate that the 
rovisions for the non-technical training in the STCW Convention do not suggest 
u
behavioural sciences are inextricably linked (Reason, 1990; Senders & Moray, 1991; 
Redmill & Rajan, 1997; Hollnagel, 1998). This is the missing ingredient in the 
training regime. What is needed is a focus on the actors at the sharp end as 
psychological beings. Although the IMO Conventions do not preclude individual 
Member States developing higher standards, the industry in general and MET, use 
such standards of the IMO as a benchmark and look to the regulatory regime for 
guidance and cues towards their action. Hether
p
what the human behaviour skills are, or what is an adequate level of competence. 
 
The importance of education and training to grasp the aetiology of such conditions 
and how they come to influence performance will assist in building defences against 
their occurrence. It is proposed that the behavioural based training that has been 
recommended (IMO, 2003a) to influence attitudes through behaviour, considers such 
cognitive human “failings” in its content. Developing the right attitudes necessitates 
the inclusion of the right content. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF SEAFARERS 
PART I 
 
The Role of Training Institutions in Safety Culture 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this multi-dimensional, multi-disciplinary and flexible environment, aim of 
MET is not only [to] give trainees basic technical knowledge to perform pre-
designed, routine and standardized objectives or briefly “training” but also to 
improve their critical thinking, decision making and problem-solving skills, 
leadership, social intelligence, moral motivation or briefly “education.” 
(Asyali, et. al. 2003). 
 
Training and education is seen as one of the critical mitigating strategies for the risks 
associated with the human factor (Arthur D. Little Ltd., 2004; Pekcan, et. al., 2005; 
arnett, et. al., 2006). Seafaring has evolved beyond traditional education and 
ch a seafarer is essential to the achievement of a 
safety culture. A seafarer of this nature would be empowered to say no to 
substandard shipping, would be averse to violations, and would seek to do the right 
thing at the right time (Manuel, 2005) displaying the level of professionalism that 
would suggest an internalization of such principles. It seems that a few shipping 
companies have found a formula, an organizational culture that reinforces as well as 
“goes beyond” the formalized training to the development through shipboard life the 
“unwritten” rules of professionalism (Lane, 1999; Hernqvist, 2008). But what 
B
training requirements of a purely technical nature to the need for the “soft” skills 
such as leadership, communication, cultural awareness, group dynamics (MARCOM, 
1999; Benton, 2006; Horck, 2006, 2008a). As Ho (2004, p.14) rightly says: “what we 
need is to develop the Seafarer of the Future who is mature, responsible, well-
rounded, has a fundamental strength of character, is empowered and aware of how 
his actions affect the whole.” Su
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becomes of the seafarer when he leaves this company, are the skills sufficiently 
ingrained to have continuity?  
 
Professionalism is considered as com  Lane (1999), demonstrating that a 
seafarer’s competence goes beyond the techni  
 needed is sionalism,” 
ed by this writer, as others have indicated (Sampson, 
2002; 
training
behavio
STCW
 
This chapter has two parts. Part I looks at MET and the state of education and 
aining in the non-technical areas, which the industry now demands. Part II is a 
petence by
cal. But such companies are few. What
 the kind of empowerment that would instil this “profesis
strength of character; it is believ
Ho, 2004; Barnett, 2005; Manuel, 2005), that it is through education and 
 that such traits are developed and more so, education and training in the 
ural sciences to augment the technical, and this should be pursued by the 
 Convention to ensure that the standards are spread globally. 
tr
review of the STCW Convention relative to its human factor provisions. The chapter 
is predicated on two assumptions that, since MET institutions are fixed then 
enforcement of standards are possible. It is also assumed that unlike with people, 
compliance may lead to excellence when given no other choice. There are 
institutions that go beyond the basic requirements, however to have global 
uniformity in standards the STCW has to prescribe these for MET. 
 
4.2 THEORIES OF LEARNING  
It is helpful to explore a few theories of learning to substantiate the need to engage 
the science of man at the MET level. Theories of learning are divided into basically 
two camps, the behavioural and the cognitive. Bigge and Shermis (1992, p.3) define 
a learning theory as: 
…a systematic, integrated outlook in regard to the nature of the process 
whereby people relate to their environments in such a way as to enhance their 
ability to use both themselves and their environments more effectively. 
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What is suggested here is that learning is deliberate and orchestrated by those 
responsible for the process. A holistic approach, systematically applied based on 
otions of how humans absorb information and relate to their environment. Such 
he behaviourists saw learning as a “change in observable behaviour” which was 
5; Barnett, et. al. 
006). Behaviour modification rests on the ABC process where antecedents, 
ered” to elicit desired responses. 
. The cognitive approach saw learning as a process of “gaining 
or chan
1992, p
factors e the 
learning process (Bigge and Shermis, 1992; Conway, 1997; Muirhead, 2008a). The 
n
deliberate orchestration is the purview of educational institutions. 
 
Learning theories were developed to make the teaching process more effective and 
efficient (Bigge and Shermis, 1992). Early approaches viewed learning as “mental 
discipline” where the mind had to be exercised, as such, much learning was based on 
repetition and recall. Subsequently, theories based on behaviourism and cognition 
emerged (Bigge and Shermis, 1992).  
 
T
conditioned through stimulus and response (Schellenberg, 1978; Bigge and Shermis 
1992; Muirhead, 2008a). The behavioural approach was seen as an improvement on 
the early repetition and recall method. The behavioural approach to education has its 
roots in the work of B. F. Skinner and his theory of operant conditioning 
(Schellenberg, 1978; Bigge and Shermis, 1992; Conway, 1997). It is reflected today 
in behaviour modification that has been a popular approach to instil attitudes and 
correct behaviour as regards safety and is commonly recommended for use in the 
maritime industry (IMO, 2003b; Manuel, 2005; Pekcan, et. al., 200
2
behaviour and consequences are “engine
 
Dissatisfaction with behaviourism in terms of problem solving and learning 
strategies led to the development of the cognitive approach (Bigge and Shermis, 
1992; Conway, 1997)
ging insights, outlooks, expectations, or thought patterns” (Bigge and Shermis, 
.10), as the learner actively participates in his/her learning. Thus individual 
such as personality and motivation, as well as social context influenc
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cognitive approach has its roots in the work of educational psychologists such as 
Vygotsky, Piaget and Bruner (Bigge and Shermis, 1992; Conway, 1997).  
 
4.3 TEACHING METHODOLOGIES 
Delivery methods developed can be viewed from the behavioural influences to the 
g the use of multi-media and other 
ch teaching aids, thus increasing the opportunities for use of a behaviour based 
is delivery 
ethod is deemed suitable for andragogy (the teaching of adults) as against 
cognitive/information processing method known as constructivism (Conway, 1997; 
Arends, 2000). The methods used by MET varies and may be seen as directly related 
to the philosophy that drives the school. The lecture mode is still a common method 
of delivery. It is a passive method (Muirhead, 2008a). However, technology has 
impacted the delivery of lectures by introducin
su
approach. As such the ABC behaviour based model has been incorporated into the 
use of simulators as an innovative method at Warsash Maritime Centre (Pekcan, et. 
al., 2005; Barnett, 2006). This will be discussed further. 
 
Constructivism utilizes collaborative/cooperative and problem-based learning 
(Conway, 2007) providing more opportunities for internalization of learning 
objectives. The terms collaborative and cooperative learning are used 
interchangeably, and refers to cooperation in the learning process as against 
competition where students work together to find solutions to a problem rather than 
compete individually for grades. Problem-based learning may involve collaboration 
and is geared at the student finding solutions to real problems; as such, th
m
pedagogy (teaching of children). The problem based approach has been 
recommended for application to the STCW requirements as it is seen as a valuable 
and reliable method of achieving learning objective of knowledge, skills and 
attitudes (Asyali, et. al. 2003). It was concluded that the competence demanded of 
the seafarer will not be gained through traditional teaching methods, therefore Dokuz 
Eylul University School of Maritime Business and Management in Turkey, changed 
its curriculum to one that utilizes problem based learning (Asyali, et. al. 2003). 
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4.3.1 The use of simulators 
Simulators have become a ubiquitous teaching tool in MET. If their advantages are 
arnessed they can be a very effective delivery method combining both behaviour 
s embraced the use of simulators as 
oaches were evident. If the 
arsash behavioural approach is used as reference, aspects of the ABC were present 
. The 
h
and cognitive based approaches. The industry ha
evidenced in the STCW Convention Section A-I/12, being mandatory for Radar and 
ARPA training. It is debated whether simulators are more efficient than onboard 
training and the conclusion is that it is in many regards (Muirhead, 2008b) as 
multiple learning objectives may be covered in a shorter time without the risks; 
confidence of the cadet is developed; hands-on experience is gained in decision 
making and operational procedures in difficult situations, which would be impossible 
on board (Muirhead, 2006, 2008c). 
 
The use of simulators has been observed by the writer on field trips to training 
institutions in Europe (France, Netherlands). Both appr
W
in the use of simulators at these institutions: A-ntecedents were the class room 
lectures; B-ehaviour was the practical exercises on the simulators and C-onsequences 
were the debrief. Additionally, the fact that the situations required critical thinking 
and problem solving by working as a team, introduced the problem-based 
approached of the cognitive theory. The writer was however uncertain that these 
methods were exploited to their fullest potential. It was clear that the focus was the 
technical. On inquiry, at one location, the writer was told that human factor issues 
were mentioned in debrief; yet these could have been incorporated in existing 
simulation exercises to account for the need of the soft skills.  
 
4.4 CONTEXT 
One of the demands of the industry is to address its accident record. This is 
predicated on the development of a safety culture. A restructuring of MET to respond 
to the contemporary demands of the industry for well-rounded seafarers has been 
seen as an imperative (Asyali, et. al., 2003; Kanev, 2003, Asyali, et. al., 2006)
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attitude ross institutions. Interviews reveal that such 
paration of departments (Schröder, et. al. 2003). 
ET curriculum is also affected by the realities of economics and politics (Prasad, 
re standards are kept. 
here are those in the evasive group that may avoid detection, but it is believed that 
st be made within the compliant group. 
 to safety culture varies ac
attitudes range from conscious and deliberate actions to incorporate the “softer” 
skills to not having any such programmes.  The importance of the non-technical 
demands that not just some, but all seafarers become beneficiaries. Training 
institutions have their own philosophies and worldview that influences their 
approach to such topics. Although dated, Rosengren, & Bassis (1976) provide 
valuable research on the social organization of maritime education and training 
which illustrates how the different philosophies and national interests drive the MET 
curriculum. The system of training is as varied today with universities, colleges and 
vocational training and different curriculum, such as those offering dual purpose 
training as against the traditional se
M
2008a).  
 
Manuel (2005) also found that MET may be driven by similar cultures as the 
industry ranging from evasive to those with a safety/excellence culture. He noted that 
by far those with a compliant culture are greatest in number. However, unlike with 
people, compliance in this instance may lead to a culture of excellence as the 
mechanisms can be instituted to drive this development. The nature of the global 
regime is such that the STCW Convention governs the curriculum so far as the 
provisions are mandatory. The provisions for accountability were strengthened in the 
1995 amendments, which are to be further strengthened in the current review (IMO, 
2008). It is assumed that since MET institutions are fixed then they are easily 
identifiable and may be subjected to the regulations to ensu
T
improvements will at lea
 
An outcome of the METNET programme was that the quality and employability of 
seafarers was mainly the task of MET institutions (Schröder, et. al., 2003). A similar 
conclusion from a global perspective was arrived at (Kanev, 2003) in looking at the 
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seafarer labour market challenge and implications for MET. The “soft” skills courses 
that are the concern of this dissertation would fit into the framework as developed by 
Schröder et.al. (2003) for the enrichment of the seafarer. If the seafarer is to see 
seafaring as a career path and he is to be prepared adequately for employment ashore, 
leadership, teamwork, cultural awareness and other social-psychological skills apply 
to all careers. Such courses could become part of the enrichment process (Schröder et. 
al. 2003).  
  
4.5     CONTENT 
The “soft” skills that shape performance are more and more coming to the fore as 
casualty investigations begin to take account of human factors in accidents. The need 
for education and training in these areas is also gaining momentum, however the 
approach remains ad hoc as topics are introduced as reactive approaches to accidents.  
dience to authority 
ampson, 2003) and its destructive nature may be discussed in a course on 
 
There needs to be an understanding among the regulators of the need for a holistic 
approach as evidenced during the deliberations of the current STCW review (IMO, 
2008) where a delegation proposed a combination of BRM, Engine-room Resource 
Management (ERM), communication and leadership as they all address human 
behaviour and human resources; however, this proposal was not supported. 
Additionally it was proposed that the requirements for communication, language etc. 
should be only for deck and engineer officers. This writer is of the opinion that all 
should benefit from such education. It may be made appropriate to the ranks and 
function of the seafarer, however all crew members, including ratings need to be 
aware of aspects of shipboard life such as the responsibility of leadership, beyond 
their perceptions of the one who gives orders; its role and function, and how they 
(the ratings) fit into the team in general. Issues such as obe
(S
leadership and taught in such a way as to develop the ability to “challenge” authority 
respectfully. The provision as it is currently stated in the STCW Table A-II/4 “ability 
to understand orders…” may be perpetuating power relations that are 
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counterproductive (Sampson, 2003) and the ability to “challenge” that is being 
discussed, may not be fostered in such an “order taking” atmosphere. A holistic top-
down and bottom-up approach is prudent.  
 
4.5.1 Culture  
Culture affects both context and content.  The seafarer is a product of his culture 
which influences the attitudes by which he views the world and through which he 
erates. This impacts both the operational procedures and the social interaction with 
n board. Cultural differences are a challenge for the safety of 
at courses developed to address safety culture are taught at every level throughout 
op
fellow shipmates o
shipping (Dzugan & Renping, 1999; Benton, 2006; Horck, 2006, 2008a). Such 
differences lie in the national/ethnic cultures from which people come (Hofstede & 
Hofstede, 2005).  However, such dimensions are not easily influenced and therefore 
the need to incorporate into the curriculum at all levels. As one institution indicated 
th
the seafarer training programme, “from first year step by step” (Appendix 4).  This 
approach, strengthened by a cognitive and behaviour based delivery method, would 
ensure enculturation of the values and principles embedded in such courses and there 
is a greater likelihood that seafarers who are so educated and trained would exhibit a 
higher level of ethics and professionalism than those who were not exposed in this 
way.  
 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) is useful in describing some of the impacts of culture. 
Culture is seen as mental programming resulting from socialization. Culture is 
learned. As such any effort at mitigating cultural influences has to tap into mind (and 
hearts) of individuals. Issues of power and authority and leadership, how these are 
perceived and the responses to these are culturally based (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005) 
and impact interactions. The concept of power distance which is becoming a 
common concept in the maritime industry, is defined as “the extent to which the less 
powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and 
accept that power is distributed unequally.” (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p.46). The 
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impact however is in its influence on behaviour where expectations and acceptance 
manifest themselves in dependence, that is, the subordinates are afraid of disagreeing 
with the superior and expect an autocratic style of leadership and decision making. 
ofstede & Hofstede (2005) also noted that counter-dependence is another likely 
outcom nce, where the subordinate rejects the power but complies in 
 4.5.1.1 Cultural Awareness 
ultural awareness is being discussed increasingly as it is seen as a possible factor 
H
e of power dista
practice. This may also result in destructive obedience as the subordinate would 
comply with any order given. 
 
Whereas Hofstede’s and Hofstede’s view may be debated, it does provide food for 
thought with regards to categorizing behaviours on board. It may be that national or 
organizational or shipboard culture is operating to foster power distance which has 
implications for intervention (an important area to be researched). Power distance is 
associated with destructive obedience (Sampson, 2002; 2003) (obeying a wrong 
command, or keeping silent due to the authority of the person giving the orders). For 
example the Domiat and the Green Lily accidents were possibly due to power 
distance where the masters’ decisions were not “challenged” by any of the officers 
which led the Domiat to run aground, and which exacerbated the situation for the 
Green Lily leading to the death of a rescue operator Appendix I). 
 
 
C
affecting shipboard operations. Investigations into casualties such as the Bow 
Mariner suggest that stereotypes may have been operating. The senior officers were 
Greek. It was reported that the Filipino officers were given almost no responsibility, 
and were closely supervised in every task.” Such behaviours reveal lack of trust in 
the abilities of the Filipino crew which may have been motivated by stereotypes of 
the abilities of Filipinos in general. As such Horck (2006; 2008a) advocates that 
MET be proactive as the need for cultural diversity training is evident. Benton (2006) 
also agrees with the need to make the study of “cultural difference” a core 
component of the curriculum of maritime institutions. The reality of multinational 
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crew demands that for greater cohesion and safety, seafarers must become culturally 
literate (Benton, 2006).  
 
 4.5.2  Communication and  Language 
The tradition in the maritime industry has been to discuss communication primarily 
as language difficulties arising from multi-nationality onboard, perhaps because this 
was easily identified. The solution has been to develop communication phrases to be 
sed in specific occasions and stressing the importance of a common language giving 
oor leadership have 
een cited as contributory causes in a number of accidents, for example Domiat and 
hip is steep in hierarchal traditions 
u
rise to Maritime English as an area of study (Benton, 2006).  Communication is 
however much more than language - grammar and vocabulary - (MARCOM, 1991; 
Dzugan & Renping, 1999; Kahveci et. al. 2002; Badawi & Halawa, 2003; Sampson 
& Zhao, 2003; Horck, 2006, 2008a) as culture, non-verbal communication, aspects 
of social interaction and meaning are critical aspects that would not be solved by 
having a common language.  
 
4.5.3 Leadership and Teamwork 
The operational imperatives onboard demand teamwork (Østreng, 2001; Asyali, et.al., 
2006); effective teams have good leaders; lack of teamwork and p
b
Dole America. The organizational structure of a s
which seemingly give rise to autocratic styles of leadership (Kahveci, et.al. 2002).  
  
Organizations ashore have long moved on to more horizontal structures where 
teamwork is encouraged. Whereas it may be necessary to maintain a vertical 
structure, “teamship” (Sampson, 2002) must be encouraged and autocracy 
discouraged, this is best done through holistic application via education and training. 
Recalling that one of the “principles” of safety culture is flexibility (Reason 1997), 
the ability to defer authority according to the exigencies of the situation, such 
flexibility has to be “cultivated.” Asyali, et.al.(2006 p.9) noted that coordination on 
the bridge requires the ability to work together which in turn requires “…people 
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skills such as communication, teamwork, leadership, the ability to learn, and ability 
to adapt to changes.” But has been said by others, (Kahveci et. al., 2002; Sampson, 
002; Arthur D. Little Ltd., 2004) “the existence of these necessary skills among 
). Although speaking specifically to 
 
were selected to demonstrate the possibilities to enrich 
e MET experience by impacting both context and content. 
 
o 
omote teamwork and less hierarchal structures according to global organizational 
2
seafarers is questionable” (Asyali, et.al., 2006 p.9
the issue of destructive obedience and authority Sampson’s (2003, p.7) observations 
may be applied generally to the non-technical requirements of seafarers’ competence: 
[these] are likely to require considerable training and re-training for masters 
[and crew] who may not currently have the skills required…simulators may 
assist in this process but to address the problems…requires that the training 
policies of companies and indeed maritime training establishments become 
more innovative. 
 
4.6 AN AMALGAMATION OF CONTEXT AND CONTENT 
Two cases from the industry 
th
 4.6.1 School of Maritime Business Management 
A conscious decision was made by the Dokuz Eylul University School of Maritime 
Business Management, Kaynaklar Campus in Turkey to change the context of 
learning by changing from the conventional delivery to the student-focused problem-
based delivery method. This change was in response to the realization of the need t
pr
trends, and the demands of the maritime industry (Asyali, et. al. 2006). The 
education strategy of the institution was stated as:  
“…to provide the students with certain proper knowledge, supported by 
desired skills and profound attitudes that they will need in their future 
professional careers and also give then the ability to respond quickly to 
changes in technology, operations, practices and procedures on board. (Asyali, 
et. al. 2003) 
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The procedure is to provide students with problem based scenarios similar to what 
practitioners would face. The students define the problem and are given guidance, 
resources and are left to solve the problem. Learning objectives are embedded in the 
scenarios which require an inter-disciplinary approach working in teams. Appendix 6 
graphically presents the process. The outcome has been rated as an effective tool for 
the requirements of the STCW Convention. 
 
 
Using 
aviation
Southa eveloped a programme to address the need for the non-
chnical skills in the maritime industry (Table 4-1) (Pekcan, et. al., 2005; Barnett, et. 
OCIAL SKILLS COGNITIVE SKILLS 
4.6.2 Warsash Maritime Centre 
the ABC behaviour modification model and adapting the contents of the 
 industry’s crew resource management (CRM), the Warsash Maritime Centre,  
mpton Institute, d
te
al. 2006).  
 
Table 4-1   Types of skills that are taught on the CRM course. 
 
S
C ation Situation Awareness o-oper
Open communication • Situation awareness • 
• Consideration for others 
• Team working 
• Risk assessment 
Leadership and Managerial 
Skills 
Decision Making 
• Situational leadership 
• Assertiveness 
• Planning and 
coordinating  
• Problem diagnosis 
• Option generation 
• Option selection 
Source: Pekcan, et. al. (2005). 
 
The course emphasizes social and cognitive skills while presenting the students with 
new wa
the a
ys of thinking and problem solving. The new ways of thinking are said to be 
ntecedents to safe behaviour developed in the lectures and the behaviours 
d and through debrief receive feedback, which are seen as the practice consequences. 
etails are given in Appendix 7.  More d
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EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF SEAFARERS 
PART II 
 
STCW 1978 Convention  
 Human Factor Provisions 
 
 
4.7 THE NEED FOR THE STCW CONVENTION 
ended as one of the four 
14
as been questioned (Pekcan, et. al., 2005; Barnett, et. al., 2006). This 
ction reviews the Convention, and current comprehensive review to ascertain the 
ity of trainin ame necessary with increased 
internationalization of maritime la u e convention is enshrined in 
ensus of the parties that education and 
g is critical to the pursuit of safety: 
ES TO THIS C N
to promote saf  erty at sea and the protection of 
ronment by establishing in common agreement international 
                                                
This section looks at the STCW Convention 1978 as am
pillars in the maritime safety regulatory regime.   The Convention is tasked with 
providing minimum mandatory training standards to ensure that seafarers possess 
uniformity in competence to carry out their duties safely and efficiently while 
protecting the marine environment. The Convention’s effectiveness as regards the 
soft skill h
se
human factor provisions.  
 
The uniform g standards bec
bo r. The spirit of th
the following principle and em
trainin
bodies the cons
THE PARTI O VENTION, 
DESIRING ety of life and prop
the marine envi
standards of training, certification and watchkeeping for seafarers…, 
CONSIDERING that this end may best be achieved by the conclusion of an 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers. (IMO, 2001, p.7). 
 
 
14 The others being SOLAS, MARPOL and the ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention, 2006. 
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In the absen udable and 
seen as reflecting the highest standar uld be practicably agreed on at the 
time (Agbakoba, 1994; IMO, 1996; Fuazudeen, 2008). However, a number of 
limitations were discovered een, 2008; Horck, 2008b; 
rasad, 2008b). The most c ement of global standards 
as having the provision “to the satisfaction of the Administration,” (Dearsley, 1994; 
, 2008). This resulted in 
al agenda item particularly as it 
oncerned the Sea-speak Manual and the desire to address poor communication 
Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations 
(IFSMA highlighting concerns regarding 
fatigue
 
Develo chnical, 
operati
discuss
contrib ship design, training and also 
anning.  The outcome was Annex 4 to the report 
to MSC “Recommendations of the Sub-Committee Related to the Role of the Human 
Element in Maritime Casualties” (IMO, 1991). These recommendations included 
ce of any standards, the promulgation of STCW 1978 was la
ds which co
 overtime (IMO, 1996, Fuazud
P rucial one preventing the achiev
w
IMO, 1996; Winbow, 1999; Mahapatra, 2007; Fuazudeen
subjectivity in interpretation and application of the Convention, giving rise to various 
standards of education (IMO, 1996; Fuazudeen, 2008; Horck, 2008b; Prasad, 2008b) 
and loss of confidence in the Convention; it was decided that the time was right for a 
comprehensive review (Dearsley, 1994; IMO, 1996; Mahapatra, 2007; Prasad, 
2008b). 
 
Other issues that were discussed included the role of the human factor in casualties 
and fatigue. Communication was an occasion
c
which was also seen as a possible factor in casualties (IMO, 1986a).  The IMO has 
therefore been discussing non-technical issues as part of the training regime for over 
20 years, beginning with a submission by the Republic of Liberia on the dangers of 
fatigue (IMO, 1986b). The International 
) also submitted a Note (IMO, 1986c) 
.  
pment in the understanding of fatigue was evidenced by the te
onal and human (including the psychological) aspects that later entered the 
ions (IMO, 1988, 1991). Recommendations were made that factors 
uting to fatigue should be taken into account in 
revision of the principles of safe m
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communication, training, fatigue, and reporting of unsafe practices. Much emphasis 
was placed on fatigue. It is apparent then that fatigue became the first major non-
technical issue to be considered as regards the STCW Convention. IMO Assembly 
resolution A. 18/Res. 772 (1993) indicated, among other things, that: “The objective 
is to increase awareness of the complexity of fatigue and to encourage all parties 
involved in ship operations to take these factors into account when making 
operational decisions.” The annex stated explicitly the dangers of fatigue and fatigue 
inducing elements situated in the technical, organizational and the human domain. 
Those elements in the human domain included multinational crews, which may 
introduce language barriers leading to “social, cultural and religious isolation” and 
the impact these may have on safety (IMO, 1993).  Resolution .772 became part of 
the deliberations on the first comprehensive review.  
 
4.8  FIRST COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW 
The first joint MSC/MEPC Working Group meeting discussed human factor issues 
that were to be taken into consideration when examining system design or 
recommended practices or procedures for human factor implications (IMO, 1992) as 
shown in Figure 4-1. Items in the call out box are further details presented in the 
source document that are direct subject matters of the behavioural sciences.  
 
 
Figure 4-1: IMO Guidelines on Fatigue: List of human factor items. 
Source: IMO Guidelines on Fatigue 
List of Items to be explored in examining system design or recommended practices or procedures 
for human
 
 factor implications:- 
• Physical capabilities required for effective human performance 
• Mental capabilities required for effective human performance 
• Minimum required training or experience 
• Critical information required for effective human performance 
• Associated events (workload) 
• Degree of precision required for effective human performance 
• Communication skills 
• Time critical factors 
• Procedural considerations 
• Design considerations for operation and maintenance 
• Any other relevant factor 
 
-Information processing 
-Memory 
-Attention 
-Mental workload 
-Fatigue 
-Decision-making 
 63
 This demonstrated a level of awareness within the IMO of the complexity of fatigue 
and the involvement of the psychological aspects. However the amendments made to 
the Convention were not commensurate with this realization. 
 
Rightly or wrongly, the deliberations on the human factor began on the premise that 
“…human error is the major contributing cause of maritime casualties and pollution 
incidents…” which became the motivation for the comprehensive approach to 
examining and finding solutions to the human factor problem. However the “devil is 
in the details,” as Cox and Flin (2000) said of culture. An examination of the 
amendments that emerged from these deliberations presents a lesser picture than the 
deliberations promised. The aims of the review, as listed by STW 28th, “Outcome of 
the 1995 STCW and STCW-F Conferences…” (IMO, 1996) are shown in Figure 4-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2:  Aims of the STCW 1978 first comprehensive revision 
Source: IMO 1996, p.5 
 
The absence of specific reference to the human factor as an aim should not be taken 
as trivial as it reflects the minimal attention given to the “soft” skills.  The aims as 
laid down were achieved: technical competence was addressed (Dearsley, 1994; 
 was introduced (Regulation 
The main aims of the revision were: 
1. to transfer all detailed technical requirements to an associated Code; 
2. to clarify the skills and competence required and take account of 
modern training methods; 
3. to require Administrations to maintain direct control over and endorse 
the qualifications of those masters, officers and radio personnel they 
authorize to serve on their ships; 
4. to make parties to the convention accountable to each other, through 
IMO, for their proper implementation of the Convention and the quality 
of their training and certification activities: and 
5. to have the amendments enter into force for all Parties to the 
Convention with the least possible delay. 
Gauw, 1994; Winbow, 1999); quality standard system
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I/8, Section A-I/8); enforcement and accountability were addressed (Regulation I/7), 
Regulation I/6, Section 
 
  factor 
A total of 32 papers and notes w ittee 
meeting (IMO, 1995), the final meeting in respect of the review. Of these, only 4 
made re nce making 
recommendation evel is 
not the purview  was to include fatigue under paragraph 
III/I Fitness for Duty in purely ph ent in 
asualties, inclu  the grounding of the bulk 
arrier Rose, w , and 
ecision makin uld have reflected more than a 
ng the founding principle of 
   
and the ensuing “white list” of complaint countries could have their systems 
examined by any other member state for purposes of recognition of certificates 
(Regulation I/10). Qualifications for lecturers and assessors (
A-I/6 paragraph 7) were also included ensuring that not only the standards were in 
place, but that trainers were qualified to deliver. These provisions sought to include 
the major stakeholders such as the companies (Regulation I/14), strengthened by the 
ISM Code that was being developed simultaneously, as well as maritime education 
and training institutions (Fisher & Muirhead, 2005). These final provisions were 
necessary, and responded to the industry’s call for a more robust training regime 
(Fuazudeen, 2008) however a training regime translated in technical terms resulting 
in an acknowledgment a few years later that the human factor has been somewhat 
neglected (O’Neil, 2002).  
4.8.1. Addressing the human
ere submitted to the 27  STW subcommth
fere  to human factor relating to fatigue with one of the 4 
s for provisions to be deleted on the grounds that manning l
 of the STCW. The decision
V ysiological terms.  The role of human elem
ding casualty discussions, for examplec
c here factors such as communication, leadership, teamwork
g were involved (IMO, 1986d) cod
perfunctory mentioning in the final document consideri
the Code states that:
RECALLING that a large percentage of maritime casualties and pollution 
incidents are caused by human error, 
APPRECIATING that one effective means of reducing the risks associated 
with human error in the operation of seagoing ships is to ensure that the 
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highest practicable standards of training, certification and competence are 
maintained in respect of the seafarers who are employed on such ships, … 
(IMO, 2001, Resolution 2, p.1.) 
There is a gap between this principle and the provisions made. Competence should 
be interpreted as also having non-technical skills (Barnett, et. al., 2006).  Appendix 5 
compares the provisions with the PSFs as identified in the literature. Considering the 
social and psychological aspects of the PSFs discussed at the time and their impact 
on safe performance (IMO, 1993), the provisions under Fitness for Duty, Regulation 
VIII/1, A-VIII/1 (IMO 2001) are insufficient (Smith, 2007).  Regulation VIII, A-
VIII/1 and A-VIII/2 are mostly operational while the psychological and social 
psychological permeates the operations but go unattended. The crew must be 
competent in all tasks, the master is responsible for ensuring his crew is fit for duty, 
not knowing the various forms fitness for duty may take and how to identify such, 
ill compromise the master’s ability to be fully effective.  
isis management, crowd management and human behaviour, 
but the
ineffec ory, and these model courses have also 
been fo
 
w
 
Noting the existence of sub-standard ships, the impact would have also been greater 
to include Bridge Resource Management (BRM) under the compulsory education, 
making it the responsibility of MET. Although reference is made in Table A-II/1 and 
A-II/2 to knowledge of effective bridge teamwork, the details are absent and 
therefore left open to interpretation. Guidance given in B-VIII/2 calls for companies 
to issue guidance on BRM. BRM and personnel management, were not mentioned 
for officers and masters in charge of a navigational watch on vessels less than 500 
gross tonnage.  
 
Later amendments gave attention to non-technical aspects as regards passenger 
vessels in the areas of cr
se requirements do not apply to cargo vessels. The model courses are also 
tive if the provisions are not compuls
und to be inadequate (Horck, 2006). 
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4.9 CU
The pr
technic eficient (Kanev, 2003; Pekcan, et. al., 2005; 
d it is proposed to revise 
hapter VIII to include more explicit provisions for rest schedules (IMO, 2007b), a 
tressors on the seafarer. This proposal also saw the benefit of 
creasing fatigue awareness as contributing to a safety base culture on board. 
ness and possible impact on attitude that 
ay be achieved through training will serve to complement the other efforts such as 
RRENT COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW: HUMAN FACTOR 
ovisions in the STCW convention as amended for the development of non-
al skills have been found to be d
Barnett, et. al., 2006; Fuazudeen, 2008). Relative to other industries such as aviation, 
the provisions for crisis management and human behaviour are considered immature 
(Pekcan, et. al., 2005; Barnett, et. al., 2006). Another comprehensive review is 
underway which promises improved provisions in the area of the “soft” skills 
(Mahapatra, 2007). 
 
 4.9.1 Fatigue  
Fatigue continues to be of major concern as a key PSF within the maritime industry 
(Lang, 2001; MIAB, 2004; Hetherington, 2006; IMO, 2007a & 2008). A step 
forward is imminent with the inclusion of mandatory fatigue management training 
for seafarers. While manning levels are still discussed, an
C
submission was also made on the premise that “the best means to improve 
understanding of fatigue is to develop and offer courses that provide tangible and 
practical methods of fatigue management” (IMO, 2007c, p.15). The recommendation 
is for new competence to be added to Table A VI/1-4 to improve personal safety and 
social responsibility training in fatigue management. The competence suggested 
were, inter alia, importance of obtaining necessary rest; effects of sleep on circadian 
rhythm; effects of schedule changes on mariners, fatigue; and effects of physical and 
environmental s
in
 
The proposal was supported by the majority and is under consideration. A few 
Members were in disagreement as they saw fatigue mitigation only in terms of the 
organization of work and therefore no need for training in fatigue management. Yet  
it is the position of this writer that the aware
m
 67
work scheduling and rest periods, making for a more robust approach to fatigue and 
d that BRM is made mandatory. Therefore Tables A-II/1 and A-
/2 are to be amended to include key elements of BRM. It was proposed that key 
urce management (ERM) are also considered for 
on, as 
roposed by a delegation.  
shipboard safety culture (Smith, 2007).  
 
 4.9.2 Bridge Resource Management 
Accidents such as the Attilio Ievoli where the investigations revealed that the bridge 
crew was not clear on their roles and responsibilities, provide evidence for increased 
focus on proper BRM. This is being given attention in the current review. It was 
suggested and agree
II
elements of engine room reso
mandatory inclusion (IMO, 2008). Care should be taken that the contents address the 
salient issues of teamwork, group cohesion and perception, and that BRM is not seen 
solely in terms of work allocation. 
 
 4.9.3 Communication and Leadership 
Leadership, management skills, situational awareness and decision making are 
proposed for inclusion in a new section, A-VI/6 (IMO 2007d). The proposal saw the 
need for seafarers in any capacity to receive appropriate training or instructions in 
leadership and communication skills. These include both cognitive and social skills. 
Details were outlined which attempted to be comprehensive. However this 
dissertation is suggesting that there are additional elements which may further 
strengthen the provisions such as knowledge of perception and perceptive biases 
which play a role in situation awareness, as is discussed in Chapter 5. Cultural 
differences and language were also seen as a necessary inclusion in this secti
p
 
Additionally, another delegation recommended a holistic approach where BRM, 
ERM, leadership and communication should be amalgamated as they all relate to the 
human behaviour and human resources. However, this recommendation was not 
supported (IMO 2008). Instead, it was suggested that training in communication, 
 68
leadership and situational awareness should be applicable only to deck and engine 
officers; but as Mahapatra (2007) rightly observes, any crew member can be thrust in 
 leadership role depending on the situation. The decision arrived at by the sub-
ommi I/6 and include the major parts of 
lude in Code B, B-VIII/2 parts 4 and 5, guidelines 
lating to alcohol and drug abuse. Recommendations are now on the table for 
her substance abuse have not been 
raining for a seafarer safety representative is being discussed as one method to 
a
c ttee was to split the proposed Table A-V
leadership in Tables A-II/2 and A-III/3 at the management level (IMO, 2008). While 
the agreed elements are an improvement, this writer maintains that it would be 
beneficial for the on board safety culture, as in the case of fatigue management, to 
have all crew given knowledge to assist in their personal and professional 
development. The holistic approach proposed should be considered.  
 
 4.9.4 Other Human Factor Considerations 
Alcohol limits, which appeared on the agenda in the 1980s is also under discussion. 
The outcome at the time was to inc
re
inclusion in the mandatory section.  Alcohol and ot
included for major discussion in this dissertation, although a PSFs this demands its 
own account. In one case, the Jacki Moon, the investigator stated that alcohol may 
have been a contributing factor to the watch officer falling asleep, combined with 
him being fatigued. The purpose of mention here is to caution the approach to 
alcohol as a sensitive issue as it relates to the welfare and health of seafarers and that 
it should be approached with understanding. A few responses from seafarers 
(Appendix 2) revealed that alcohol is used as a coping strategy onboard in times of 
stress and depression. Alcohol therefore should not be discussed in isolation of the 
influencing welfare factors that are a cause for concern (Kahveci, 2007). 
 
T
develop on board safety culture. Such a person would be intricately involved in 
aspects of the vessel operations that relate specifically to the occupational health and 
safety of the seafarer (IMO, 2007e). This is also an improvement on the existing 
situation, but reflects the tendency to compartmentalize knowledge and skills. The 
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presence of such a person should not preclude everyone benefitting from appropriate 
knowledge and skills and being informed so as to take their share of personal 
responsibility for on board safety culture. 
 
4.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The chapter focuses on the discussions surrounding the deficiencies in seafarer 
training as regards the “soft” skills. It examined learning theories and delivery 
methods to indicate that structures exist for effective delivery, the challenge is to 
harness the strengths with the appropriate content. The chapter also notes that 
afarers need to become “culturally literate” (Benton, 2006); culture affects the 
 operations (Dzugan & Renping, 
ed that the 
utcome was not commensurate to the level of discussions that took place regarding 
se
interpersonal dynamics on board and impinge on safe
1999; Benton, 2006; Horck, 2006, 2008a). This view was expressed much earlier 
when Lloyd’s Ship Manager (Seafarers training needs…, 1992, p.53) quoted Martyn 
Dyer-Smith, psychologist and former navigating officer, as saying “In addition to 
focusing on technical skills, training of ‘the seafarer-of-the-future’ may well 
increasingly have to include social-psychological dimensions”  
 
The chapter also reviews the STCW convention as one of the pillars of the safety 
culture regime of the maritime industry. It looks specifically at the human factor 
provisions in light of criticisms that the Convention was limited in that regard. A 
retrospective review of discussions leading to the first comprehensive review was 
done to ascertain provisions as regards the human factor. It was revealed that the 
human factor has been a longstanding agenda item in relation to fatigue and 
communication in particular, but also leadership. The review reveal
o
the human factor. A current review is underway and the promise of improved 
provisions to develop the “soft” skills seems far greater than in the previous 
comprehensive review. The hope is that these receive the support of the Member 
States. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE HUMAN
Idiosyncrasi
 CONDITION 
es in Action 
 
 
W ompared to what lies within us –  
Filipino officers and 
ratings were remarkable.  Filipino officers did not take their meals in the 
(US Coast Guard, 2005, investigation into the explosion and sinking of the 
Bow Mariner) 
hat lies behind us and what lies before us are small matters c
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
On February 28, 2004, the vessel caught fire and exploded while the crew 
was engaged in tank cleaning. Of the 27 crew members aboard, six 
abandoned ship and made it to a life raft and were rescued. An unknown 
number abandoned ship to the water, three were rescued, one deceased and 
the other two died before reaching the hospital.  The crew composition was 
Greek senior officers and Filipino junior officers and ratings. 
 
The distinctions between the Greek senior officers and 
officers’ mess, were given almost no responsibility and were closely 
supervised in every task. The second assistant engineer reported that on 
arriving on the vessel for the first time he inquired of his duties and was 
sternly told he would be given verbal job orders daily, and was to do only as 
he was told and would have no administrative duties beyond making log 
entries. There was a lack of trust in the deck department. The surviving deck 
crew reported that the chief officer would not sleep beyond short naps in a 
chair in the cargo control room during cargo operations.  When questioned 
as to what they would do if instructed to do something unsafe by one of the 
senior officers each crewman replied that they would do as they were ordered. 
“Orders from the Greeks were like words from God.”[Author’s emphasis] 
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The Bow Mariner represents a textbook case for leadership, power, authority, 
destructive obedience, cultural diversity, communication, teamwork and violation. 
These are all interrelate the autocratic style of 
leadership compounded by mistrust on onboard, which impacted poor teamwork
symp
destructive obedience as the subordinates’ response to power and au
 
elected cases (Appendix 1), discusses a selection of 
the com
sea. Th
view to
educati
an awa
develop es and provide 
him with the knowledge to counter the effects in his work and personal environments.  
There a
such as
the com
 
5.2 
The lit
underst
The PS
and soc
to unde
system
underly
integra
mediate
(Esgate 2005; Chandler, 2008). Cognitive processes are useful 
d. ed Culture may have influenc
, 
toms of which are poor communication and lack of group cohesion, resulting in 
thority. 
This chapter, with reference to s
mon cognitive and behavioural human factor challenges impacting safety at 
ese are described alongside the corresponding psychological theory with a 
 offering insight into the human condition as well as to suggest areas for 
on and training. It is believed, to use the maxim, “knowledge is power”, that 
reness and understanding of the mechanisms leading to such behaviours, will 
 an appreciation in the seafarer for these human idiosyncrasi
re however challenges to engaging the behavioural sciences in a holistic way 
 availability of trainers with seafaring and behavioural sciences background, 
mitment of MET, to name a few, however these are not insurmountable. 
THE BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES 
erature thus far has shown the importance of the behavioural sciences in 
anding and finding solutions to the human factor challenges to safety culture. 
Fs explored, pertain to the cognitive and behavioural domain of psychology 
ial psychology. Cognitive psychology was developed in response to the need 
rstand cognitive limitations and capabilities of human operators of technical 
s (Esgate & Groome, 2005).  It involves the study of the mechanisms 
ing sensory cues - sight, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching – and how they 
te with existing mental repertoires built by culture and socialization and 
d by culture and context to make judgments and therefore drive actions 
 & Groome, 
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mechanisms provided by nature through which humans view and come to understand 
the world. Yet these mechanisms are also wrought with “errors” that may have 
negative outcomes (Esgate & Groome, 2005).  
 
A useful book was written by Stadler (1987) some years ago on the Psychology of 
Sailing: the seas’s effects on mind and body. Although it spoke about sailing, it also 
as relevance for merchant shipping. Stadler (1987) premised his book on the fact 
ther 
to the starboard of the first. The master ordered had to starboard helm. When 
 hard to port helm. Shortly afterwards 
h
that “we sail with mind and body…we do not function on a boat in purely physical 
capacity, rather life at sea affects the entire being, behaviour and personality.” He 
believes that recognition of the psychological and social psychological phenomena, 
which are encountered at sea, can enhance one’s ability to identify and therefore 
cope with them. This has to be learnt through education and training, how to 
recognize these phenomena and so alerted to the need to at times seek further 
information, to question one’s judgment or the judgment of others in times of doubt. 
On approaching the Nab Tower, the master thought he saw the light of 
another vessel and ordered a starboard helm to avoid collision before going 
to the front of the bridge to confirm what he thought he had seen. The second 
officer also joined him and confirmed the red light and said he saw ano
no further lights were seen he ordered
the vessel collided with the tower. The source of the red light had not been 
determined. (excerpt from MAIB, (2000), investigation into the Dole 
America collision). 
 
The master in this instance sought confirmation from the second officer, but then 
there is the matter of dealing with the idiosyncrasies of others and cultural influences 
mediating responses to leadership and authority, as Shakespeare so deftly 
demonstrates: 
Hamlet:  Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in shape of a camel? 
Polonius:  By the Mass, and ‘tis like a camel indeed. 
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Hamlet:  Methinks it is like a weasel. 
Polonius:  It is backed like a weasel. 
Hamlet:  Or like a whale? 
Polonius:  Very like a whale. 
The stu
number
sometim
2008). 
might s
 
From Shakespeare’s Hamlet (Act II, Scene II) (quoted from Chandler, 2008) 
5.3 PERCEPTION AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS  
Perception is the cognitive area of interest in this dissertation. Perception is of two 
types, namely how we perceive objects, particularly visual perception, and how we 
perceive others.  Perception is the first action in a sequence of actions relating to 
situational awareness: First the situation is perceived, that is taking in information, 
this leads to comprehension and then projection as to likely future developments and 
decision making.15
 
dy of perception alerts us to the fact that we see differently based on a 
 of factors such as culture, gender, moods; and that there are grounds to 
es question what we think we see (Zebrowitz, 1990; Geller, 2001; Chandler, 
Figure 5.1 has been used in perception exercises to demonstrate how we 
ee differently depending on factors of salience to us. 
 
Figu 1: Duck or hare? 
Source: Chandler (2008) 
                                 
re 5.
                
15 Maritime Resource Management seminar, August 19, 2008 at the Swedish Club. 
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The report on the D the contributory causes, lack of 
situatio ptain was aware of the situation, but 
the situ  perc rate from Barnett (2005, p.134):  
ak  kind that all men are liable to make on 
occasions. Seeing what they expect to see; not seeing what they should see, 
 all, in 
ing rooted in irrational or maladaptive tendencies, [or unusual or 
unexpected situations – author’s addition] these recurrent error forms have 
iences if erroneous acts are to be understood and effectively managed. If there had 
indeed been a vessel, as the master perceived the situation, then his actions would 
have prevented a collision.  
 
To compound the situation for the master of the Dole America, he was sure that there 
was another vessel present and the likelihood of an accident, evidenced by his helm 
order even before going to the bridge window to have a closer look and asking the 
second officer’s opinion. The vessel initially had a pilot who informed the master of 
two other inbound vessels. The master therefore may have focused his attention on 
what he thought was a situation to avoid, a collision, being “primed” regarding the 
passage of the other vessels leading to confirmation bias. In this case the master 
ole America noted among 
n awareness. This is a misnomer as the ca
ation as he eived it.  To reite
[Seafarers m e] mistakes of the
failing to recognize a mistake in a colleague, reacting too late, or not at
the face of the unexpected.  
 
It does not however have to be in unexpected situations. The master expected the 
vessel. What this writer calls human idiosyncrasies occur in everyday normal 
situations. They are a part of being human. To again repeat an earlier reference 
Reason (1990, p.1) notes: 
Far from be
their origins in fundamentally useful psychological processes. Ernst Mach 
(1905) put it well: “Knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources, 
only success can tell the one for the other.”  
 
Reason (1990) therefore makes a case for an engagement with the behavioural 
sc
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consulted the second officer who responded in the affirmative. The report however 
noted that the second officer had returned not long before from escorting the pilot out; 
therefore, his vision might not have adjusted to the darkened bridge; another 
percept
 
Priming
to be a  that which obtained on the Dole America, in 
hich case, priming is a phenomenon where a situation is judged based on recently 
of seeing what is expected. 
 
Figure 
to as th
an old w
 
ive limitation.  
 is often used in person perception (Zebrowitz, 1990); however, it is possible 
dapted to situations such as
w
activated scripts. The master, having been informed by the pilot, of the inbound 
vessels, was “primed” and therefore channelled his expectations in that direction and 
confirmed this when he “saw” the red light. Priming may therefore lead to 
confirmation bias in terms 
5-2 is another typical picture used in perception exercises, sometimes referred 
e wife and the mother-in-law. Depending on how one is primed one will see 
oman or a young woman. 
  
Figure 5-2: The young woman and the old hag 
Source: Zebrowitz, L. (1990). 
 
Confirmation bias is the tendency to look for information that confirms beliefs and to 
ignore other information that may be contradictory (Esgate & Groome, 2005). The 
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master of the Dole America, due to his expectation of the inbound vessel may have 
led himself to believe he saw a red light and if that light was present, he may have 
led himself to believe it belonged to a vessel about to collide with his. 
 
Confirmation bias also occurs when cues are used to confirm initial hypothesis and 
perceives him/herself to be in 
ontrol of an uncontrollable event (Esgate & Groome, 2005). Such a perception 
is “over-confidence” in 
peating that act. From the outset of the events the master remained optimistic about 
the weather conditions not deteriorating and when it did, he was optimistic about a 
successful outcome of the rescue. However, the result was the death of a rescue 
personnel. 
 
Illusion of control is also useful in understanding perceptions of risk and therefore 
attitude and behaviour towards risks. Persons who feel they are in control or have an 
“it will not happen to me” attitude (Geller, 2001) or the machismo and confidence in 
the equipment, will be less likely to take precautionary measures; recall the master of 
e “unsinkable” Titanic. 
one of the actions discussed as regards perception were malicious; these were 
thus markings are interpreted incorrectly (Hetherington, et. al., 2006). This may have 
been the case in the Royal Majesty grounding where the report stated that several 
cues indicating that the vessel was off course were present yet these did not alert the 
officers to that fact and the vessel ran aground 17 miles off its course. 
 
Another concept of relevance to situational awareness as regards perception is 
illusion of control. This is the situation whereby one 
c
exists in situations where earlier successes were experienced. In the case of the 
Green Lily the report indicated that the master had taken his vessel through poor 
weather conditions, and this may have contributed to h
re
th
 
N
genuine beliefs in the situation as was perceived at the time and actions were taken, 
or not taken accordingly. There is also a place for bravado and confidence in the 
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social world as nature’s way of imprinting survival models. This is the complexity of 
people and what it means to be humans (Geller, 2001). Therefore, the importance of 
awareness as regards these human idiosyncrasies cannot be overemphasized.  
aviour” in the 
autical Institute’s Alert newsletter (Rogue behaviour is …2008). The understanding 
s, under pilotage, were proceeding at unsafe speeds for the fog condition,  
as cited as both masters’ “over-reliance” on the pilots. 
 
5.3.1 Complacency and Diffusion of Responsibility 
Failure to adequately assess a situation may also be due to complacency. 
Complacency is becoming another frequently used term in the maritime industry to 
describe a seafarer’s lack of vigilance during watchkeeping (Hetherington, et. al., 
2006). It has been named as one of the manifestations of “rogue beh
N
from this label is that operators will monitor less effectively when there is 
automation, more so when the automation has been effective over time (Hetherington, 
et. al. 2006). Although speaking of the technology, Lützhöft and Dekker (2002) tell 
us that automation creates new error pathways. New error pathways may also be 
created on the part of the operator as Stadler (1987) observed, “these devices 
translate the psychological problems into another medium where they reappear in  
more serious forms.” Complacency may be one of those forms where there is over-
reliance on automation, as may have been the case of the Royal Majesty. A 
contributory factor in the collision between the Skagern and Samskip Courier, where 
both vessel
w
 
Hetherington, et. al., (2006) in search of an explanation for complacency asks the 
question if automation results in “some kind of cognitive lackadaisicalness? This 
dissertation is suggesting that such behaviour is possibly a case of diffusion of 
responsibility.  
 
The concept diffusion of responsibility was developed in the early years of social 
psychology (the 1970s) in response to the murder of a young lady, Kitty Genovese. 
What prompted the foray into a series of research was that there were witnesses to 
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the murder yet nobody went to her assistance even after the murderer left and 
returned to continue the assault (Aron & Aron, 1986). The incident led to several 
studies in pro-social or helping behaviour. The initial research discovered that the 
ore persons who witness someone in need, the less likely that person will be 
assisted c  Aron, 1986). Other 
es to become distracted also 
iffused their responsibilities to the automated system, or the other members of the 
situations of fatigue, particularly when there is a lone watchkeeper, a 
ossible explanation for the grounding of the Jacki Moon (MAIB, 2005). 
m
, as ea h person is thinking the other will assist. (Aron &
explanations have emerged for helping behaviour since then, but diffusion of 
responsibility remains a worthwhile concept. 
 
In a modified form, diffusion of responsibility provides a plausible explanation for 
complacency on the bridge rather than the more negative “why bother” attitude that 
the Alert is suggesting (Rogue behaviour is …2008). In the presence of “others” such 
as the pilot or an automated system, perceived as reliable, some of the responsibility 
will be diffused. The watchkeeping officers, consciously or unconsciously will 
become less vigilant. However, through education along with attitude change, an 
appreciation for continuous vigilance may be instilled. It is believed that revelation 
of the underpinning mechanisms will serve to bolster the principles and provisions 
for watchkeeping.   
 
 5.3.2 Distraction 
A similar analysis may be applied to distraction, which is another finding in casualty 
investigations. It is likely that those who allow themselv
d
watch team. For example, the mate who was on watch at the time of the grounding of 
the Bunga Teratai Satu (ATSB16, 2001) was said to have been distracted by private 
calls his wife was making to their family home. Diffusion of responsibility is also 
highly likely in 
p
Watchkeepers take comfort in the presence of the automation. 
 
                                                 
16 Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
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5.3.3 Violations 
Violations in shipboard operations are yet another human factor contribution to 
maritime accidents. Except for accounts in accident investigations where rules were 
broken, this area has not been studied in the maritime industry. Violations include 
acts such as not adhering to company policies, for example the Attilio Ievoli, where 
the master chose to use the west Solent contrary to company instructions;  
professional misconduct such as the officer of the watch on the Bunga Teratai Satu 
r the pilot on the Crimson Mars who both were distracted by use of their mobile 
ted with ethics, versus conventional violations associated more 
ith etiquette and social acceptability, such as wearing jeans to a formal affair. 
onven  as dependent on authority, and moral rules are seen as 
olations and morality, 
ediated by affect (Nichols, 2002), then perhaps rules will be obeyed. Manuel (2005) 
has suggested education in the affective domain to develop such values and attitudes 
o
telephones. Violations stem from a complex interplay of psychological and 
philosophical perceptions regarding rules and risks and may therefore affect how a 
situation is evaluated. 
 
  5.3.3.1  Rules 
Attitudes to rules may be based on whether these rules are seen to have moral 
underpinnings (Nichols & Mallon, 2006).  Nichols (2002) distinguishes between 
morals and conventional violations.  Moral violations, such as directly hurting 
someone, is associa
w
C tional rules are viewed
wrong regardless of domain. This view is instructive for the maritime industry. 
 
The question is: Does the seafarer see it as morally wrong to violate rules? Where 
rules are perceived as “conventional” and their violation in the interest of commerce 
may be supported by the company, then there is no moral dilemma associated with 
their violation. Additionally, if the rules and procedures are seen negatively as 
creating more work and adding to the stress of the seafarer, then overlooking such 
rules will not be the source of any discomfort. However, if rules are seen as a matter 
of ethics, and the connection can be made between such vi
m
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so that ave ethically regardless of the company with which he 
d by perceived rather than actual risk and is related to illusion 
f control. Persons with lower perception of risk may also feel they have control over 
. Also, the master of the Green Lily may 
ssary 
urden. The opposite scenario is where protective equipment actually served to 
or not fit for his post… 
 a seafarer would beh
works. This dissertation takes that suggestion a step further to suggest that the 
content of such affective education comes from the behavioural sciences. An 
example of a pilot who refused to fly in an unsafe situation and was fired (Dekker, 
2006) represents the attitude that is desirable for the seafarer in the presence of 
substandard shipping. The seafarer however has to be empowered with the mindset 
to take such actions. 
 
  5.3.3.2  Risks 
Violations are also mediated by ones perceptions of risk. Geller (2001) notes that 
behaviour is determine
o
situations, the Titanic again comes to mind
have been operating on perceived risks and therefore made the choice to leave port in 
poor weather conditions. This makes the management of safety even more 
challenging. At this level, rules, regulations, and procedures are no defences against 
such risks, the defences have to come from within where informed choices are made 
(HSL, 2002). Vuren (2000) as quoted in the HSL (2002) review, in a study of the 
Dutch steel industry found that “enormous risks” were taken and the use of personal 
protective equipment was not treated seriously and considered to be unnece
b
reduce the perception of risk and so the worker engages in more risk taking 
behaviours (Geller, 2001).  
 
5.4 TEAMWORK, LEADERSHIP AND POWER 
Many years ago there lived an Emperor who was exceedingly fond of fine 
new clothes that he spent vast sums of money on dress… one day two 
swindlers, calling themselves weavers, arrived. They declared that they could 
make the most magnificent cloth that one could imagine; … the clothes made 
from it had the special power of being invisible to everyone who was stupid 
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So the Emperor gave the swindlers large sums of money and the two weavers 
set up their looms in the palace… They demanded the finest thread of the best 
silk and the finest gold and they pretended to work. Now the Emperor was 
eager to know how much of the cloth was finished. He was, however, 
somewhat uneasy to look. He decided to send his faithful old minister. He will 
best be able to see how the cloth looks. He is far from stupid and splendid at 
his work. The minister saw nothing. But he did not say so... To the Emperor 
he said…"The cloth… is truly magnificent." 
reen Lily left port Lerwick for the Ivory Coast in poor 
 during pumping out of the 
waters 
weathe
failure 
investig
predict
                                                
The Emperor became anxious to see the costly stuff for 
himself…accompanied by a number of selected ministers. He saw nothing. 
"What can this mean?"… Am I so stupid? Am I not fit to be Emperor?... he 
thought. But aloud he said, "Oh, the cloth is perfectly wonderful. They 
advised the Emperor to have some new clothes made to wear in the great 
procession the following day… And so the next day the Emperor set off at the 
head of the procession. All the people standing by cheered and cried, "Oh, 
how splendid are the Emperor's new clothes. But among the crowds a child 
suddenly gasped out, "But he hasn't got anything on." And the people began 
to whisper to one another what the child had said…The Emperor himself had 
the uncomfortable feeling that what they were whispering was… true. "But I 
will have to go through with the procession," he said to himself. (Stephen 
Corrin, 1964) 17
On November 18, 1997, G
weather conditions. The vessel experienced flooding and
the main engine stopped. Attempts at rescue were hampered by severe 
r conditions resulting in a fatality.   In addition to lack of propulsion and 
to start the engine as the main factors leading to the grounding, the 
ators also listed the master’s imprudence to sail in view of the prevailing and 
ed weather conditions and an overly-optimistic attitude about a successful 
 
mperor’s New Clothes by Ha17 The E ns Christian Andersen (1805-75), adapted by Stephen Corrin.  
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outcom
decisio
about t
Leader
greatly
the sto
perpetu  is also a likely response to 
leadership, one does not want to expose one’s ignorance of a situation or that one 
does no
the sto
expecti
questio
challen
withou
environ
Shipbo
Like an
“orders
reports
leaders ribed, are inimical to healthy operational, professional and 
social relationships on board. Leadership impacts teamwork and accompanying 
ce. It was discovered that people have a 
e. The report documented an autocratic leadership style resulting in poor 
n making and, not unlike the story above, at least one officer was concerned 
he master’s decision to sail but no one openly questioned him. 
ship and attitudes to leaders are key aspects of any social organization and 
 affects positively or negatively subordinates’ responses. Like the ministers in 
ry, none of the officers “challenged” the master’s decision, they assisted in 
ating a negative situation. “Face-saving”
t understand, least it is construed as a personality flaw. Like the Emperor in 
ry, the master of the Green Lily made no contingency plans, optimistically 
ng a successful conclusion in the face of a worsening situation and no one 
ned his decisions, as they were not themselves empowered to make such a 
ge; the outcome is at a minimum embarrassment when the master is “left 
t his clothes”, or worst a casualty, loss of lives, property and damage to the 
ment.  
ard structure is rigid and maintains the traditional hierarchy (Østreng, 2001). 
 Emperor, the master is Lord of his vessel or indeed given “god-like” status 
 from the Greeks were like words from God.” (Bow Mariner). Many accident 
 have cited lack of teamwork as a contributory cause. Such views of 
hip as just desc
factors of communication, group cohesiveness, power distance and destructive 
obedience. However, the gravity of power relations on board is not commensurate 
with the attention it gets in the maritime industry (Sampson, 2003).  
 
5.4.1 Destructive Obedience 
Destructive obedience has become a cause for concern in the maritime industry 
(Sampson, 2002). In 1963 at Yale University, behavioural scientists were exploring 
obedience and the power of social influen
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destructive deference for authority that resulted in destructive obedience (Aron & 
Aron, 1986). Destructive obedience lies in obeying incorrect orders, (Bow Mariner) 
keeping quiet rather than volunteering information (Green Lily) to prevent a negative 
situation, or not “challenging” incorrect decisions (Domiat). Policies and procedures 
ion into the Bow Mariner explicitly commented on the lack of 
t was discovered 
that group cohesion may be created through the presence of a superordinate goal18 
(Aron & Aron, 1986; Hayes, 1993; Brewer & Miller, 1996; Brown, 2000). Yet what 
are weak defences against such human conditions as destructive obedience. It is 
assumed that no seafarer goes to sea with the intent of causing a grounding or 
collision and putting their lives at risk, such human responses should therefore be 
understood from the human perspective. 
 
The term power distance has been co-opted to the maritime scenario to explain the 
power relations between the master and his sub-ordinates and the negative impact on 
shipboard operations. Power relations on the Bow Mariner is stark evidence of its 
destructive outcome. 
 
 5.4.2 Teamwork and Group Cohesiveness 
The investigat
cohesion onboard which also impacted communication. It may be extrapolated that 
this is directly related to the shipboard culture, a problem with mixed nationality 
crew (MARCOM, 1999; Horck, 2006, 2008a). The MARCOM (1999) project 
provides a list of national groupings that are incompatible onboard, although Greeks 
and Filipinos were not among the list, it does not preclude the development of such 
negative group dynamics. 
 
The behavioural sciences begun its foray into intergroup relations influenced by the 
events of World War II (Aron & Aron, 1986). In a series of studies i
has been discovered since then is that social/cultural identity, is a more powerful 
                                                 
18 Superordinate goals are situations affecting the groups welfare and which demand that the groups 
cooperate to achieve this common objective. 
 84
determinant of intergroup relations (Brewer & Miller, 1996, Brown, 2000). Social 
identity theory explains how a person’s personal identity is intricately associated 
with membership in a social/cultural group and affects relationships with other 
groups (Hayes, 1993; Brewer & Miller, 1996; Brown, 2000).  Negative intergroup 
relations on the Bow Mariner may be explained by social identity theory where the 
lines of group identity were clearly drawn on cultural differences. The individual 
identities of the Greek officers were expressed through their cultural grouping which 
affected relationships with the other cultural group, the Filipinos. As such 
ommunication was poor, leadership was autocratic, mistrust and apathy, and a lack 
 relevance for the Bow Mariner as regards culture is 
thnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is the belief that one’s culture is superior to others. 
001). It is not unreasonable to 
99) proposed the encouragement and promotion of social 
ctivities onboard to help overcome the impact of multicultural crew. Whereas this 
contacts may lead to heightened tensions (Hayes, 1993; Brewer & Miller, 1996; 
c
of care for the crew, permeated the shipboard culture and no doubt exacerbated the 
disaster.   
 
Another concept of
e
(Hayes, 1993; Brewer & Miller, 1996; Østreng, 2
extrapolate that this situation existed on the Bow Mariner resulting in mistrust of the 
Filipinos to perform tasks without being continuously supervised. Ethnocentrism can 
lead to prejudice and stereotypes. Although Kahveci et. al. (2002) did not find such 
tensions in their research, the hierarchy and social separations on some vessels as 
found by Østreng (2001) are pre-conditions for intergroup tensions.  
 
The MARCOM project (19
a
may be successful in some situations, it may not be in others. The senior officers on 
the Bow Mariner were all of one nationality sharing the same attitude towards their 
subordinates, therefore there was no one to initiate these activities. The company 
could very well give such directives, but there is no one from the company ensuring 
that these are carried out. Intergroup contact has to be carefully orchestrated as such 
MARCOM, 1999; Brown, 2000; Østreng, 2001). 
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 Education and training in cultural diversity has also been proposed as a way to 
counter such negative effects (Horck, 2006, 2008).  Care must however be taken to 
combine such education with positive mental models associated with cultural 
relativism, that is judging a culture by its own standards (Hayes, 1993). In agreement 
with MARCOM (1999), “…the idea is that there is knowledge and with further 
research, advances in understanding these issues can be made, companies do not 
have to learn by trial and error” likewise the seafarer and the maritime industry as a 
whole. However the challenges with companies that have been noted elsewhere in 
the dissertation, suggest that the place of such education is with the MET. 
 
5.5 FATIGUE 
urrent legislation, as said before, focuses on the physiological aspects. These 
Fatigue is the third factor affecting seafarers’ performance that this dissertation 
explores. Issues of mental health, wellbeing and welfare are grouped under fatigue as 
they have implications for its development (Smith, 2007). Fatigue has been discussed 
elsewhere in the dissertation. The emphasis here is that fatigue is a major risk factor 
for stress, mental health problems such as depression and it is implicated in acute 
illnesses of the seafarer (Stevenson, 2002; Smith, 2007) which it is suspected may 
lead to premature death (Smith, 2007). 
 
C
legislation have been found to be inadequate in the face of commercial pressures and 
so seafarers or companies falsify the work and rest records (Smith, 2007), again 
reference is made to the grounding of the Jacki Moon. Education regarding the 
severe negative effects of fatigue is among the suggestions for solutions as part of a 
holistic approach. Mental health problems, depression, wellbeing have to be dealt 
with from a behavioural sciences perspective. 
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5.6 CHALLENGES TO ENGAGING THE BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES 
his said however, there are a few challenges facing the use of the behavioural 
must be qualified persons with seafaring background or 
ions will require supporting data to ensure 
ccuracy in intervention methods. 
 received behavioural based approach 
creased their usage by 85-90%. The challenge will probably be in gaining the 
ommitment of the MET to adapt new ways of teaching.  
There is no doubt of the role of the behavioural sciences in addressing issues of safe 
behaviour in the actions of the people at the sharp end in the maritime industry. This 
has been borne out thus far in the exploration of the issues involved. The maritime 
industry has been engaging the sciences in a fragmented manner. Currently the call is 
for the introduction of fatigue, leadership, communication and cultural awareness 
training from separate directions.  This is a piecemeal approach, as the areas are 
interrelated. An amalgamated course of study to holistically deliver such courses, as 
well as incorporating into the technical aspects would be more beneficial. 
 
T
sciences. Firstly there 
seafaring knowledge to develop and teach these courses. The integration of, and 
relevance to seafaring is important.  
 
Secondly, empirical research is needed to ascertain the direct impacts of the PSFs 
and how the behavioural sciences can be modified to suit the situations. Cultural 
diversity and perceptions based on years of socialization and personality formation 
are difficult to impact. Such intervent
a
 
Thirdly, the content must be combined with behaviour and cognitive based 
approaches to behaviour change, as discussed in Chapter 4. The traditional methods 
of delivery will be ineffective. As HSL (2002) notes, in a case to convince workers in 
a metal fabrication plant to wear ear plugs: Those who received lectures on hearing 
conservation and threats with disciplinary actions did not increase their usage by 
more than 10%. The experimental group that
in
c
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Fourthly, the STCW Convention has to incorporate relevant provisions to ensure that 
…there is a psychological world behind the errors to do with people’s 
rs such as culture, socialization, individual 
ifferences, gender, mood, etc. A change in perspective can challenge initially held 
oural changes are necessary to combat the human 
iosyncrasies. We possess cognitive models that may be as useful as they may be 
such education and training become a part of the global standard. Problems with 
substandard shipping necessitate that some intervention to develop a safety culture is 
also directed at the seafarer who will need to take a stand in promoting safer shipping. 
However the implementation of provisions rests on the democratic machinery of the 
IMO and at times the machinery does not agree with what may seem a prudent 
course of action to others.  
 
5.7  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
attention, perception, decision making…” (Dekker, 2006, p.120). 
The chapter presented some of the human factor challenges to safety culture from a 
behavioural sciences perspective. Important is the realization that how we view the 
world is mediated by many facto
d
beliefs and is especially important for how others of a different culture are viewed, 
which may assist in multicultural relations on board. Figure 6.3 overleaf illustrates; 
turn the dissertation upside down and the situation appears less negative. 
 
Cognitive interventions and behavi
id
dangerous. The problem is that many of us go unaware of such mental forces. 
Lützhöft and Dekker (2002) analysing the Royal Majesty accident, presented 
insightful explanations of the negative effects when the mental models are not fully 
developed for a particular situation, they however focused on the technological and 
omitted to see that even if the correct mental models for the automation were in place, 
the grounding might still have occurred, as the mental models for human 
idiosyncrasies are lacking. 
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F
S
igure 6-3: Upside down head 
ource: Geller (2001)  
r impact on actions.  
 
 
A Behaviour based approach is the popular method of addressing attitude change as 
regards safety (HSL, 2002; Manuel, 2005; Broadbent, 2006; Al-Hemoud & Al-
Asfoor, 2006).  The premise is that behaviour is related to attitude and changing 
behaviour will lead to a change in attitude. However, changing attitude also involves 
inputting the right content, creating the awareness in the seafarer that as humans 
there are inbuilt mechanisms that may lead to erroneous acts. Such an undertaking 
belongs in the MET where these may be integrated with other courses of study to 
reinforce the lessons of thei
 
 89
CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCUSSION  
Part I 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This section discusses the information gathered from the responses and other sources 
of data. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is a discussion of select 
information according to the main concepts under exploration: safety culture, human 
factor (challenges to safety culture), MET, and the behavioural sciences. The second 
section presents a description of the aviation industry’s initiative to develop and 
promote a safety culture with specific reference to the use of the behavioural sciences 
in its CRM programme. 
 
It is recognized that the data is limited in terms of scientific rigor and therefore 
constrained in making generalizations, but it is adequate for exploratory purposes. 
The information gathered in the discussions and interviews were in-keeping with 
what was found in the literature. Information was gathered from sources as follows: 
iews/discussions with seafarers, 2 were currently serving 
MU. 
trips to MET institutions in the 
Netherlands and France as part of the WMU’s curriculum for its MET 
specialization. 
 
• 10 email interv
while 8 were students at the W
• A personal interview with a student at the WMU in his capacity as a seafarer 
and as a training manager for a prominent ship management company. 
• Two email discussions and one personal discussion from the perspective of 
training institutions. 
• One seminar session on Marine Resource Management (MRM) at the 
Swedish Club (August 18, 2008) and discussions with the Manager, Martin 
Hernqvist. 
• Discussions and observations on field 
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Details of the topics explored in th presented in Appendices 2-4. 
 
6.2 SAFETY CULTURE 
here is no doubt that safety culture h ly established in the deliberations 
the three components of the safety triad, the technology 
s a factor in the performance of seafarers has received the least responses. Also, the 
ed, the seafarer at the sharp end holds a 
improving the industry. One seafarer saw it as important that charterers should be 
involved in this discussion as well “
seen as essential for the seaf
protect property and the environm
[stay] a cludes 
his a
discussion of fatigue and lone voices regarding occupational health (Nielsen & 
Pan id
still ro
seafarers’ health awareness training (IMO, 2008), the details remain to be seen.  
 
 
 
e discussions are 
T as been firm
of the maritime industry. Of 
a
literature has indicated that technology has improved resulting in less accidents from 
that domain, bringing the human contribution to accidents to the fore (Hetherington, 
et. al. 2006; Redmill & Rajan, 1997). The emphasis in the general discussion of 
safety culture in high risk industries is now the organization, however emphasizing 
the role of the human factor such as management and management decisions.  Yet, in 
the maritime industry, while the organization’s role is acknowledged and the actions 
of the people at the blunt end are not deni
large portion of the responsibility in the discussions of maritime accidents. 
 
There was general agreement among the respondents that safety culture was 
important and should be the purview of all involved. This is seen as a way of 
what kind of ship is he chartering?” It was also 
arer to have the idea about safety culture to not only 
ent, but “most importantly they need to survive and 
live for their loved ones.” This comment indicates that the seafarer in
he lth and wellbeing as a factor in safety. While mention is made in the 
ay es, 2005) are attempting to include seafarers’ health and well being, there is 
om for improvement. The STCW review promises to make provisions for 
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 6.2.1 Maritime Resource Management (MRM) 
MRM was developed to address the needs for the non-technical skills and to 
t of a safety culture in the maritime industry by 
visits are 
one onboard to observe if the practices are applied.  Unfortunately, it is only a few 
 not 
form the watch officer as he thought it was not his place. While power distance 
ay have been operating here, another reason to expose all crew to such education 
contribute towards the developmen
imparting these skills to mariners as well as shore based personnel including pilots 
and accident investigators. MRM is an expansion of BRM which has incorporated 
aspects of the aviation industry’s CRM. The training was instituted as part of the loss 
prevention philosophy of the Swedish Club, a marine insurer. The Club sees the need 
for a change in culture to promote the right attitudes and behaviour towards accident 
prevention in the maritime sector. The course contents are described in Appendix 7. 
 
This initiative can be applauded as a step in the right direction. It seeks to be 
comprehensive in addressing the “soft” skills which have been established as critical 
to improve performance and therefore safety. It was explained by the manager, 
Martin Hernqvist, that not only do they teach the courses, but follow-up 
d
of the cruise lines that are currently sending their officers to such training.  
 
Two points of concern arose as a result of the visit to the Swedish Club: 1) the 
mentality that only officers should have certain knowledge and 2) the benefits of 
such training are reserved for those working with more conscientious companies. 
These concerns run throughout the dissertation as have already been discussed in 
relation to the revision of the STCW Convention. The argument remains that there is 
prudence in exposing all seafarers to appropriate aspects of such knowledge during 
their cadetship to circumvent the deficiencies in the system that they encounter in 
their careers. Not only officers need to develop professionalism, but all crew. The 
crew on a vessel is a team. This view is supported by the attitude of the AB in the 
Bunga Teratai Satu where he knew the vessel was on the wrong course and did
in
m
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and training, it is also a matter of teamwork, everyone feeling a part of the team and 
6.3.1 Fatigue 
ined the 
portance of being safe so as to return to family and simultaneously working 
                                                
therefore takes responsibility. 
 
6.3 HUMAN FACTOR CHALLENGES TO SAFETY CULTURE 
Both the literature and the discussions with seafarers have identified similar factors 
that affect performance on board. Fatigue, stress, health and wellbeing as well as 
non-technical performance issues such as leadership, communication and cultural 
differences have been shown to affect performance.  
 
The dissertation has grouped health and wellbeing issues under fatigue as fatigue has 
been shown to have both physiological and psychological dimensions (Smith, 2007) 
affecting health and which may also be exacerbated by family issues ashore. Family 
problems and attempting to fix things ashore from the ship, as one seafarer pointed 
out, as well as home sickness, have been the “Achilles’ heel” 19  of the seafarer 
(Thomas, 2003: Kahveci, 2007). One seafarer paradoxically expla
im
unsafely for the family’s sake. This is the explanation when asked about ever having 
done something that was considered unsafe on the job: “sometimes you have to do it 
for the sake of others. You are forced to do it to be good in your work for giving your 
loved ones a good life.” The watch officer on the Bunga Teratai Satu (Appendix 2) 
was preoccupied with a private call to his family and so missed changing course and 
the vessel ran aground; but to re-emphasize the point, if the AB had been a team 
player, the watch officer would have been duly alerted. 
 
The literature has indicated that seafarer’s health and wellbeing are two areas in need 
of great attention in the maritime industry (O’Neil, 2001; Nielsen & Panayides, 2005; 
Thomas, 2003: Kahveci, 2007) and are associated with fatigue (Smith, 2007). Mental 
health issues, depression, possibly leading to suicide. As the training officer 
 
19 Area of vulnerability 
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interviewed (Captain X) revealed that during his time serving he dealt with three 
suicides on three different ships in the space of one year.  There are also a number of 
ontentious issues of welfare and rights in the industry (Mukherjee & Mustafar, 2005; 
 X explained, he lost his father 
hile serving and could do nothing but cry alone in his cabin. As the captain he felt 
there n distance [between him and the crew], so there was no 
iew and research on fatigue, 
mith (2007) concluded that of all the possible approaches to fatigue management: 
 
c
Kahveci, 2007; Donner, 2008; Zhang, 2008, Mukherjee n.d.).  
 
The consensus regarding life on board is that it is lonely, the seafarer feels isolated 
and it affects his mental state, although some find job on board enjoyable, which is a 
function of the care the company shows. As Captain
w
eeded to be that 
emotional support. The seafarer writing in the Nautilus (My battle with ‘the black 
dog’ 2008) about his depression, underwent counseling and recommended that all 
seafarers read the book Getting Over Depression (cognitive therapy). Such 
expressions of loneliness and isolation have been verified in studies where seafarers 
described life on board as tantamount to being in prison (Kahveci, 2007).  
 
The behavioural sciences may help in raising awareness regarding fatigue and its 
effects. It may also assist if the STCW implements the provisions for fatigue 
awareness training. Dealing with fatigue only in physiological terms may be 
undermining the gravity of the situation and influencing perceptions of being in 
control, being able to stay awake.  It was revealed in the investigation of the Jacki 
Moon accident that hours of work were falsified and fatigue was a contributory factor. 
One seafarer interviewed also indicated that he has worked while tired and 
“thankfully no incident happened.” In his extensive rev
S
regulation, enforcement, awareness, campaigns, training and guidance – everyone is 
deficient in the maritime industry. A robust and holistic approach is necessary which 
Smith (2007) and this author believe, can lead to a culture that benefits the industry 
as a whole.   
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6.3.2 Teamwork 
Issues relating to group relations, leadership, power and communication were 
discussed as a part of teamwork because ultimately it is a team effort that runs the 
ship and these factors impact the cohesiveness of the team and therefore performance. 
s one seafarer put its: 
er distance 
ulture) in the literature, is also a major problem on board as revealed by accident 
A
It is very important for seafarers to understand that the safety of the ship 
depends on the total collaboration of all on board and that safety does not 
only mean taking care of one’s machineries or doing one’s assigned duties, 
but looking after each other’s affairs also count. 
This statement is instructive for creating a philosophy among seafarers and therefore 
the importance of education and training at all levels and not senior officers only, as 
the current STCW review is proposing; again the AB’s response in the Bunga 
Teratai Satu incident emphasizes this need. 
 
Not speaking out for various reasons, chief of which has been cited as pow
(c
investigations. The behavioural sciences have a rich tradition of research and 
practices in team management, group relations and leadership that may be harnessed 
to instill values and attitudes where each seafarer shares the responsibility of a safe 
ship and is empowered with the knowledge and confidence to speak out on issues. 
Although the STCW makes provisions for such training, the literature and the 
interviews suggest that these are not enough. It was indicated that courses on 
leadership, group relations, communication, cultural awareness and perception 
(Appendix 2) were taught in the schools that the seafarers attended. However they 
were not all exposed to all these courses to the same degree. Only five had courses 
on cultural awareness and perception. This variation is also supported by the three 
training institutions that responded to the questions (Appendix 4).  
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 Communication 
trained by cultural differences (MARCOM, 1999; Dzugan & 
Renpin
seafare
create p
 
giving an order and somebody thinks, 
aggressive captains…do not allow anybody to speak. [On the other hand] bad 
ing psychological 
gies such as talking may assist in relieving some of the 
sychological effects (Horck, 2008a), rather than destructive coping strategies, such 
s drinking, smoking, becoming aggressive (Appendix 2). To repeat the saying 
 6.3.2.1  
While communication difficulties stemming from language, grammar, vocabulary, 
tone, pitch etc. affect performance, also important are communication problems 
associated with culture. Communication is essential for healthy social relationships 
on board which are cons
g, 1999; Sampson & Zhao, 2003; Horck, 2006, 2008a). The responses by the 
rs support that communication problems exist and that cultural differences 
roblems in this regard (Appendix 2).  
Power distance and destructive obedience are also associated with communication 
problems. One seafarer explains how communication misunderstanding operates 
from two sides: 
[On the one hand] The captain is 
orders are given and you keep silent not to make a problem and do it.  
 
Additionally, Captain X explains: 
Sometimes the respect the master is expecting is not there. Like a junior 
officer from Asia or so, will stand when the master enters the bridge and walk 
after him but one from Europe or other developed country may not. A ship is 
not a democracy it is a high risk environment, and so it is necessary to have 
structure, but at times the master may act as a dictator and this can hinder 
communication, so it [power distance] has to be taken into consideration. 
But there is no structured training for these things. 
 
In addition to healthy social relationships, and safe ship board operations, 
communication may also assist on the individual level combat
tensions. Simple strate
p
a
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“knowledge is power,” one has to have the knowledge in order to use it. Empowering 
ated in the cases of the Domiat where 
e master thought he saw another vessel approaching, or the Green Lily where the 
en as important however and it is included in the CRM training 
course.
associa
useful of the 
afarer. Issues of autokinesis, which makes a single point of light appear to move; 
 a light is interrupted on passing through different 
media 
(Kristia
discuss
should 
the obj
is the 
order t as to be aware of the 
henomena which come though education. The master of the Dole America may 
the seafarer with such knowledge combined with the right attitude and technical 
skills, will go a far way in contributing to safety as sea.  
 
 6.3.3 Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness is another of the important factors that impacts the performance 
of the seafarer. It is associated with the cognitive domain and affects how situations 
and objects are perceived as may be extrapol
th
master did not perceive the gravity of the situation. Except for being named in 
casualty investigations, situational awareness has not been studied in the maritime 
industry. It is se
 Where it is discussed, the approach is not holistic as the cognitive elements 
ted with sensory perception is absent. Kristiansen (2005) has given some 
insights into the effects of being at sea on the perceptive abilities 
se
or refraction, when the direction of
may result in misinterpretation of the direction of other vessels or objects 
nsen, 2005). These phenomena work in tandem with those perceptive biases 
ed in Chapter 5 and impact the decision making process. Questions that 
arise to assist in correctly making a decision for visual perception is whether 
ect if moving or stationary?; is the source of light a marker or another vessel?; 
object moving away or coming towards my vessel? (Kristiansen, 2005). In 
o effectively utilize these simple techniques on h
p
have faced a similar situation when he thought he saw a light which he used as the 
basis of his decision to change course, leading to the collision, the report noted that 
the source of the light was not determined. 
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6.4  MET 
MET varies across countries as borne out by the METNET project (Schröder, et. al., 
2003).  The responses given in this regard also demonstrate that seafarers are 
xposed to different types and levels of training in the non-technical skills, reflective 
 discussions with training institutions also 
psychology would be helpful: 
After a while when the seafarer goes ashore he has tunnel vision, should have 
counselling, do a debrief before going to family…The seafarer cannot make 
e
of the different training regimes. The
testify to this. Two responses from training institutions indicated that their 
curriculum had been impacted by the discussions of safety culture whereas another 
had not been impacted (Appendix 4). It is as a result of such variations (both from 
the literature and the discussions) that the proposal is made to include education and 
training for the non-technical skills within the standards of the STCW. 
  
STCW is the standard bearer for the education and training of seafarers. Some MET 
institutions are in a compliant stage, while others are operating at a stage of 
excellence, yet others are at the avoidance stage (Manuel, 2005). Making provisions 
mandatory in the STCW would at least ensure those in the compliant stage, which it 
is suspected are in the majority, are educating and training in the soft skills. There is 
no question as to the need for the technical skills, provisions are not questioned 
regarding the importance of familiarization training, the seafarer is learning to 
manage all aspects of his profession except himself. All the sources of data have 
provided evidence that the “soft” skills are important. The industry now demands it, 
the seafarers also demand it for their personal, operational and professional survival. 
The root of the “soft” skills lies in the behavioural sciences and therefore it is 
inevitable that they become a part of the curriculum of MET. 
 
6.5 BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES 
The importance of the behavioural sciences was underscored by the cases as well as 
the interviews. They were seen as necessary for personal, operational and 
professional reasons. Captain X opines that 
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full use of port chaplains because sometimes he cannot go ashore because of 
stitution was 
certain as to whether teaching the behavioural sciences would be helpful. However, 
Hernqvist, 2008). This 
ggests that there is a place for the use of the behavioural sciences in the education 
duties..  
Captain X also believes that company personnel should be exposed to such education 
in diversity management and psychology. It would be useful even if persons are not 
professional psychologists, issues can be adequately identified and informed 
decisions can be made. 
 
The other persons who responded to questions have noted the importance of courses 
in leadership, communication etc. mentioned above, as contributing to harmonious 
relationships on board as well as safety. One response from an in
un
the other two responded that they would be helpful, with one clarifying that such 
courses should be taught by professionals in seafaring and supported by proper on 
board training. 
 
6.6 SUMMARY OF PART I 
This preceding section presents an overview of the findings from responses and the 
other sources of data. All evidence points to the use of the behavioural sciences in 
every aspect of shipping that is non-technical. While the results from the discussions 
cannot be generalized, they do corroborate what was found in the literature. The 
MRM training has reported success in the behaviour and attitudes of personnel of 
Star Cruises which has been associated with a dramatic reduction in accidents and 
near misses since they have started using the programme (
su
and training of seafarers. 
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 DISCUSSION 
 have often been drawn between the aviation industry and the maritime 
ilar discussions regarding technological development and its 
an factor concerns and training in the “soft” skills 
Barnett, et. al. 2006; Fuazudeen, 2008).  
decision making, fatigue and personality theory, to name a few. CRM is mandatory 
training and is no longer seen as training for pilots only but for all persons involved: 
cabin crew, engineers, mechanics, technical staff, air traffic controllers, and in some 
cases dispatchers and ramp agents (Dahlström, 2008 personal communication). 
 
                                                
Part II 
LESSONS FROM AVIATION 
 
Parallels
industry. There are sim
impact on human factor and the role of the organizations in developing a safety 
culture (Batteau, 2001; Hudson, 2001; Ek, 2006). Concerns also abound in the 
aviation industry relative to the role of the human factor in safety culture as regards 
issues such as violations, leadership, communication, power distance, and decision 
making mediated by cognitive biases and perception (Hawkins, 1993; Kern, 2001; 
Dahlström, 2007). However, the aviation industry is said to be ahead of the maritime 
industry relative to addressing hum
in a holistic way (Pekcan, et. al., 2005; 
 
Similar to the maritime industry, the aviation industry has had to cope with a culture 
of reactive response to accidents (Kern, 2001) but have moved beyond to proactively 
addressing its human factor concerns. Crew resource management (CRM) is the 
aviation industry’s human factors training programme which is defined as “the 
effective utilisation of all available resources to achieve safe and efficient operation” 
(Dahlström, 2007). The behavioural sciences are an intricate aspect of this training 
programme. Appendix 8 is an indication of the topics covered in a section of a CRM 
course20  showing areas of basic psychology, information processing as it affects 
 
20 This was obtained in personal communication with Dahlström. 
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The maritime industry lags behind in this regard. Although it has embraced some of 
the principles of CRM into BR pulsory. MRM which is more 
comprehensive, is only being utilized by a select few. Deliberations are only now 
underway to make aspe be limited to deck and 
the details are to be seen. 
an 
 
e 
to acknowledge the need for a holistic and integrated approach. Staff at all levels are 
M, it is not com
cts of BRM mandatory, and this will 
engine officers (IMO, 2008), and 
 
Another perspective of this dissertation, which is done in the aviation industry, is the 
incorporation of such “soft” skills at all levels in the training of the seafarer. The 
incorporation of the behavioural sciences in aviation is at all levels as regards the 
sharp end, that is, the pilots. Dahlström (personal communication, 2008) explains 
that a pilot receives basic human factors training as a student in “Human 
Performance and Limitations” creating awareness of the human potentials and 
failings in terms of cognitive and behavioural mechanisms. This course is fully 
incorporated into their initial qualifications for licensing.  Subsequently, the student 
does a “Multi Crew Cooperation” course which has a significant portion of hum
factors/CRM training. On arriving at his first airline he again undertakes the
company’s full CRM training. The industry then has regulatory requirements for 
CRM when a pilot is changing operator, when changing aircraft type and when being 
upgraded to commander. 
 
The lesson to be derived from the aviation industry is a holistic approach to the 
human factor. To reiterate, the suggestion to amalgamate communication, leadership 
and BRM at the recent STW sub-committee meeting considering the comprehensive 
review of the STCW convention (IMO, 2008), was not supported. Additionally, the 
final decision was to separate aspects of the competence table making the BRM and 
leadership training exclusive to engine and deck officers. This has probably been the 
shortcoming of the regulatory training regime. Issues concerning the human factor 
are approached in an ah hoc manner and are fragmented. As shown in the syllabus at 
Appendix 8, all these areas are interrelated and impact each other. Aviation has com
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beneficiaries of training to enhance knowledge and awareness, providing them with 
suitable skills to contribute more effectively to their organizations. While it is 
acknowledged that there are aspects that may not be suitable for some levels of staff, 
there are basic elements to which all should be exposed. Courses may be tailored for 
appropriateness. The maritime industry would benefit from adopting a few more 
ssons from the aviation industry. le
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 CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
BEYOND A BOUNDARY 
 
We cannot discover new oceans unles
 
s we have the courage to lose sight of the shore. Anonymous  
eyond a Boundary is the title of an autobiographical novel by West Indian 
(Caribbean) writer C.L.R. James. The subject matter is the game of Cricket, famous 
in the West Indies. In the novel, the “boundary” is presented in its literal sense as the 
outer parts of the cricket field where maximum “points” are scored. It also acts as a 
metaphor, going beyond the boundaries of the cricket field to discuss the social and 
political implications of the game. The point is, there are realities beyond the 
boundaries we place on ourselves. While possibilities may exist, they are limited and 
hindered by boundaries. To quote Bertrand Russell from Hawkins (1993, p.16): “Not 
only will men of science have to grapple with sciences that deal with men but – and 
this is a far more difficult matter – they will have to persuade the world to listen to 
what they have discovered.” 
  
While the discoveries of this dissertation may not be about persuading the “world,” 
as the literature does reveal that there are those converted to the possibilities of the 
behavioural sciences in the maritime industry, yet others need persuading at the 
junctures where global changes can be made, namely MET and STCW Convention. 
The objective of the study was to identify and examine the potential benefits to the 
maritime industry of an education in the behavioural sciences towards achieving a 
safety culture. Attempts to meet this objective took the form of an extensive use of 
the literature, case studies of accidents, discussions with persons in the industry and 
field trips, to ascertain the prevailing situation regarding the concepts of interest, 
which were safety culture, the human factor, STCW Convention, MET and the 
behavioural sciences. Figure 8-1 attempts a diagrammatic presentation of the key 
concepts and their relationships. 
B
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A 
C 
C 
 I 
D 
E 
N 
T 
S 
Human 
Factor 
Safety 
Culture 
Cognitive , 
behavioural 
skills 
acquired 
Performance 
shaping 
factors 
MET 
Behavioural 
Sciences
STCW 
 
gure 7-1: The key concepts and their interrelationship 
substantial role in accidents. 
Fi
Source: Author 
 
The figure illustrates the path from human factor to safety culture which is thwarted 
by accidents resulting from PSFs. It is suggested that education and training 
regarding the failings of the PSFs at the MET level, utilizing the behavioural 
sciences as set by the standards of the STCW, will result in the necessary cognitive 
and behavioural knowledge and skills to complement the technical competence and 
therefore circumvent accidents leading to a safety culture.  
  
The research was predicated on the following issues:  
• There are problems in the maritime industry as regards safety. 
• Safety culture is seen as an approach to improve safety. 
• The human factor plays a 
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• Many aspects of the human factor are behavioural, that is, belonging to the 
psychological and/or social psychological realm. 
• The IMO has opened the topic for debate and finding solutions, yet the 
regulatory regime is lacking in addressing it substantially and holistically.  
• Maritime education and training has a role to play in transferring skills and 
knowledge that resides within the behavioural sciences so as to enhance the 
human factor contribution to a sa  culture. 
 
In exploring these issues towards re endations for action, four research 
questions were developed: 
• What are the human factor challenges to arriving at a safety culture? 
• What provisions are there in the STCW Convention to address these 
challenges? 
• What is the role of MET in meeting these challenges? 
• What can an education in the behavioural sciences contribute towards 
meeting these challenges? 
 
pt used in all high risk industries to 
sire to attain optimum levels of safety to ensure operations are of such 
 seen as systems in their 
n right and should be engaged as such. 
In t m gful level even 
tho an factor is about the 
relationship between people and the tasks th ental capacity for 
fety
comm
It was found that safety culture was a conce
signify the de
standards so as to minimize the risk of accidents. However, the human factor, a key 
element in any safety culture agenda, also poses challenges towards achieving such a 
goal. The challenges lie in the PSFs associated with what the dissertation describes 
as human idiosyncrasies. While the research acknowledges the role of the 
organization and the technology in contributing to accidents, it also notes that human 
idiosyncrasies should not be denied. People are therefore
ow
 
he aritime industry, the people have been neglected on a meanin
ugh there is much discussion of the human element. The hum
ey perform at work, m
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pro s
their re Yet the science of man is 
abs  
factor a
 
Some w
subject the STCW to strengthen the 
rovisions. However, the current comprehensive review reveals that the provisions 
nted way, is doing its part with the more forward looking 
inst t ress the 
lack f
States and individual researchers are undertaking studies to inform decisions. All this 
wil
 
The in -standard shipping and therefore a top-down 
rganizational strategy should be complimented by a bottom-up strategy targeting 
ected by factors that are purely human, as 
ristiansen (2005) calls it the “human condition.”  Issues of perception and cognitive 
ces ing information relevant to their job, their motivation, health, welfare and  
lationships with colleagues (Kristiansen, 2005). 
ent in a holistic way from the training and deliberations regarding the human 
nd its place in the overall maritime system.  
ork is ongoing in the industry by way of the IMO in terms of promoting the 
 and taking steps in the current review of 
p
are still applied in an ad hoc way when a holistic approach would be suitable.  The 
wider industry, in a fragme
itu ions and professional bodies proactively developing measures to add
 o  “soft” skills among seafarers. Casualty investigation departments within 
l however come to naught if such efforts are not channeled in the right direction. 
dustry grapples with sub
o
the actors at the sharp end, the seafarers. A safety culture entails more than just safe 
operations. The human factor needs to be committed to the cause. The “soft” skills 
are not fully developed in the seafarer leading him to be a victim of his 
idiosyncrasies. The current status of job satisfaction, health and welfare of the 
seafarers is undesirable; tensions among multinational crew are evident, culture that 
affects group relationships and communication, are all reasons to suggest engaging 
the human factor in their capacity as feeling, sensing beings.  
 
Additionally, performance on the job is aff
K
biases that may lead to misinterpretation of information are vital to operational safety 
onboard. These are all aspects of the human condition that must be understood from 
the perspective of people. The people skills and knowledge offered by the 
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behavioural sciences are also useful for personal development and are transferable to 
careers beyond seafaring. In brief, the behavioural sciences promise to contribute to 
the overall development of the seafarer, professionally, operationally and personally.  
 
The study concludes that this is best done through the training regime of the STCW 
s 
 ultimately where it matters, the system is a psycho-socio-technical system. HSL 
 perception would be 
lerted to; and communication in its many manifestations as verbal, cultural, group 
Convention to ensure that as many institutions as possible include such education in 
their curricula and spread the benefits widely.  Companies are interested in training 
officers, if they train at all. Every member of the crew is a part of the team and 
his/her actions contribute to the overall safety culture of the vessel. Thus MET has a 
role to play in producing the seafarer of the future.  It is believed that with awareness 
through education and the development of appropriate skills through training, all 
seafarer will learn to recognize these human conditions and take appropriate action at 
the necessary times. Therefore, the dissertation wishes that the role of the individuals 
at the sharp end is emphasized as their responses to on board culture and operation
is
(2002) provides an approach to individual response with which this writer is in 
favour. The individual response is thus: 
 
questioning attitude + rigorous and prudent approach + communication = safety 
 
The seafarer would thus be empowered through education and training to elicit those 
responses: A questioning attitude would entail being able to “challenge” decisions or 
seek further information if situations appear unclear; rigorous and prudent approach 
involves thinking through situations, here the elements of
a
and social. However the obstacles to such individual responses, as the dissertation 
has explored, will have to be overcome. The focus of this dissertation is mainly about 
content being incorporated in the education and training regime, and a holistic 
approach to engaging the behavioural sciences at all levels of the training process 
among all levels of seafarers. There is evidence of much discussion on the subject 
 107
matter, there are educational tools and effective delivery methodologies available, 
however if the right content is missing, and the fragmented approach continues, then 
all these efforts are in vain.  
 
7.1 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
Although there are a number of limitations, the study revealed the status of 
discussions and actions on the human factor in the maritime industry. Further 
research is needed, but as a contribution to the area of convergence for safety culture, 
human factor, MET and the behavioural sciences, the study is expected to: 
• Create an awareness of the behavioural and cognitive limitations of humans 
that may contribute to accidents; 
• Offer explanations to phenomena that were hitherto not discussed in the 
maritime industry and therefore adding these phenomena to the discussions; 
• Offer an additional area for consideration in devising strategies towards 
developing a safety culture in the maritime industry; 
• Create an awareness of the existence of theories and applications within the 
behavioural sciences that may be harnessed to create safer shipboard cultures; 
• Highlight the need to consider a review of the content and context within 
• Open a discussion on the holistic application of the behavioural sciences in 
which seafarer education is offered. 
the STCW Convention. 
• Highlight the need to not only focus on officer training in the “soft” skills, but 
recognize that all crew are a part of the team and needs human skills. 
• Point to areas for further research. 
 
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study presents adequate evidence to conclude that the behavioural sciences are 
needed to develop the “soft” skills within the maritime industry. They are being 
utilized in other industries, and the maritime industry now demands their holistic 
approach. The following recommendations are therefore made, that: 
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• The current review of the STCW Convention considers broadening the scope 
of its provisions for the “soft” skills to include cognitive and perceptive 
elements. The aviation industry’s CRM is there as a guide, or an expansion of 
the MRM programme. 
 
 needs. What is needed are partnerships 
 
• selves to share 
  
7.3 
There a ns to this study. It must be borne in mind that the 
stud w
key con
y and therefore more work is needed to 
include empirical data to come to more definitive conclusions; 
ere limited in number which prevents 
• The current review of the STCW Convention considers the holistic approach 
suggested by one delegation. 
• The current review of the STCW Convention considers making the 
provisions for the “soft” skills applicable to all crew. Model courses 
appropriate to each level may be developed. 
• MET institutions consider reviewing their curriculum to ascertain their level 
of responsiveness to industry’s
between MET and industry, as suggested in Sudhakar’s (2005) model, a top-
down and a bottom-up approach to ensure all elements in the safety triad are
addressed. 
MET institutions consider creating partnerships among them
methods, resources and information. The two models of education and 
training presented in this dissertation may be replicated throughout other 
institutions. 
LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES OF STUDY 
re a number of limitatio
y as exploratory and the main aim was to seek out the issues with regards to the 
cepts. Limitations are: 
• The study is an exploratory stud
• Interviews with seafarers w
generalizations. 
• Responses from seafarers included only officers. The perspective of other 
crew is important. 
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• Responses from MET institutions were poor which limited more concrete 
conclusions about MET. 
Lack of responses from potential participants. Participants who had initially 
indicated a willingness 
• 
to be interviewed later abdicated.  
 
Optimu deal for an industry as global as the maritime 
ind r
which 
should this is the only way to come to a 
full d
 
m safety culture may be an i
ust y, but its principles are worth pursuing as they will lead to improvements 
are needed in the system. The seafarer is a key component of this system and 
be involved as human beings on their terms, 
 un erstanding of the human factor in order to develop effective interventions. 
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APPENDICES 
ppendix 1 – Maritime Accident Cases 
The ma
5 case 
f the appendix, were used as supporting material. 
reen AIB,21 1999). 
ay be found at: 
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources/green_%20lily_pub_1999.pdf
 
A
 
in cases used throughout the dissertation are listed in this appendix. The first 
summaries were used for detailed analysis and the reminder, listed at the end 
o
 
 Lily – Refrigerated general cargo vessel. (MG
 
Details of the case m
 
Summary  
The vessel left port Lerwick in the Shetland Islands on November 18, 1997 on its 
way to the Ivory Coast. Weather conditions were poor. Early on the 19th of 
November the vessel experienced flooding which was controlled but the main engine 
stopped during pumping out of the flood waters. Efforts to restart the engines were 
unsuccessful. Shetland Coast Guard was advised of the situation. Subsequently 
“Mayday Relay” broadcasts were made. Three tugs proceed and rescue operations 
commenced. Poor weather conditions exacerbated the situation and hampered the 
rescue operations resulting in one casualty.  The members of the crew were from 
Croatia and the Philippines.  
 
Analysis  
The main cause of the accident was listed as grounding due to lack of propulsion and 
failure to start the engine in time to prevent the vessel drifting ashore.  
 
Contributory causes were listed as the master’s imprudence to sail in view of the 
prevailing and predicted weather conditions. He failed to make contingency plans at 
each stage of the incident and instead, remained overly-optimistic about a successful 
conclusion. The report noted that an autocratic management style resulted in decision 
                                                 
21 Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
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making shortcomings not being id as no commercial pressure from 
ter made this decision on his own. The 
vestigator indicated that at least one officer was concerned about the master’s 
urces/dole%20america.pdf
entified. There w
shore to leave in the weather. The mas
in
decision to sail but no one openly questioned him. 
 
Dole America – Refrigerated cargo vessel (MAIB, 2000). 
 
etails of the case may be found at: D
http://www.maib.dft.gov.uk/cms_reso
 
ummaryS  
On November 7, 1999 the vessel collided with the Nab Tower in the eastern 
dered hard to port helm. From his position at the front 
f the bridge he could not see the Master was unaware of the vessel’s heading and 
osition in relation to the tower. Shortly afterwards the vessel collided with 
nalysis
approaches to the Solent after departing berth at Portsmouth on her way to Antwerp. 
The vessel left port with a pilot, who before disembarking told the master that there 
were two inbound vessels. which were confirmed on radar.  On approaching the 
tower, the master thought he saw the light of another vessel and ordered a starboard 
helm before going to the front of the bridge to confirm what he thought he had seen. 
The second officer, who was the only other person on the bridge besides the 
helmsman, joined him and confirmed the presence of a red light and said he saw a 
second to starboard of the first. The master ordered hard to starboard helm. When no 
further lights were seen he or
o
her exact p
the tower. The crew was from Norway, India, the Philippines, Ecuador and Poland.  
 
A  
adversely affected  his perception and decision making abilities.  A dedicated look 
The investigator indicated the immediate cause of the accident to be the master’s 
inappropriate and unquestioned helm order to port. Contributory causes included the 
master’s perceived need to alter course for what he took to be a crossing vessel, his 
lack of situational awareness and the probability that fatigue and stress might have 
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out was not posted on the bridge. The personnel on the bridge all had other duties. 
The lack of a predetermined pilotage passage plan was also seen as a contributing 
factor. Its absence let to distraction at a point when neither the master nor the second 
officer had time to sufficiently appraise themselves of the changing situation. 
dditionally, the second officer was asked to verify the light after returning from 
 to power distance the 
cond officer did not question the master’s order to port.  The source of the red light 
tyle of 
A
outside to the darkened bridge. The report speculated that due
se
had not been determined. The investigator commented on an autocratic s
adership. le
 
Domiat – Bulk Carrier. (SMI22 2004) 
 
Details of the case may be found at: 
http://www.sjofartsverket.se/upload/listadedokument/engelska/haverirapporter/domia
t-eng.pdf
 
Summary 
The vessel ran aground on June 7, 2004 on its way from St. Petersburg to a not yet 
defined port in India. A passage was planned to go through the Sound via Flintrannan. 
The second deck officer planned the route which was approved by the master.  After 
loading, the draft was several meters beyond the limit of the Sound. This was pointed 
out to the master by the chief officer and one of the third officers. The Master 
neglected the information and the ship ran aground. The crew was all Egyptian 
nationals. 
 
Analysis 
The investigator noted the circumstances to be the small draft, the master approving 
the route plan and a hierarchic order on board. The report noted that the manner in 
which the master neglected the officers’ apprehensions and their adherence to his 
standpoint reveal that the cooperation on board was unsatisfactory. It shows a 
devastating respect for the opinions of a superior. The investigator reported that 
                                                 
22 Swedish Maritime Inspectorate 
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during a visit on board an obvious hierarchic atmosphere was present where the 
officers seemed afraid to voice their opinions in the presence of the master. At a 
questioning one referred to the opinion of the master.  
 
Reference was made to the contents of the Bridge Resource Management in relation 
to clear assignment of duties and responsibilities and good cooperation on board 
which were lacking on the Domiat. Comments included the use of available 
resources and the evaluation of new information to avoid tunnel-vision. 
 
Bow Mariner – Chemical tanker. (USCG23, 2005). 
etails of the case may be found at: 
%20accidents/USCG%20Bow%20Mariner.pdf
 
D
http://www.dieselduck.net/library/09
 
Summary 
ry 28, 2004, the vessel caught fire and exploded while the crew was 
 
On Februa
engaged in tank cleaning. The ship sank 45 nautical miles east of Virginia. Of the 27 
crew members aboard, six abandoned ship and made it to a life raft and were rescued. 
An unknown number abandoned ship to the water, three were rescued, one deceased 
and the other two died before reaching the hospital.  The crew composition was 
Greek senior officers and Filipino junior officers and ratings. 
 
Analysis 
The cause of the casualty was listed as the ignition of a fuel/air mixture, either on 
 the cargo tanks. The ignition source could not be precisely determined. 
                                                
deck or in
Contributory causes were listed as the operator and the senior officers not properly 
implementing the company and vessel Safety, Quality and Environmental Protection 
Management System (SQEMS). 
 
 
23 United States Coast Guard 
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The report noted that the distinctions between the Greek senior officers and Filipino 
officers and ratings were remarkable.  Filipino officers did not take their meals in the 
officers’ mess, were given almost no responsibility and were closely supervised in 
very task. The second assistant engineer reported on arriving on the vessel for the 
uld not sleep 
eyond short naps in a chair in the cargo control room during cargo operations. There 
at they would do if instructed 
 do something unsafe by one of the senior officers each crewman replied that they 
e comment received was that orders from the 
e
first time he inquired of his duties and was sternly told he would be given verbal job 
orders daily, and was to do only as he was told and would have no administrative 
duties beyond making log entries. The report noted a lack of trust in the deck 
department. The surviving deck crew reported that the chief officer wo
b
was lack of group cohesion. When questioned as to wh
to
would do as they were ordered. On
Greeks were like words from God.  
 
Attilio Ievoli – Chemical tanker. (MAIB, 2005) 
Details of the case may be found at: 
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources/Attilio%20Ievoli.pdf
 
Summary 
 
The vessel ran aground on June 3, 2004 on Lymington Banks in the west Solent after 
leaving Fawley Marine Terminal, Southampton headed towards the English Channel 
ia the west Solent and Needles Channel.  The master, second officer and a cadet 
bridge. Neither the second officer nor the cadet was sure of who was 
f 13 Italians, one Russian and two Ukrainians. 
 
v
were on 
responsible for plotting positions.  The master was not paying attention to the 
navigation of the vessel being distracted using the ship’s mobile telephone. The 
master instructed the second officer to remove the pilot flag, who informed the 
master, before departing, that the vessel was north of the planned track. The master 
did not hear. The crew consisted o
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Analysis 
The human factors analysis was carried out by QinetiQ’s Centre for Human Sciences. 
The Centre reported that the human factor failures started with the master’s  decision 
to use the west Solent, contrary to company instructions. The crew was not clear on 
the roles and responsibilities of each other. Task performance were not coordinated, 
and there was little overt management and supervision. The report extrapolated that 
power distance was at work as the second officer was reluctant to question the 
master’s authority or competence. Poor teamwork and cultural differences among 
team members led to role confusion among them. 
 
Supporting Cases 
 
• The grounding of the Royal Majesty on June 10, 1995. The vessel was off course 
by 17 miles. Human factor contribution was the officers’ reliance on the 
, 2000 at the north end 
ury Reef. Human factor contribution was listed as the mate had become 
preoccupied with private phone calls. (ATSB, 200125) 
 
                                              
automated system. (NTSB24, 1997). 
 
• The grounding of the Bunga Teratai Satu on November 2
of Sudb
 
• Jackie Moon, general cargo vessel ran aground on September 1, 2004 at Dunoon 
Breakwater, Firth of Clyde, Scotland. Chief Officer who was sole person on 
watch fell asleep. Human factor contribution was listed as fatigue and alcohol 
consumption. Falsification of hours of work and rest due to commercial pressures 
were discovered. (MAIB, 2005). 
 
• Grounding of the Crimson Mars on May 1, 2006 in the River Tamar, Tasmania. 
Miscommunication between pilot and helmsman. Human factor contribution was
   
 National Transportation Safety Bureau 
 Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
24
25
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listed as ineffective bridge resource management and distraction caused by 
pilot’s use of mobile telephone. (ATSB, 2006). 
 
• Collision between Skagern and Samskip Courier in the Humber Estuary on June 
7, 2006. Ships collide in dense fog. Both were going at unsafe speeds for the 
condition. Human factor contribution was listed as both masters’ over-reliance on 
the pilots. (MAIB, 2007). 
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Ap
 
The search questions as to the human 
ctor challenges to safety culture, the status of education as regards the non-
wit
one
resp
Of the persons approached, ten were responsive. Two were active seafarers on the 
job and eight were students enrolled at the WMU at the time of the study.  These 
took the form of personal communication via email where responses to the questions 
were sent and follow-up discussions done via email if clarification was needed.  
 
Biographical Data
pendix 2 - Responses from Seafarers 
 topics discussed were to further explore the re
fa
technical skills and the role of the behavioural sciences. The rationale was to discuss 
h the seafarers their opinions and perspectives on the concepts as they are the 
s directly affected. Questions are indicated with underlining in bold and the 
onses follow. 
 
 
 
This information was sought to have an idea of the experience of the seafarer 
supporting their opinions. 
 
 Qualification Current position Type of vessel 
currently on or 
last employed 
on 
How long have 
you been a 
seafarer 
How long 
in current 
rank 
1 Engineer – Certification 
III/2 management level 
Chief Engineer Offshore supply 33 years 
intermittently  
8  years 
2 BSc Second Engineer Bulk carrier 10 years 4 years 
3 Captain ocean going  Chief Mate Feeder 10 years 3 years 
4 Master Mariner, 
Maritime Pilot 
Maritime Pilot  No vessel pilot 
for 4 years 
20 years 4 years 
5 Class 3 Deck Officer 2nd Officer container 4 years 2 years 
6 Master, Class I Chief Officer Container & 
LPG Gas 
Tanker  
16 years 
continuous and 10 
years temporary 
5 years 
continuous 
and 10 
years 
temporary 
7 Deck Officer, 
operational 
3rd Deck Officer Bulk carrier 5 years 1 year 
8 Deck Officer 2nd Deck Officer Bulk carrier 3 years 2 years 
9 Merchant Class I 
(inland waters) 
Chief Engineer Passenger 10 years 6 years 
10 Class I Masters Licence Masters Container vessel 18 years 10 years 
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What do you think are some of the factors that affect a seafarer’s performance 
of his duties onboard? Choose as many and you may add others not mentioned?
 
Factors affecting performance at sea Number of 
responses 
Stress 10 
Fatigue 10 
Family problems ashore 10 
Does not understand the technology   6 
Not properly trained   9 
Lack of resources from company   8 
P
o
ersonality problems (does not get along with 
thers) 
  8 
Too much technology on board ships today   5 
 
Others factors added were: one respondent each: a) stringent regulations which 
involve a lot of paper work and commercial pressures b) frustration c) homesickness 
d) alcohol and attitude of only working for the money and not caring for the 
rofession.  
ulticulturalism
p
 
M  
 issue of multiculturalism and communication on board to 
scertain the level of group interaction. Except for 2 persons they all sailed on 
ulticul  with 4 p  o
and 4 sailing with more than 5 different natio
id you e any difficultie g of th alities?
 
The following explored the
a
m tural vessels ersons sailing n vessels with 
nalities.   
3-4 different nationalities, 
 
D  hav s getting alon  with any e nation  
fficultie nbo
 
Di s getting along with other nationalities o ard 
2 Yes 
 the  segre1 Not really but ship was very gated, working but not socializing  
No 5 
 
 
Did any of the nationalities have difficulties getting along with each other?
 
 
is qu like erson ore comfortable 
ting e ation ab n elves. A o 
ave been on multicultural vessels answered yes to this question with one explaining 
 
Th estion was asked as it is more ly that p s feel m
rela seemingly negativ  inform out others tha  thems ll 8 wh
h
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that it was during a time when there was national conflict between the countries of 
the persons onboard. 
 
Did you personally have any commun ifficulties (talking with and ication d
understanding each other) because of diff nt languages?ere  
cation in safe operatio as been established in accident cases 
; MARCOM, 1999; Horck, 2006, 2008). Five persons 
multinational c  said yes they had communication 
lties. 
The role of communi ns h
as well as in research (Dzugan
of the 8 who sailed with rew
difficu
 
Did you witness any communication difficulties (talking with and understanding 
each other) among other members of the crew because of different languages? 
All 8 said they had witnessed communication difficulties among others in the crew. 
 
Did you personally have any difficulties (getting along with each other) because 
of different cultures? 
4 persons said yes they had difficulties because of culture. 
 
Did you witness any difficulties (getting along with each other) among crew 
because of different cultures? 
 
7 persons said they had witnessed difficulties among others due to culture. 
 
Any other difficulties you can think of due to the mixed nationalities onboard? 
• Othe vement of 
the head to signify yes or no, was different in some cultures. 
• In some companies there were different salaries depending on nationality and 
 
r difficulties mentioned were in terms of sign language the mo
that caused problems. 
• 5 persons mentioned that meals were a problem. The type of food and 
difficult for the catering department to suit all the tastes.  
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• Culture clashes occurred when one nationality says something that another 
found offensive. 
• One person who mentioned food as an issue also spoke of hygiene, religion, 
and music, as causing difficulties. 
 
 
Maritime Education and Training 
 
This section was explored to ascertain the extent to which courses geared towards the 
non-technical were offered in MET, how they were delivered and the seafarers’ 
erceptions of the value of such courses. p
 
While at training school did you do any studies on topics such as 
 
 
Non-technical courses that were completed Number of 
responses 
Leadership 7 
Group relations 7 
Communication 9 
Cultural awareness 5 
Perception 5 
 
The respondents were invited to name other courses but there was no indication of 
other courses taught relating to the non-technical. One person indicated that the 
ommunication studies he did was only for radio.  
o you think that these courses would be helpful for safety reasons onboard? 
c
 
D  
he agreement was that such courses would be helpful for safety reasons. Comments 
rece e
• cessary because 
erience on the job and if not well handled may easily 
 
 
T
iv d were: 
In my country, leadership and group relations courses are ne
most people become officers whilst young and are made to manage older 
people with lots of exp
lead to conflict, as there is always the “we had done it this way” syndrome. 
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• All these courses teach how to understand and deal with a micro-society, they 
will definitely be helpful for enhancing safety onboard. To have safety 
 
• They would be helpful for safety reasons, but in an effort to reduce classroom 
e been reduced or eliminated in the UK and in 
training institutions elsewhere they are not even mentioned. 
safety is concerned. 
• Assist in interaction with your colleagues 
s very important for seafarers to understand that the safety of the ship 
s on the total collaboration all on board and that safety does not 
n taking care of one’s mac neries or doing one’s assigned duties, 
but looking after each other’s affairs count. 
• By helping to understand the situation but cannot solve the problem. I mean 
r reflexes guide our behaviours. 
 
In term
unsure,
 
 Yes they would be helpful but it is preferable to work with one nationality 
crew or at least same culture 
onboard in the first place you need a well functioning society. 
time most of these courses hav
 
• Awareness is the key, if you have background to all of these you can probably 
survive onboard especially where 
 
 
• It i
depend of 
only mea hi
 
• It prepares you for life onboard. It does assist you in dealing with problems 
that will pop up from time to time. 
 
people will act according to their own culture especially in urgent situations 
when ou
s of such courses helping to improve safety, 9 persons agreed and one was 
 but think it would be useful for group interaction. Comments were: 
•
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• Everything which is sincerely applied can be useful 
Don’t know if such courses improve one’s safety awareness…think it helps 
more in the area of interaction plus man management. 
• 
Ho
 
w were these courses delivered? 
s of delivery of non-technical courses Number of 
responses 
 
Method
Formal classes only 4 
Integrated in other courses only 1 
Formal classes and general discussions 2 
Form  c
other cou
al lasses, general discussions, integrated in 
rses 
2 
Not delivered 1 
 
The method of delivery varied from formal classes only to some receiving 
instructions in for  
ourses.  
 
Which
mal classes plus informal discussions and being integrated in other
c
 one of the following do you think play the greatest role in safety on 
board?
This qu perception as it relates to who is 
sponsible for safety as a comparison with the different paradigms as to which of 
the t
 
spects of the safety system Number of 
responses 
estion was asked to ascertain the seafarer’s 
re
fac ors in the safety-critical system is responsible for safety. 
A
The technology only 0 
The organization only 1 
The seafarer only 4 
The organization and the seafarer 2 
All 3 3 
 
For those believing the seafarer only plays the greatest role for safety on board, the 
comments were: 
• The seafarer is an element of the organization and he uses the technology, he 
 
is the most important factor 
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• It is the seafarer who uses the technology and who follows the directives of 
nizations with little 
technology. 
 th res established to safeguard 
tified risks, and eventual  hazards not foreseen. 
i  
ersons who thought that all 3 were important had this to say: 
farers (at least partly). All are equally important but today I would say 
that we do have the technology and the organization in most cases but the 
able seafarers are not competent.  
ation can make a 
difference. 
en used to help uction of human errors, the 
n is coming up with ne  regulations so as to improve safety 
e seafarers are at the end of the chain that is they are there to 
lations and al meet up with the required knowledge 
and skill to combat the demands required to operate these technologies. 
r shipping company is serious about safety?
the organization. Seafarers who are safety conscious and safety aware can 
create working environment even for rouge orga
 
• He/she is responsible to follow e procedu
against iden ly identify
 
• The seafarer is the whole in everyth ng
 
P
 
• Technology is no better than the user, the organization is made up of 
sea
lack of training of seafarers is the problem. Partly there is a total lack of 
seafarers and in addition many avail
 
• A technology which is used with capable and educated seafarers under the 
supervision of the highly organized/sensible organiz
• Technology is be in the red
organizatio w
onboard; th
implement these regu so 
 
Do you think you    
Thi u
safety t ement. Six persons indicated that their company, 
or the last company they worked with was serious about safety. One comment was 
s q estion is to explore the perceptions regarding the company’s approach to 
o ascertain company’s involv
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the m
general
“at the
happy. So shipping companies will compromise safety for profit.” 
Oth c
• nies do 
not respect their own regulations. 
 
• The written procedures are mainly to satisfy the requirements for 
e” form other types of 
This be
safety. 
 
 your job have you had to do anything that is considered not safe but you do 
co pany tried to make the ship a “home away from home”. Another gave a 
 comment that some companies are not doing their best with regards to safety 
 end of the day, shipping is all about returns. Profit. Making shareholders 
 
er omments were: 
I think only from the side to comply with the regulations. Some compa
certification of the ship. Some are even “copy and past
ships, without proper consideration with the ship’s reality. For instance, 
procedures and checklists in a language not understood by all. 
ars out the findings from the literature that companies vary in attitudes to 
In
any who ? 
as a general query and not necessarily a reflection of present company or the 
pany with w
This w
last com hich the seafarer was employed to explore issues of violations. 
Six r
person,
extrapo
• 
un at 
full speed in restricted visibility. The distance between small, island states 
little time for the 
 pe sons said they had done things that are unsafe in their jobs. Except for one 
 these acts were external to the seafarer to meet commercial pressures or the 
lation can be made that one had to carry on to preserve ones job: 
In an effort to keep schedule and because of commercial concerns masters 
have to dock vessels in small ports without pilotage assistance and to r
around the Caribbean is also so small that there is very 
body to recover between leaving a port and arriving at another. Though 
companies do not explicitly say they want the ships to run at an optimum it is 
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understood that a Master who does otherwise for the sake of safety may be 
replaced. 
 
• Trying to combat fire without the protective gear; anyway the reaction was 
spontaneous and the vessel was saved from massive destruction. 
ur loved ones a good life. 
As chief mate assuming the watch keeping from 04h00-08h00 after 
loading/discharging , which took around 12 hours at least of continuous work. 
 
• Sometimes you have to do it for the sake of others. You are forced to do it to 
be good in your work for giving yo
 
• Sailing with defective machinery form homeport under instructions from 
management and when you refuse to go with the ship you are thought to be 
incompetent and you risk your job, and being the only shipping company you 
had to do it anyway. 
 
• 
I felt tired, thankfully no incident happened. 
 
• For lack of appropriate material and tools. 
 
In your job ever seen anyone doing anything that is considered not safe but he 
does it anyhow 
Nine persons said they had seen persons doing things that were unsafe similar to 
wha th
workin
make o
that we
work g
person 
t ey had done personally, such as working without proper equipment, and 
g while tired. One comment was that some persons worked while tired to 
vertime. Others indicated that persons were ordered by officers to do things 
re unsafe “a motor man went into a partially ventilated enclosed space to 
iven an order by the second engineer.”  One indication was that a particular 
committing an unsafe act did not believe in the probably consequences. 
 142
Anothe
to wea
Hea
r indicated that a crew was working aloft without a safety belt as he refused 
r it.  
 
lth Issues (Mental)  
n has been named as one of the factors affecting seafarers menta
 
Isolatio l health and 
ossibly leading to depression (Thomas, 2003; Kahveci, 2007). These may affect 
per m
concern arer giving his 
xperience in the Nautilus (My battle with the black dog, 2008). Health issues are 
asso a
four of
both si
other t felt lonely more on multinational vessels, with one 
ommenting that “being the only black officer amongst Eastern European officers, I 
som m
in the 
gatheri  is time to think about the family. 
rinking, recreation, entertainment (movies) going ashore and keeping busy with 
wor
nal problems and multinational crew. Coping strategies are similar, 
p
for ance but are not openly dealt with in the maritime industry. Recently 
s have been raised regarding depression with one seaf
e
ci ted with fatigue. Regarding isolation, with associated feelings of loneliness, 
 the 10 said they felt lonely/isolated on board. One indicated he felt lonely on 
ngle and multi-national vessel alike as his loneliness was homesickness. The 
hree indicated they 
c
eti es felt that I was segregated from the group.” This feeling comes on mostly 
officers’ saloon or at mealtimes. Similarly, the others felt lonely at social 
ngs, and at the end of work period when there
D
k were used as coping strategies. 
 
Five persons have experienced others saying that they felt lonely on board. Reasons 
given were perso
entertainment, going ashore, keeping busy, trying to call home. One comment was 
“you can even see that in their face, they are holding on just because of the money 
and sometimes drinking heavily.” 
 
Eight persons said they have felt depressed on board. Job related issues, multicultural 
crew, homesickness, home problems, and too much work, have been given as 
reasons for the onset of depression. Coping strategies for depression included 
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focusing on work, looking forward to leave time, drinking, entertainment, quit the 
job, and crying. 
ther crew members who have said they were depressed, 
 Work and environment was dangerous but you 
were provided with most of the things… a kind of protected society away from 
he type of ship, type of trade, nationality of crew, 
how the company deals with its crew, area of trade. I would say it is ok. 
and wellbeing. 
 
In terms of knowing of o
seven persons said yes. Coping strategies used were drinking or smoking, quitting 
the job, sometimes they talk to others, isolate themselves or become aggressive. 
 
A description of life on board in general was sought to ascertain the type of 
environment which may affect mental health. The responses were: 
• Crew life can be fun, interesting with a busy schedule, however a supportive 
family is essential. 
• Life onboard is no more fun; mostly everyone tires to do his job so as to get a 
clean cut for the next contract. 
• Was fun though labouring as vessel was continuously sailing and calling in 
ports throughout day and night. 
• Unique, abnormal, and sometimes fun because you can visit other places. 
Good experience that you could meet different people with different traits and 
personalities. 
• Life onboard was very secure.
reality. Interesting and satisfying work. 
• Boring routine, uncomfortable, unhealthy environment. 
• Terrible, but very good money which you will never get on shore even as a 
manager. 
• Life onboard varies with t
• Isolated. 
• Stress, fatigue and isolation. 
The responses vary, but show that life on board may have negative effects on health 
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 Safety Culture 
There was general agreement that safety culture was important and should be 
iscussed by all, administrations, management [companies] and seafarers, if the 
 not 
nly protect property and the environment, but most importantly they need to survive 
d
maritime industry is to improve. One person saw it as important that charterers 
should be involved in this discussion as well “what kind of ship is he chartering?” It 
was also seen as essential for the seafarer to have the idea about safety culture to
o
and [stay] alive for their loved ones. 
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Appendix 3 – Interview with Training Manager 
  
Interviewee: at sea for 25 years, retired 4 years ago. Training manager for ship 
management company. 
 
It is said that a large percentage of accidents are caused by human factors.  Do 
you agree with such a statement  or do you see other issues? 
The real problem is not investing enough in human resources, it is not valued. It’s 
just hire and fire.  If you check many companies they don’t have HR policy, just 
short term HR. 
 
What about issues of leadership? 
You learn on the job. No course. Bridge resource management is not mandatory, it 
depends on the company and it is not enough.  
 
Communication? 
Communication among crew is in English but it is not mandatory, they may put 
together enough words to say something, but it is difficult, and sometimes 
communication is with body language and that can be a problem. Cultural 
differences can pose a problem, example some crew leave their duties and go pray 
(Indonesians), the captain is suppose to handle this, has anybody bother to sensitize 
him? There can be confrontation is captain stops them. They need education. The 
ship is out in the sea and is a 24hr operation cannot compromise safety that way. 
 
Give you an example, cocoa cola, the parent company wants to set up a company in 
another country, he sends the person there to live for a short while to see if he likes it, 
get a feel of the place. Shipping is anti-social life and anti-people. As long as you are 
on the ship and working that is it. 
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What about power distance, is it a problem? 
Sometimes the respect that a master is expecting is not there like a junior from Asia 
or so will stand when the master enter the bridge and walker after him but one from 
urope or developed country may not. A ship is not a democracy it is a high risk 
n, so this has to be 
nd superintendent might say carry on 
ard.
E
environment so the hierarchy, it is necessary to have structure. But at times the 
master may act as a dictator and this can hinder communicatio
taken into consideration.  But there is no structured training for these things. Power 
distance sometimes as well between superintendent and captain. Master can divert if 
somebody sick a
 
How would you describe life on bo  
rd for culture and crew compatibility. 
ome crew get on well together and some do not. Desires of crew sometimes not 
e cultures have tea. Italian officers don’t offer tea. Not sensitive 
e a 
elfare fund and the master pockets that, others use it to organize more focussed 
Social life onboard ship is lonely. Somebody can sit in the room and not come out 
and nobody enquires after him. There is no rega
S
considered, like som
to cultural needs. Or they can have pasta as meal and what about the other crew, 
power abuse onboard. 
 
No regard given to emotional and psychological needs. Crew lounge is small, cabins 
next to smoking room, space is cramped sometimes no space. No regard, no strategic 
planning to take care of crew needs. Sometimes they [seafarers] go ashore there is 
problem to pass time, they go to pubs or go shopping. Some companies hav
w
outings. 
 
 Are there conflicts on board? 
Fights occur sometimes. This is because of stress build up. A lot of time its because 
f food. People are working whole day and when they come to the mess room and no 
roper dinner, this is a cause of unhappiness and conflict. On land you go to 
staurant or you have a nice dinner at home. 
o
p
re
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 Have you had any experience of someone committing suicide on board? 
Suicides occur. I have had 3 suicides on ships three different ships in one year that I 
have been on, these were for personal reasons. People don’t have friends onboard to 
talk with.  We used the fridge room where all ships vegetable and meat are stored to 
store the body until we got to port we let the body off and carried on. No counselling 
you are left to deal with it on your own. 
 
What do you think about introducing subjects into maritime education and 
training regarding such matters of leadership, communication, how to deal with 
life onboard. 
Psychology would help. After a while when seafarer go ashore they have tunnel 
vision, should have counselling, do a debrief before going to family. My father 
passed away while I was on ship, all I could do is cry in my room, no emotional 
support and as the captain you have that power distance. 
 
Sometimes as well, a power struggle between captain and chief engineer. The chief 
ngineer want to exercise power and the captain is in charge and this cause group 
ney I go.  Companies do not employ a psychologist. No company employs a 
sychologist.  They would say the money is too much, don’t want to invest. 
e
struggle with the deck and engine.  Being in the engine room for long affects their 
minds sometimes, being in that environment for long. The model course “personal 
safety and social responsibility” is there but it is not enough, need to learn how to 
deal with people. Need to invest in people, people are neglected.  It is like you are a 
casual labourer, you work for today and that is it, no regard, so if somebody offers 
more mo
p
 
What about the Port Chaplains? 
Cannot make full use of the Chaplains because sometimes we cannot go ashore 
because of duties. Some ports have no chaplains. 
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Also the life is lonely no support, now one of my colleagues is detained, the 
 support company is still paying him, but sometimes they are abandoned. No body to
you if you are in problems. 
 
The proposal is to have such courses from entry into school and build on the 
knowledge throughout each year. 
I agree, but it is not the seafarer alone needs this education. Company should ensure 
aining in diversity management undertaken by all involved in ships safety.  Issues 
s that affect seafarer. They should also make it mandatory for senior 
b satisfaction is important. 
hipping needs an overhaul in that regard.  Training is just the same, some guy come, 
 of care, 
akes a lot of difference. 
tr
can be identified, even if the person is not a professional psychologist, issues can be 
identified so when they are making decisions they have information, they are aware 
about the thing
management level dealing with crew to have a degree or diploma or some 
qualification in human resources. 
 
Lack of caring of seafarers affecting the recruitment, jo
S
and the white board and push the slides and thinking “when this one finishes, he will 
be getting more money than me.”  All stakeholders must be involved. Shipping is cut 
and dry, lack of compassion. For example, you are entering like the English channel, 
you are up the whole night because you take pilot, next day you have to deal with all 
who come to the ship and survey and check and the stores come, this come, that 
come, and nobody says, ok they have been up the whole night, nobody cares.  It’s 
like you have sold our soul. The thought process in the industry has to change. 
Awareness has changed, people want more, its like Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. 
Small things such as designated air conditioning on bridge, or some show
m
 
What are your thought on how to arrive at safety culture? 
Loyalty, build the crew loyalty, with that safety culture will come automatically, you 
arry out the company policy willingly. Now it is done more reluctantly and you c
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have to be policed. There are shipping companies with good HR policies.  They map 
a career path for junior officers, they stay with the company, this builds loyalty. To 
achieve a safety culture a lot has to be done at the basic level making the seafarer a 
art of the team, not just hiring and firing. Root cause of ill treatment is money, don’t p
want to invest, and attitude of owners. 
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Appendix 4 – Responses from MET Institutions 
 
RESPONSES QUESTIONS 
Maritime Academy 1 Maritime Academy 2 Training Centre 
Do you see safety 
culture as a 
challenge for the 
maritime 
yes Yes – safety culture has never 
been a high priority item with 
yes 
industry? 
maritime employees, it has 
been with the shipping 
companies  
Is the topic 
discussed in your 
training 
institution among 
the prospective 
seafarers? 
Yes it is Yes but not enough. All 
aspects of safety need to be 
discussed and applied. We 
need to show more by example 
rather than discussion. We 
have plenty of room for 
improvement. 
Not really, it depends on 
the lecturer 
Whose is 
responsible in the 
maritime industry 
to work towards a 
safety culture? 
By my understanding that 
the logical sequence of such  
are: IMO – Maritime 
Administrations – Shipping 
companies - MET 
Everyone, not just employers, 
but educational institutions as 
well 
Companies, 
administrations, MET, 
everyone… the seafarer. 
What actions 
relative to 
seafarer training 
has the industry 
taken towards 
achieving a safety 
culture? 
First of all it is the 
implementation of all 
instruments where the 
elements of Quality 
Management algorithms 
exist (ISM Code, STCW…) 
as safety culture anticipates 
the reflections to 
deficiencies and projection 
of situation developments 
I can’t answer this one Create regulations, 
STCW, ISM 
Has the 
discussion on 
safety culture 
impacted on any 
course delivery in 
your institutions? 
Yes it has. Every course has 
case studies relating to 
safety that is influenced by 
the level of safety culture of 
seafarers. 
All types of delivery 
methods are used and 
assessment is by exams. 
The courses are done from 
first year step by step 
Yes, we are incorporating it 
into our labs and lecturers as 
well as our practical training 
aboard ship. 
The courses are delivered with 
general lecture, problem-based 
learning, case studies etc. 
All required outcomes are 
assessed on content 
knowledge. Safety is an add on 
that in most cases is not 
assessed. These courses are 
done primarily 1st and 3rd year. 
No courses are offered 
that are not a part of the 
STCW. There are no 
courses on leadership, 
culture, communication 
and so on. 
Do you have any 
suggestions as to 
how the industry 
could go about 
developing a 
safety culture 
To invest in MET 
To develop STCW 
mandatory provisions for 
shipping companies for 
organization of proper on-
board training. 
No response Yes, by teaching courses 
outside the STCW such 
as bridge resource 
management. And discuss 
with seafarers about 
safety onboard. 
Do you think 
teaching 
behavioural 
sciences to 
seafarers will be 
helpful 
Yes, I do, if these sciences 
are delivered by 
professionals in seafaring 
and supported by proper 
onboard trainng. 
Unsure Yes. But if those courses 
are offered nobody will 
take them. We used to 
discuss implementing  
courses outside the 
STCW in our school but 
if it is not compulsory the 
seafarers are not taking it 
as they have to pay and 
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RESPONSES QUESTIONS 
Maritime Academy 1 Maritime Academy 2 Training Centre 
they also don’t want to be 
away from work too 
of the 
ey. We don’t teach to 
regular students. 
much because 
mon
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Appendix 5 – Non-technical aspects of the STCW Code Parts A and B geared 
towards the human factor. 
 
 Human Factors CODE Part A Column 1- 
Competence 
 CODE  Part A – Column 2 – Knowledge, 
understanding and proficiency26
Corre ance 
Shaping Factors 
sponding Perform
27
Table A-II/1 –  Maintain a 
safe navigational watch, 
p.30.  
- Respond to emergencies 
p.33 
 
 
 
- Use Standard Marine 
Navigational Vocabulary as 
replaced by the IMO 
Standard Marine 
Communication Phrases 
and use English in written 
and oral form. p.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Operate life-saving 
appliances. p. 38 
Through knowledge of effective bridge 
teamwork procedures.  
 
- Precautions for the protection and safety of 
passengers in emergency situations. 
 
 
 
-  Adequate knowledge of the English 
language to enable the officer to use charts 
and other nautical publications, to understand 
meteorological information and messages 
concerning ship’s safety and operation, to 
communicate with other ships and coast 
stations and to perform the officer’s duties 
also with a multilingual crew, including the 
ability to use and understand the Standard 
Marine Navigational Vocabulary as replaced 
by the IMO Standard Marine Communication 
Phrases. 
 
 
 
- Knowledge of survival at sea techniques 
 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication, 
cultural diversity, decision 
making, situation awareness, 
health, stress, fatigue 
 
 
 
 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication, 
cultural diversity, decision 
making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication, 
cultural diversity, decision 
making, situation awareness, 
health, stress, fatigue 
 
Table A-II/2 – Establish 
watch-keeping 
arrangements and 
procedures. p.45 
 
 
- Plan and ensure safe 
loading, stowage, securing, 
care during the voyage and 
unloading of cargoes. p.51 
 
 
- Monitor and control 
compliance with legislative 
requirements and measures 
to ensure safety of life at 
sea and the protection of the 
Effective bridge teamwork procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
- Ability to explain the basic principles for 
establishing effective communications and 
improving working relationship between ship 
and terminal personnel. 
 
 
- responsibilities under international 
instruments affecting the safety of the ship, 
passengers, crew and cargo. 
 
- actions to protect and safeguard all persons 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication, 
cultural diversity, decision 
making, situation awareness, 
health, stress, fatigue 
 
communication, cultural 
diversity, decision making,  
health, stress, fatigue 
 
 
 
 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication, 
cultural diversity, decision 
making, health, stress, fatigue 
                                                 
26 Where recommendatory provisions have been given in Part B of the Code this will be listed 
accordingly. 
27 Performance Shaping Factors compiled from the literature relating to the maritime industry, 
including IMO documents. Hetherington et. al. (2006) also listed safety climate and safety culture, 
which are important but relates specifically to the organization, although it is acknowledged that the 
PSFs are also affected by safety climate and safety culture. 
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 Human Factors CODE Part A Column 1- 
Competence 
 CODE  Part A – Column 2 – Knowledge, 
understanding and proficie
Corresponding Performance 
ping Factors 27ncy26 Sha
marine environment… 
.55-56 p
 
-Organize and manage 
crew. p. 57 
on board in emergencies 
 
ue 
 
 
- A knowledge of personnel management, 
organization and training on board ship. 
 
 
 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication,
cultural diversity, decision 
making, health, stress, fatig
Table A-II/3 – Respond to 
emergencies. p.64 
 
- Precautions for the protection and safety of 
passengers in emergency situations. 
 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication, 
cultural diversity, decision 
aking, health, stress, fatigue m
Table A-II/4 – Contribute to 
ng 
Ability to understand orders and to 
tch in 
amwork, language, 
ommunication, cultural 
 
monitoring and controlli
a safe watch. p.71 
- 
communicate with the officer of the wa
matters relevant to watch-keeping duties. 
 
te
c
diversity, health, stress,
fatigue 
Table A-III/1 – mainta
safe engineering watch. 
p.76 
 
in a 
Use English in written and 
ral form. p.77 
diversity, decision 
aking, situation awareness, 
ealth, stress, fatigue 
nguage, communication 
 
 
- 
o
- Duties associated with taking over and 
accepting a watch 
 
- Routine duties undertaken during a watch 
 
 
Adequate knowledge of the English language 
to enable the officer to use engineering 
publications and to perform engineering 
uties. d
 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication, 
ultural c
m
h
 
 
la
 
Table A- III/2 – Monitor 
to ensure safety of life at 
the 
 security 
 
 
perational condition of 
 and 
 Responsibilities under international 
, 
 
 on board ships. 
 
sion 
aking, health, stress, fatigue 
and control compliance 
with legislative 
requirements and measures 
sea and the protection of 
marine environment. 
Maintain safety and
of vessel, crew and
assengers and thep
o
life-saving, fire-fighting
other safety systems. p. 91 
 
- Organize and manage 
rew. p. 91 c
–
instruments affecting the safety of the ships
assengers, crew or cargo. p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- A knowledge of personnel management, 
rganization and trainingo
 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication, 
cultural diversity, decision 
making, health, stress, fatigue
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication, 
ultural diversity, decic
m
Table A- III/3 as required under A-III/2 
 
 
Table- III/4 -Understand 
orders and be understood in 
matters relevant to 
watchkeeping duties. p.94 
- Engine watchkeeping procedures 
 
teamwork, language, 
communication, cultural 
diversity, health, stress, 
fatigue 
 
 Section A-V/2 – Crowd 
management training. p.108 
- Crowd management training 
 
leadership, teamwork, 
communication, health
 
-Safety training for 
personnel providing direct 
service to passengers in 
passenger spaces p.110 
  
 
stress, fatigue, decision-
making 
 
, 
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 Human Factors CODE Part A Column 1- 
Competence 
 CODE  Part A – Column 2 – Knowledge, 
understanding and proficiency26
Corresponding Performance 
Shaping Factors 27
 
Table A-V/2 – Crisis 
anagement and Human 
- control response to 
Control passengers and 
other personnel during 
- Establish and maintain 
Leadership skills 
stress handling  (ability to identify the 
rs of 
e ship’s emergency team. 
by 
mergency situations can affect the 
performance of individual and their ability to 
res. 
 
adership, teamwork,  
l 
al 
,  
M
Behaviour Training 
 
emergencies p. 114 
 
- 
emergency situations. p. 
115 
 
effective communication. 
p.116 
- 
- 
development of symptoms of excessive 
personal stress and those of other membe
th
 
- Understanding the stress generated 
e
act on instructions and follow procedu
 
- Human Behaviour and responses 
 
Ability to establish and maintain effective
communications 
 
le
communication, cultura
diversity, decision making,  
health, stress, fatigue 
 
 
 
 
leadership, teamwork,  
communication, cultur
diversity, decision making
health, stress, fatigue 
 
 Section A-V/3 
 
Similar requirements to Section A-V/2  
Table A-VI/1-1 survive at 
123 
 
 
Principles concerning survival 
sea in event of ship 
abandonment. p.
- 
 
CODE B: recommends elementary firs
to be part of the early stage of basic vocat
training
t aid 
ional 
 
adership, teamwork, 
nguage, communication, 
aking, health, stress, 
fatigue. 
 
le
la
cultural diversity, decision 
m
 
Table A-VI/1-4 
-Observe safe wo
practices. p. 130 
 
- Understand orders and be 
understood in relation
shipboard duties. p. 130 
 
- Contribute to effec
human relationships 
onboard ship. p. 130 
 
rking 
 to 
tive 
Ability to understand orders and to 
ommunicate with others in relation to 
hipboard duties 
Importance of maintaining good human and 
orking relationships aboard ship. 
Social responsibilities: employment 
onditions; individual rights and obligations; 
angers of drug and alcohol abuse. 
ODE B
- Importance of adhering to safe working 
practices at all times. 
- 
c
s
 
- 
w
- 
c
d
 
C : Comment on the significance of 
nd 
resence of multinational crew.  
ecommends the adoption of a common 
 safety by 
ducing error in communication. 
tigue 
communication and language bearing in mi
communication needs onboard and the 
p
 
R
language as important in promoting
re
teamwork, language, 
communication, cultural 
diversity, health, stress, 
fa
 
 
Table A-VI/2-1 –M
survivors and survival craft
anage 
 
after abandoning ship. p. 
- Apportionment of food and water in survival 
craft 
 
s, including 
ontrol of bleeding and shock. 
e, communication, 
ultural diversity, decision 
atigue 134 
 
- Management of injured person
c
 
leadership, teamwork, 
languag
c
making, health, stress, f
Table A-VI/3 – Con
fire-fighting operations 
aboard ships. p.139 
 
trol Communication and co-ordination during 
fire-fighting operations. 
 
- Management and control of injured persons 
ip, teamwork, 
nguage, communication, 
cultural diversity, decision 
making, health, stress, fatigue 
- leadersh
la
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 Human Factors CODE Part A Column 1- 
Competence 
 CODE  Part A – Column 2 – Knowledge, 
understanding and proficiency26
Corresponding Performance 
Shaping Factors 27
 
Table A-VI/4 – Apply
immediate first aid in the 
event of accident or illn
 
ess 
n board. p.142 
re to 
e sick and injured while 
ted 
o
 
- Provide medical ca
th
they remain on board 
 
Details as to training requirements presen
 
 
leadership, language, 
communication, cultural 
diversity, decision making,  
health, stress, fatigue 
Section A-VIII/2 parts 2
3-1.  
Part 
, 3,  
3. Watchkeeping at Sea 
ering watch 
 
 
 
Principles to be observed in keeping a 
Lookout 
ODE B
 
Part 3-2 Principles to be 
observed in keeping an 
engine
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
- Principles applying to watchkeeping 
generally.  
- 
navigational watch. 
- 
- Watch arrangements etc. 
 
C : Guidance regarding fitness for 
o 
hours of work or rest. Administration should 
f hours of 
ork or rest. 
 
CODE B
duty – Prevention of fatigue in relation t
consider the keeping of records o
w
 
- No Guidance on watchkeeping at sea. 
 
. Guidance on Keeping a 
ies should issue 
. Review 
etails 
72. 
, 
reness, 
ealth, stress, fatigue. 
 
 
  
navigational watch. Bridge resource 
management – compan
guidance on proper bridge procedures
use and allocation of bridge resources. D
Code B pp. 270-2
leadership, teamwork, 
language, communication
cultural diversity, decision 
making, situation awa
h
 
The Table outlines those a n-human relations as well as operational 
n fac t. In bold in Column 3 have 
erforma rature) that would impact those 
reas identified as needing huma
duties where the huma
been inserted the p
reas.  
tors that may contribute to accidents are salien
nce shaping factors (identified in the lite
a
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Appendix 6 – Problem Based Delivery Method Adapted by Dokuz Eylul 
University School of Maritime Business Management, Kaynaklar Campus in 
Turkey 
 
 
Source: Asyali, et. al. (2003). 
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Appendix 7 – Aspects of the ABC approach to developing non-technical skills ad
by Warsash Maritime Centre, Southampton Institute, UK. 
 
apted 
Antecedents 
Within the Warsash training course, the lecturer inputs are descriptions and explanations of the 
following: 
• Models of human error 
• Error chain analysis 
• Situational leadership 
• Interpersonal influence 
• Cultural awareness 
• Situational awareness 
• Effective communication 
 
These teacher led activities are antecedent to student-centred activities described under the behaviours 
section below. 
 
Behaviours 
There have been a number of training programs produced that aim to improve the higher order 
cognitive skills of the students within specific context (Woods, 1983; Wales & Nardi, 1985; Resnick, 
1987). These techniques have been adapted at Warsash to try and improve students’ social skills such 
as communication and co-operation. Some of the techniques used are: 
• Having students justify their solutions to one another; 
• Having students evaluate other students solutions; 
• Allowing students to make and correct errors; 
 
Other studies have been directed at trying to generate training techniques to improve general problem 
solving skills that would be transferable into different contexts of application (de Bono, 1985; 
Covington, 1987; Resnick, 1987. These techniques have also been adapted at Warsash to improve the 
students’ cognitive and metacognitive skills: 
 
• Considering multiple sides of an issue (lateral thinking); 
• Considering consequences; 
• Selecting goals and planning strategies; 
• Prioritizing factors involved in a situation; 
• Generating and evaluating evidence; 
• Using perceptual rather than logical thinking; 
• Extensive practice of solving problems; 
• Teaching the use of heuristic strategies; 
• Use of graphical representations to show the structure of 
problems 
Consequences 
“Debriefing is the key to the entire learning process, during which trainees’ knowledge and attitudes 
are applied, tested, analysed and synthesized.” (Ellman, 1977). 
 
A student-centred debriefing technique has been shown to be more effective because students learn 
better through self-discovery and self-analysis than by lecture. The student-centred debriefing 
technique draws upon students’ professional expertise and motivation to perform well, and it helps the 
lecturer understand the students’ performance. 
Source: Pekcan, C., Gatfield, D. & Barnett, M. (2005). 
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Appendix 8 – Maritime Resource Management (MRM) Course Contents 
 
Attitudes and Management Skills 
The human nature and its wea e he trainees learn to be aware of 
"hazardous thoughts", that ca in nd the opposite, "safe thoughts". 
The concept of Common Term o  
Cultural Awareness
kn sses are discussed. T
n duce accidents, a
in logy is introduced.
 
ultural differences and how to deal with ollowing characteristics are 
eminine-Masculine, and Short-Long Term. 
C  them. The f
used to describe cultural differences: Group-Individual, Power Distance, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, F
Communication and Briefings 
This module deals with common errors in communication, the importance of "closed
loop communication" and how you achieve a good commun
 
ication climate. Briefings 
and debriefings are mandatory in aviation and should be applied also on ships. 
Practical guidelines are given   on how to perform briefings and debriefings. 
Challenge and Response  
The importance of a Challenge and Response environment is emphasised, defined as
a "supportive environment", in which
 
 everybody feels free to question assumptions 
nd actions, and in which posi ve responses are the norm
Short Term Strategy
a ti . 
 
Short Term Strategy is a pr ic y type of task, but 
especially useful in abnorma all available 
resources is necessary. 
Authority and Assertiveness
act al method for dealing with an
l or emergency situations when use of 
 
In this module, behaviour in terms of authority and assertiveness is discussed
Reasons for and the dangers of extreme combination
. 
s of authority and assertiveness 
are analysed. 
Management Styles 
Different leadership styles are discussed and how to deal with them. The 
erformance/human relation management grid is used. p
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Workload 
The dangers of too low and too high workload are discussed and systematic ways to 
nalysis, delegation and rotation of tasks are 
addressed.  
avoid them. Methods like task a
 
State of the Ship  
The state of the ship is generated by the combination of the team members' personal 
derlying reasons for different states of mind are discussed, as 
well as the importance to detect and take action on state extremes and differences 
states of mind. The un
between the crew members. 
Human Involvement in Error 
Here, underlying causes of accidents in terms of externally and internally induced 
errors are discussed, and the importance of responding to and learning from errors.  
 
Judgment and Decision Making  
Factors affecting judgment and decision making and the process of decision making 
are addressed. The importance of detecting and avoiding hidden pressure is 
 
emphasized.  
Leadership in Emergencies
Transferring an emergency situation from the unanticipated, fast reaction type toward 
the anticipated, slow reaction type is discussed, and the necessity to apply different 
ferent emergency situations Attitudes & Management Skills.  
 
leadership styles in dif
Crisis and Crowd Management 
Together with the above modules, this module meets the STCW requirement for 
theoretical training in C&C management. It covers mental and physical reactions in a 
ith them, how to deal with a crowd and finally a 
method for personal crisis debriefing. 
crisis situation, how to deal w
Automation Awareness  
This module addresses the consequences of increased automation on ships' bridges. It 
els of automation, characteristics, advantages and dangers with 
automation and some guidelines for learning to work in automated environments.  
Source: http://www.swedishclub.com/mrm_main.php?id=50&menuid=61
discusses different lev
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Appendix 9 – Crew Resource Management 
 
aining. 
on lectures are mixed with practical discussions and 
abus, to analyse the implications of the 
theoretical knowledge. (Dahlström, 2008, personal communication). 
COURSE SYLLABUS 
As part of Multi Crew Co-operation course at Lund University School of Aviation. 
This section presents the syllabus for 15 out of the total 25 hours of theoretical 
tr
 
Syllabus below is presented in a form equivalent to that of the teaching sessions. 
Each session is one or two hours and the course ends with a summary and a course 
evaluation. During the sessi
cases, some of them mentioned in the syll
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
• Presentation of course contents and 
Conclusions through cases and 
discussions 
e key in every 
us 
Airways 
dent 
COCKPIT MANAGEMENT 
• Situational awareness revisited 
o Benefits and problems 
• Group dynamics 
o Theories of group dynamics 
o Group think and risky shift 
• Communication 
o Verbal and non-verbal 
o
o Escalation of conflict 
o Conflict resolution 
learning objectives 
o Presenting the questions and 
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